Collateral, credit history, and the financial decelerator

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 63-88

  Elul, Ronel ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Collateral; Credit history; Default; Financial accelerator

Indexed keywords

EID: 36248988532     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: 10960473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2007.07.001     Document Type: Article

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