U.N. sanctions against individuals - A challenge to the architecture of European Union Governance

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 567-600

  Nettesheim, Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

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EID: 36549013767     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (183)

1. Judicial protection is granted to the staff members of the United Nations against their employer (see GA resolution 351A (IV), 9 Dec. 1949, approved by the ICJ: Effect of awards of compensation made by the UN Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion of 13 July 1954, ICJ Reports 1954, p. 47, at 57).
2. See ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p, 16, at 53 para 115.
3. See e.g. Franck, "The 'Power of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" 86 AJIL (1992), 519;
4. Brownlie, "The Decision of Political Organs of the UN and the Rule of Law", in Macdonald (Ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (1994), p. 95;
5. Gill, "Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter", (1995) NYIL, 68;
6. Akande, "The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations", 46 ICLQ (1997), 341;
7. Judge Schwebel, Dissenting Opinion in the Lockerbie case (Jurisdiction), ICJ Reports 1998, p. 167;
8. Lamb, "Legal Limits to the United Nations Security Council Powers", in Goodwin-Gil et al. (Eds.), The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (1999), p. 366;
9. Oosthuizen, "Playing the Devil's Advocate: The United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law", 12 LJIL (1999), 551;
10. Gowlland-Debbas, "The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System", in Byers (Ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics, Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford, 2000), p. 303;
11. Nolte, "The Limits of the Security Council's Powers and its Functions in the International Legal System: Some Reflections", in Byers (Ed.) op. cit. p. 316;
12. Cot, "Politics and law in International Adjudication", ASIL Proceedings 97 (2003), 286;
13. Payandeh, "Rechtskontrolle des UN-Sicherheitsrates durch staatliche und überstaatliche Gerichte", 6 ZaöRV (2006), 41.
14. On several occasions, UN members were convinced that their statutory rights had been encroached upon; see General Assembly (GA) resolution 3206 (XXIX), 30 Sept. 1974, and decision of the President of the General Assembly, Buteflika, 12 Nov. 1974 (with regard to South Africa);
15. GA resolution 3376 (XXX), 10 Nov. 1975 (with regard to Israel);
16. Security Council resolution 687 (1991), 3 April 1991 (with regard to Iraq). An advisory procedure was never initiated.
17. Cameron, "The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions", Report for the Council of Europe, 2006;
18. Tietje and Hamelmann, "Gezielte Finanzsanktionen der Vereinten Nationen im Spannungsfeld zum Gemeinschaftsrecht und zu Menschenrechten", (2006) JuS, 299;
19. Schaller, "Die Richtigen treffen", (2005) Vereinte Nationen, 132;
20. Wallensteen and Staibano, International Sanctions. Between Words and Wars in the Global System (Routledge, 2005);
21. Gutherie, "Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of the Individual Rights", NYU Annual Survey of American Law 60 (2004), 491;
22. Schilling, "Der Schutz der Menschenrechte gegen Beschlüsse des Sicherheitsrats", 64 ZaöRV (2004), 343;
23. Albin, "Rechtsschutzlücken bei der Terrorbekämpfung im Völkerrecht", (2004) ZRP, 71;
24. di Brozolo and Megliani, "Freezing the Assets of International Terrorist Organisations", in Bianchi (Ed.), Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism (Hart, 2004), p. 377;
25. Dörr, "Gewalt und Gewaltverbot im modernen Vö lkerrecht", (2004) APuZ, 14;
26. Cameron, "UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the ECHR", 72 NJIL (2003), 159;
27. Biehler, "Individuelle Sanktionen der Vereinten Nationen und Grundrechte", (2003) Arch. VR, 167;
28. Cramer, "Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted U.N. Sanctions: The Erosion of Trust in the Security Council", in De Wet and Nollkaemper (Eds.), Review of the Security Council by Member States (Intersentia, 2003), p. 88;
29. Krajewski, "Selbstverteidigung gegen bewaffnete Angriffe nicht-staatlicher Organisationen", 40 Arch. VR (2002), 190;
30. Ruffert, "Terrorismusbekämpfung zwischen Selbstverteidigung und kollektiver Sicherheit", (2002) Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik, 247.
31. See World Summit Outcome document, UN Doc. A/Res/60/1 (2005), para 109;
32. Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, para 152.
33. See UN Security Council Resolution 1617/2005, para 4.
34. Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II-3533.
35. Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II-3649.
36. See e.g. Tomuschat, Case note, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 537, at 543 et seq.;
37. Hörmann, "Völkerrecht bricht Rechtsgemeinschaftsrecht? Zu den rechtlichen Folgen einer Umsetzung von Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrats durch die EG", in 44 Arch. VR (2006), 267;
38. von Arnauld, "UN-Sanktionen und gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Grundrechtsschutz", 44 Arch. VR (2006), 201;
39. Steinbarth, "Individualrechtsschutz gegen Maßnahmen der EG zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus", (2006) ZEuS, 269;
40. Schmalenbach, "Normentheorie vs. Terrorismus: Der Vorrang des UN-Rechts vor EU-Recht", (2006) JZ, 349;
41. Kotzur, "Eine Bewährungsprobe für die Europäische Grundrechtsgemeinschaft", (2006) EuGRZ, 19;
42. Schmahl, "Effektiver Rechtsschutz gegen "targeted sanctions" des UN-Sicherheitsrats?" (2006) EuR, 566;
43. Möllers, "Das EuG konstitutionalisiert die Vereinten Nationen", (2006) EuR, 426;
44. Harings, "Die EG als Rechtsgemeinschaft (?) - EuG versagt Individualrechtsschutz", (2005) EuZW, 705;
45. Bartelt and Zeitler, "'Intelligente Sanktionen' zur Terrorismusbekämpfung in der EU", (2003) EuZW, 712.
46. See, e.g. Möllers, "European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept", 43 CML Rev. (2006), 313;
47. Wind and Weiler, European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge, 2003).
48. See Brandl, "Die Umsetzung von Sanktionsresolutionen des Sicherheitsrates in der EU", 38 Arch. VR (2000), 376;
49. with regard to sanctions in general, see Osteneck, Die Umsetzung von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionen durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft (Springer, 2004);
50. Ress, Das Handelsembargo (Springer, 2000);
51. Garcon, Handelsembargen der Europäischen Union auf dem Gebiet des Warenverkehrs gegenüber Drittländern (Nomos, 1997);
52. Bohr, "Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the European Community", 4 EJIL (1993), 256;
53. Klein, "Sanctions by International Organizations and Economic Communities", 117 Arch. VR (1992), 101;
54. Lauwaars, "The Interrelationship between United Nations Law and the Law of Other International Organizations", in Festschrift Eric Stein (1987) p. 466;
55. Klein, "Zulässigkeit von Wirtschaftssanktionen der EG gegen ihre Mitgliedstaaten", 31 RIW (1985), 291;
56. Verhoeven, "Sanctions internationales et Communautés Européennes", 19 CDE (1984), 259;
57. Petersmann, "Internationale Wirtschaftssanktionen als Problem des Völkerrechts und des Europarechts", 80 ZVglRWiss (1981), 1;
58. Maier, "Zur Kompetenz der EG-Mitgliedstaaten zur Durchführung von Sanktionsbeschlüssen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen", 25 RIW (1979), 247.
59. See e.g. Canor, "Can Two Walk Together, Except they be Agreed? The Relationship Between International Law and European Law: The Incorporation of United Nations Sanctions Against Yugoslavia into the European Community Law Through the Perspective of the European Court", 35 CML Rev. (1998), 137;
60. Neuwahl, book review of Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy & Defence in EU Constitutional Law- the Legal Regulation of Sanctions, 39 CML Rev., 424;
61. see also Bronckers, "The relationship of the EC courts with other international tribunals; Noncommittal, respectful or submissive?" in this Review, pp. 601-627.
62. nd ed. (2004);
63. Winn and Lord, EU foreign policy beyond the nation state: Joint actions and institutional analysis of the Common Foreign And Security Policy (Palgrave, 2001).
64. Regulation No. 2580/2001 empowers the Council to amend the list of persons to whom sanctions apply. The Council decides unanimously on the basis of "precise information or material which indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent authority". Affected persons are not notified of the evidence or reasons that led to their inclusion in the list.
65. Of course, questions about the interpretation of the EU implementation measures also came up (see, e.g. Case C-117/06, reference from the Kammergericht Berlin of 21 Feb. 2006, Gerda and Christiane Möllendorf (concerns Salem-Abdul Ghani El-Rafei, Dr Kamal Rafehi and Ageel A. Al-Ageel), pending;
66. Case T-318/01, AJ, Order of the President of the Second Chamber of the CFI of 27 Oct. 2006, nyr.
67. Yusuf, cited supra note 8.
68. Kadi, cited supra note 9. The appeal against the CFI decision was later removed from the ECJ register.
69. Other cases are still pending: see Case T-253/04, Zubeyir Aydar on behalf of Kongra-Gel and 10 others, filed on 25 June 2004;
70. Cases T-135-138/2006, Al-Bashir Mohammed Al-Faqih; Sanabel Relief Agency Ltd; Ghunia Abdrabba; Taher Nasuf, filed on 5 May 2006.
71. However, the European Courts had to deal with the question of standing in other cases, see Case T-229/02, PKK and KNK v. Council, [2005] ECR II-539;
72. Case C-229/05 P, PKK and KNK v. Council, judgment of 18 Jan. 2007, nyr.
73. See Kadelbach, "Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and other Rules - The Identification of Fundamental Norms", in Tomuschat and Thouvenin (Eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order. Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (Brill, 2006), p. 21;
74. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge, 2005).
75. In public international law doctrine, broad agreement exists as to the binding nature of ius cogens for the Security Council; see, e.g. Elihu Lauterpacht to ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, p. 407, at 440 para 100;
76. Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et controle de la lé galité des actes du Conseil de Sécurité (Brussels, 1994), p. 46;
77. Tomuschat, "Peace Enforcement and Law Enforcement - Two Separate Chapters of Intemational Law?", in Studi di diritto internazionale in onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (Naples, 2004), Vol. Ill, p. 1745, at 1767.
78. Case T-253/02, Chakif Ayadi, judgment of 12 July 2006, nyr. Reiteration of this position in: Case, T-362/04, Leonid Minin, judgment of 31 Jan. 2007, paras. 91-104.
79. See, e.g. Case, C-50/00 P, UPA v. Council, [2002] ECR I-6677. In UPA, the ECJ overruled the CFI in Jégo- Quéré v. Commission, expressing its unwillingness to reinterpret the condition of individual concern under Art. 230(4) EC. See Nettesheim, "Effektive Rechtsschutzgewährleistung im arbeitsteiligen System europäischen Rechtsschutzes", (2002) JZ, 928
80. With regard to the role of the Member States in the listing procedure: Guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work, adopted on 7 Nov. 2002, last amended on 29 Nov. 2006, section 8, available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/ committees/1267/1267-guidelines.pdf.; see Gutherie (op. cit. supra note 5), p. 491 at 513.
81. Appeal lodged 1 Dec. 2005, case C-415/05 P.
82. Appeal lodged 27 Sept. 2006, case C-403/06 P.
83. Appeal lodged 24 Nov. 2005, case C-402/05 P. It is to be assumed that the applicant was removed from the list.
84. Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple d'Iran, judgment of 12 Dec. 2006, nyr. According to the Court, the Council enjoyed broad discretion in its decision to amend or update the list. Further, it conceded that justifications exist for a limitation of the right to a hearing. However, the lack of information rendered the Court incapable of reviewing the lawfulness of the decision. Consequently, the decision was annulled.
85. Order of 7 June 2004 in Case T-333/02, Gestoras Pro Amnistía association, Juan Mari Olano Olano and Julen Zelarain Errasti, un published.
86. Order in Case T-338/02, SEGI association, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga and Aritza Galarraga,[2004] ECR II-1647;
87. confirmed by: Order in Case T-299/04, Selmani, II-20*.
88. Common Position 2002/340/GASP, 2.5.2002, O.J. 2002, L 116/75.
89. Common Position 2002/462/GASP, 17.06.2002, O.J. 2002, L 160/32.
90. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, of 26 Oct. 2006, in Gestoras Pro Amnistía, Case C-354/04 P, and Segi, Case C-355/04 P, at para 57.
91. Common Position 2001/931 is based both on Art. 15 TEU (Title V TEU) and Art. 34 TEU (Title VI TEU).
92. Order of 7 June 2004 in Case T-333/02, Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v. Council, unpublished;
93. Case T-338/02, Segi et al. v. Council, [2004] ECR II-1647.
94. Segi, supra note 36, paras. 34-37.
95. Segi, supra note 36, paras. 32 and 33
96. Segi, supra note 36, para 39. According to the Council declaration of 18 Dec. 2001 annexed to the minutes at the time of the adoption of Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation No 2580/2001: "The Council recalls regarding Article 1(6) of Common Position [2001/931] that in the event of any error in respect of the persons, groups or entities referred to, the injured party shall have the right to seek judicial redress."
97. Segi, supra note 36, para. 38.
98. With regard to the relationship of competence and standing: Segi, supra note 36, para 42.
99. This view was confirmed in: Organisation des Modjahedine du Peuple d'Iran, cited supra note 29, paras. 45-60.
100. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, cited supra note 34, para 75.
101. A.G. Mengozzi, cited supra note 34, para 85.
102. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost, [1987] ECR 4199 (it has been the constant position of ECJ jurisprudence since this decision that the power to annul EC acts is only given to the European Courts; the ECJ and CFI have exclusive competence to declare EC acts invalid).
103. Case C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistía et. al. judgment of 27 Feb. 2007, nyr.
104. Ibid. paras. 44-48.
105. Ibid. paras. 58-62.
106. Ibid. paras. 49-57.
107. Klaus Guenther characterizes this model as follows: "Most academic as well as political debates about the law are still directed to the concept of a national legal order with a centralised and public legislation, with a legally bound executive power that is responsible to the sovereign people, and with a relatively autonomous judiciary that is committed to a coherent adjudication of a legitimate legal system." See Guenther, Legal Pluralism and the Universal Code of Legality: Globalisation as a Problem of Legal Theory, 2003, p. 1. (www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2003/readings/gunther.pdf).
108. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, (2004) NJW, S. 3407 (Görgulü);
109. Conseil d'Etat, Rec. Lebon 1989, p. 190 (Nicolo);
110. th ed. (2003), p. 41 et seq.
111. Kirchhof, "Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen Integration", in Isensee and Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts Band VII, 1992, § 183, Rn. 65;
112. Kirchhof, "Das Kooperationsverhältnis zwischen Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischem Gerichtshof", in Müller-Graff (Ed.), Perspektiven des Rechts der Europäischen Union (Heidelberger Forum, Bd. 104), 1998, p. 163 at 170 et. seq.
113. See Guenther, op. cit. supra note 50, p. 3: "Political legislation by general and coherently ordered legal norms and a legal adjudication based on the coherent interpretation of legal norms and precedents which all belong to one legal system seems to be more and more replaced by fragmented areas of self-regulation, practised by norm giving actors who have empowered themselves and who enact norms with different degrees of generality and scope."
114. Case 181/73, Haegemann, [1974] ECR 449;
115. see also Case 104/81, Kupferberg, [1982] ECR 3641;
116. Opinion 1/94, WTO, [1994] ECR I-5267.
117. Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, [1999] ECR I-8395;
118. Case C-94/02 P, Biret et Cie v. Council, [2003] ECR I-10565.
119. Interestingly, the CFI, in Yusuf, speaks of "the domestic or Community legal order" (para 181). This seems to imply that vis-à-vis the UN system, the EU system constitutes nothing other than a separate (or "domestic") regime, the relationship of which to the UN system is governed by the rules regulating the relationship between international law and national law.
120. There is no doubt that the Member States of the UN are bound to implement UN Security Council regulations: ICJ, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p, 3, at 15 para 39;
121. see also: Bemhardt, Comments on Art, 103, in Simma et al. (Eds,), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, vol, II, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2002), p. 1292, at 1295 para 9;
122. Thouvenin, Comments on Article 103, in Cot, Pellet and Forteau (Eds,), La Charte des Nations Unies. Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed. (Paris, 2005), p, 2133, at 2146.
123. In EU legal doctrine, such an automatic transfer of duties is postulated by the so called "Hypothekendoktrin" (see Pescatore, L'Ordre juridique des Communautés Européennes, 2nd ed. (1973), p. 147;
124. Pescatore, "External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities", 16 CML Rev. (1979), 615 at 637.
125. See in general Wolfrum, "Means of Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement of International Environmental Law", 272 RdC (1998), 9.
126. See Kadelbach, Zwingendes Völkerrecht (1992), p. 30;
127. Tomuschat, "Völkerrechtlicher Vertrag und Drittstaaten", in Tomuschat, Neuhold and Kropholler (Eds.), Völkerrechtlicher Vertrag und Drittstaaten (BDGV, 1988), p. 9 at 18;
128. Klein, "Sanctions by International Organizations and Economic Communities", (1992) Arch. VR, 101 at 107;
129. for a different opinion, Faßbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto, A Constitutional Perspective (Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 133;
130. H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951, p. 109.
131. See Hörmann, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 277-280.
132. Kadi, cited supra note 9, para 193.
133. Joined Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company, [1972] ECR 1219.
134. See Biehler, "Individuelle Sanktionen der Vereinten Nationen und Grundrechte", 41 Arch. VR (2003), 169 at 173.
135. See, for a different view, Tomuschat, Case note, op. cit. supra note 10 at 542 ("Thus, in sum, the inference can be drawn that the EC Treaty yields to the UN Charter, not wishing to abrogate the latter's stipulations. In this regard, too, the exposition of the Court does not show any weaknesses").
136. This change in perspective is apparent even if one takes the position that public international law norms of jus cogens are also binding upon the European Union. Such norms do not constitute "autonomous" law of the EU; instead, they are based on an external source.
137. It is obvious that the CFI did not apply its approach stringently: "In fact the reviewed judgments show that the Court did not confine its assessment to jus cogens proper, but resorted to applying to their full extent the standards evolved in the practice of the Communities judicial bodies" (Tomuschat, op. cit. supra note 10, at 551. This, however, does not put into question the innovative and - ultimately - problematic conceptual approach adopted by the ECJ.
138. Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, [1996] ECR 1-3953.
139. The case was situated within the area of the Common commercial policy of the EU. It dealt with embargo measures against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the basis of regulation No 990/93. At issue was the impounding of an aircraft owned by an undertaking based in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and leased to an undertaking from another non-member country.
140. For a critique: Canor, op. cit. supra note 13 at 161 et. seq.
141. Case T-184/95, Dorsch Consult, [1998] ECR II-667;
142. Case C-237/98 P, Dorsch Consult, [2000] ECR 1-4549.
143. The applicant, Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH, concluded, in 1975, with the Ministry of Works and Housing of the Republic of Iraq a contract for services relating to the organization and supervision of works on the construction of a motorway. After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Council, referring to United Nations Security Council Resolution No 661 (1990), adopted Council Regulation (EEC) No 2340/90 of 8 Aug. 1990 preventing trade by the Community as regards Iraq and Kuwait (OJ 1990 L 213, p. 1). In response, on 16 Sept. 1990, the Higher Revolutionary Council of the Republic of Iraq adopted with retroactive effect from 6 Aug. 1990 Law No 57 on "protection of Iraqi property, interests and rights in Iraq and elsewhere", effectively seizing the property of the applicant. The firm then lodged an application claiming damages from the EC.
144. See Schmahl, op. cit. supra note 10 at 567: "Allerdings sind Organe internationaler Organisationen ⋯ prinzipiell nicht dazu ermächtigt, in den Mitgliedstaaten unmittelbar wirksames Recht zu setzen."
145. Kirgis, "The Security Council's First Fifty Years", 89 AJIL (1995), 506 at 524;
146. rd ed. (1994), § 867;
147. Partsch, "International Law in Municipal Law: Law and Decisions of International Organizations and Courts", in: Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. 2 (1995), p. 1228.
148. See Paulus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht (2001), p. 309;
149. Hörmann, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 274-277.
150. In international law discourse, some scholar take the position that each UN Member State is free to determine whether the decisions of the Security Council are in compatibility with its obligations (see e.g. De Wet and Nollkaemper, "Review of Security Council Decisions by National Courts", 45 GYIL (2002), 166 at 181;
151. Rösgen, Rechtsetzungsakte der Vereinten Nationen und ihrer Sonderorganisationen (1985), p. 157;
152. Herbst, Rechtskontrolle des UNSicherheitsrates (1999), p. 295 et. seq.;
153. the general consensus, however, assumes that the power of assessment lies solely with the Security Council itself (see Lorinser, Bindende Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates (1996), p. 34, 99;
154. Watson, "Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court", 34 Harvard ILJ (1993), 1 at 39;
155. Herdegen, "The 'Constitutionalization' of the UN Security System", 27 Vanderbilt J. Trans. L. (1994), 135 at 154.
156. Von Arnauld, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 201.
157. See Rittberger and Nettesheim (Eds.), Changing Patterns of the Global Political Economy, forthcoming 2007.
158. In the case of the European members of the Security Council, the solution of the Court creates yet further dilemmas.
159. See Schmalenbach, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 352 ("Unterordnung").
160. Möllers, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 428 ("Das CFI nimmt eine gerichtliche Zuständigkeit an, die es letztlich jedem nationalen und regionalen Gericht auf der Welt gestatten würde, Entscheidungen der Vereinten Nationen und anderer internationaler Organisationen auf einen Verstoß gegen jus cogens zu überprüfen.").
161. ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari v. Ireland, EHRR 42 (2006), p. 1;
162. see Douglas-Scott, "A Tale Of Two Courts: Luxemburg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis", 43 CML Rev. (2006), 629;
163. Schreck, "The Relationship between European Courts and Integration through Human Rights", 65 ZaöRV (2005), 837. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly noted that notwithstanding the transfer of competences to an international organization, parties to the ECHR remain responsible for ensuring the protection of Convention rights; see e.g. Matthews v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 24833/94. A general overview is given by Weiler and Alston (Eds.) The EU and Human Rights (OUP, 1999).
164. Similar principles are necessary to order the relationship of EU law and national law; see e.g. Kumm, "The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty", 11 ELJ (2005), 262;
165. Schilling, "The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Some Supplementations to Mattias Kumm", 12 ELJ (2006), 173.
166. Currently, the relevant Common Position stipulates that "the names of persons and entities on the list in the Annex shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least once every six months to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them on the list." (Art. 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CSFP);
167. it "shall be kept under constant review" (Art. 6 of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP).
168. See also Art. 2(3) of Regulation 2580/2001/EC.
169. The question of whether individuals can claim access to documents was decided in: Case T-405/03, Sison, judgment of 26 April 2006, nyr, application dismissed; at the ECJ, Case C-266/05 P, Sison, judgment of 1 Feb. 2007, nyr, appeal dismissed
170. In its decision in Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple d'Iran, cited supra note 29, the CFI took a different approach; it stressed the importance to give reasons.
171. See, e.g. Curtin, "The Constitutional Structure of the Union: a Europe of Bits and Pieces", 30 CML Rev. (1993), 17;
172. von Bogdandy and Nettesheim, "Die Europäische Union: Ein einheitlicher Verband mit eigener Rechtsordnung", (1996) EuR, 1.
173. The Treaty on a Constitution for Europe would close these loopholes; see Arts. III-365;
174. III-370 and III-431(2).
175. Case C-105/03, Maria Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285;
176. in this decision, the ECJ had to determine the effects of Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA within the legal orders of the Member States. The Framework Decision aims at the protection of victims of crimes - particularly those most vulnerable - in criminal proceedings. To protect them from the effects of giving evidence in open court, these victims may, by decision taken by the court, be entitled to testify in a different manner. Italian criminal procedural law did not provide for such possibilities. The ECJ sees an obligation vested in the national courts to interpret the national law in accordance with framework decisions. At the same time, Member State courts have to ensure that this interpretation does not run afoul of fundamental rights.
177. See Gestoras Pro Amnistía (supra note 46), para 56.
178. See note 24 supra.
179. See Case C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285, para 42.
180. See e.g. Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London 1978);
181. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense - Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition, 1995;
182. Teubner, "Des Königs viele Leiber: Die Selbstdekonstruktion der Hierarchie des Rechts", in Brunkhorst et al. (Eds.), Globalisierung und Demokratie (Frankfurt, 2000), p. 240;
183. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Northwestern University Press, 2001.