-
1
-
-
53349154333
-
-
This point is due to James Tomberlin
-
This point is due to James Tomberlin.
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
53349133655
-
-
note
-
In his note Lycan argues that on my own account intuition might not be a basic source of evidence. He asks us to consider someone with unreliable intuitions regarding the syntax and semantics of an imperfectly learned second language. The example does not succeed, for it is not addressed against the deliverances of a natural prepositional attitude (i.e., intuition); rather it is addressed against a small proper subclass of the deliverances of a natural prepositional attitude (i.e., a certain proper subclass of someone's intuitions). Of course, specific intuitions and specific subclasses of intuitions can lose their evidential authority; what I deny is that intuition generally could cease to be evidential. Another fault in Lycan's argument is that he does not distinguish between possessing concepts determinately and possessing them but only indeterminately. If one determinately possesses the concepts relevant to the syntax and semantics of a second language, one's intuitions involving those concepts would be by and large reliable. The same thing holds for phenomenal experience. If one determinately possesses concepts relevant to it, one's reports of it would be by and large reliable. But if one does not possess those concepts determinately, one's reports of one's phenomenal experience may always be challenged in the manner of J. L. Austin: "Are you sure it was magenta, not vermilion? Perhaps you are unsure of the difference." This phenomenon does not show that phenomenal experience is not basic; so also for intuition.
-
-
-
-
3
-
-
53349158110
-
-
Early in his paper, Lycan mentions (but does not endorse) Harman's view that genuine factual beliefs be causally explainable by the putative fact that would make the belief true. This requirement is far too strong. Nonetheless, a weaker version of this requirement is validated by this theory of concept possession: very roughly (even this is too strong), the putative fact that P plays a role in the explanation of the intuition that P. This point is addressed in note 8 of my paper
-
Early in his paper, Lycan mentions (but does not endorse) Harman's view that genuine factual beliefs be causally explainable by the putative fact that would make the belief true. This requirement is far too strong. Nonetheless, a weaker version of this requirement is validated by this theory of concept possession: very roughly (even this is too strong), the putative fact that P plays a role in the explanation of the intuition that P. This point is addressed in note 8 of my paper.
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
53349094881
-
-
Note that this case does not meet the conditions for a candidate counterexample, for the qualitative epistemic situation of our language group - i.e., our whole language group - is not replicated on the twin earth; only that of a tiny fraction is replicated
-
Note that this case does not meet the conditions for a candidate counterexample, for the qualitative epistemic situation of our language group - i.e., our whole language group - is not replicated on the twin earth; only that of a tiny fraction is replicated.
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
53349106834
-
-
In response to this counterexample it would do no good to adjoin to the analysis the requirement that the subject be introspectively aware of the inclination, for in our counterexample the subject could well be introspectively aware of his inclinations to believe that gold has atomic number 79, etc. But as before the subject could not have a priori intuitions of these things
-
In response to this counterexample it would do no good to adjoin to the analysis the requirement that the subject be introspectively aware of the inclination, for in our counterexample the subject could well be introspectively aware of his inclinations to believe that gold has atomic number 79, etc. But as before the subject could not have a priori intuitions of these things.
-
-
-
-
6
-
-
53349110399
-
-
For the sort of theorizers who are able to engage in end-game self-approving theorizing, these cognitive conditions would perhaps need to be even higher, and so in turn the class of relevantly elementary propositions would be larger. Of course, what counts as "elementary" and "approximate" is vague. Although the lines are fuzzy, the larger point is clear enough
-
For the sort of theorizers who are able to engage in end-game self-approving theorizing, these cognitive conditions would perhaps need to be even higher, and so in turn the class of relevantly elementary propositions would be larger. Of course, what counts as "elementary" and "approximate" is vague. Although the lines are fuzzy, the larger point is clear enough.
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
53349085584
-
-
note
-
Notice that the above account is itself context-free in the sense just isolated: regardless of context anyone capable of real theorizing would feel its intuitive pull. Incidentally, I provisionally defined one's nonbasic sources of evidence to be those deemed reliable by one's best theory based on one's basic sources. There is an alternative approach. Just now in the text, when I tried to explain the role basic sources play, I reasoned thus: if there were an evil demon, I could have no success in my quest for the truth, so I might as well suppose that there is no such demon; that way I maximize my chances for succeeding in my quest. Perhaps this style of reasoning could be applied a series of times, once for each kind of relative basicness. First, for completely basic sources, where the only sort of threat would be an evil demon (or something on a par with one). Second, for observation, where besides evil demons there is a threat from bad observation conditions. Third, for testimony, where besides demons and bad observation conditions, there is a threat from liars. And so forth.
-
-
-
|
