Greedy cheating liars and the fools who believe them

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4335 LNAI, Issue , 2007, Pages 161-175

  Arteconi, Stefano ^a   Hales, David ^a   Babaoglu, Ozalp ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS; OPTIMIZATION; ROBUSTNESS (CONTROL SYSTEMS);

NIHILIST NODES; PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS; REASONABLE LEVELS;

WIRELESS NETWORKS;

EID: 36348978536     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-69868-5_11     Document Type: Conference Paper

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