An agent-based model of tax compliance with social networks

National Tax Journal

Volumn 60, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 589-610

  Korobow, Adam ^a   Johnson, Chris ^a   Axtell, Robert ^b  

^a LMI   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36348939982     PISSN: 00280283     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2007.3.16     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (18)

1. Allingham, Michael, and Agnar Sandmo. "Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis." Journal of Public Economics 1 No. 3-4 (1972): 323-38.
2. Alm, James, and Michael McKee. "Extending the Lessons of Laboratory Experiments on Tax Compliance to Managerial and Decision Economics." Managerial and Decision Economics 19 No. 4/5 (June-August, 1998): 259-75.
3. Alm, James, Gary H. McClelland, and William D. Schulze. "Why Do People Pay Taxes?" Journal of Public Economics 48 No. 1 (June, 1992): 21-38.
4. Alm, James. "A Perspective on the Experimental Analysis of Taxpayer Reporting." Accounting Review 66 No. 3 July, 1991): 577-93.
5. Axtell, Robert L. "Why Agents? On the Varied Motivations For Agent Computing in the Social Sciences." Center on Social and Economic Dynamics Working Paper No. 27. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, November 2000.
6. Becker, Gary S. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Journal of Political Economy 76 No. 2 (March, 1968): 169-217.
7. Bloomquist, Kim M. "A Comparison of Agent-Based Models of Income Tax Evasion." Social Science Computer Review 24 No. 4 (Winter, 2006): 411-25.
8. Bloomquist, Kim M. "Multi-Agent Based Simulation of the Deterrent Effects of Taxpayer Audits." Paper presented at the 97th Annual Conference of the National Tax Association, Minneapolis, MN, November, 2004.
9. Bonabeau, Eric. "Agent-Based Modeling: Methods and Techniques for Simulating Human Systems." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 No. 10, Supplement 3: Sackler Colloquium on Adaptive Agents, Intelligence, and Emergent Human Organization: Capturing Complexity through Agent-Based Modeling (May, 2002): 7280-87.
10. Davis, Jon S., Gary Hecht, and Jon D. Perkins. "Social Behaviors, Enforcement and Tax Compliance Dynamics." Accounting Review 78 No. 1 (January, 2003): 39-69.
11. Erard, Brian, and Chih-Chin Ho. "Searching for Ghosts: Who Are the Non-Filers and How Much Tax Do They Owe?" Journal of Public Economics 81 No. 1 (July, 2001): 25-50.
12. Erard, Brian, and Jonathan Feinstein. "Honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game." Rand Journal of Economics 25 No. 1 (1994): 1-19.
13. Feld, Lars P., and Bruno S. Frey. "Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation." Law & Policy 29 No. 1 (January, 2007): 102-20.
14. Glaeser, Edward L., Bruce Sacerdote, and Jose A. Scheinkman. "Crime and Social Interactions." Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 No. 2 (May, 1996): 507-48.
15. Mittone, Luigi, and Paolo Patelli. "Imitative Behaviour in Tax Evasion." In Economic Simulations in Swarm: Agent-Based Modelling and Object Oriented Programming, edited by Benedikt Stefansson and Francesco Luna, 133-58. Amsterdam: Kluwer, 2000.
16. Myles, Gareth D., and Robin A. Naylor. "A Model of Tax Evasion with Group Conformity and Social Customs." European Journal of Political Economy 12 No. 1 (April, 1996): 49-66.
17. Traxler, Christian. "Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers." Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 2006-28. Munich: University of Munich, 2006.
18. Wenzel, Michael. "Misperceptions of Social Norms about Tax Compliance: From Theory to Intervention." Journal of Economic Psychology 26 No. 6 (December, 2005): 862-83.