Armed Islamist movements and political violence in Algeria

Middle East Journal

Volumn 54, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 572-591

  Hafez, Mohammed M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034259006     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (139)

1. I am grateful to Camille al-Tawil and the archive staff of the Al-Hayat newspaper in London for providing me with communiqués and other material issued by armed Islamist groups in Algeria.
2. In May 1991, the FIS called a general strike to protest new electoral laws that were clearly intended to benefit the ruling party, the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN). The strike, which extended to early June, resulted in a series of clashes and escalations between the movement and security forces, and culminated in the arrest of the two principal leaders of the FIS, 'Abbasi Madani and 'Ali Belhaj.
3. Takfir wa'l-Hijra, a title also used for a movement in Egypt, is traditionally difficult to translate accurately. Takfir in this sense means "declaring someone to be an unbeliever", while hijra, as used here, means withdrawal from the secular world.
4. In this article Algerian personal names are spelled as the individuals themselves prefer to spell them, while Arabic titles and terms follow the Middle East Journal's standard Arabic transliteration system. - Ed.
5. In 1987, security forces effectively repressed the Bouyali Group after it killed Mustapha Bouyali in an ambush. Abdelkader Chebouti and Mansouri Meliani were sentenced to death in 1987, but they were given amnesty in 1990.
6. They often carried signs that read "down with democracy" (tasqut al-dimuqratiyya) and chanted "no covenant and no constitution, said God and said the Prophet" (la mithaq wa la dustur, qal Allah wa qal al-Rasul). See Haydar Ibrahim 'Ali, Al-Tayarat al-Islamiyya wa Qadiyat at-Dimuqratiyya (The Islamic Currents and the Democratic Debate), (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-Arabiyya, 1996), p. 274.
7. Camille al-Tawil [Kamil al-Tawil], Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Musalaha fi al-Jaza'ir: min al-Inqadh ila al-Jama'a (The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria: From the FIS to the GIA), (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998), pp. 59-62.
8. This information is derived from the 62-page pamphlet by Jamal Zitouni (Abu 'Abdelrahman Amin), the fifth amir of the GIA, entitled Hidayat Rabb al-'Alamin fi Tabyin Usul al-Salafiyin wa ma Yajib min al-'Ahd 'ala al-Mujahidin (The Guidance of the Lord of the Universe in Clarifying the Traditions of the Salafis and the Requirements of Allegiance among the Holy Fighters) (No Place Listed: dated 27 Rabi'a al-Thani, 1416 [1995],) pp. 13-16.
9. Approximately 60 Islamists attacked a border post near the Tunisian border, killing three policemen.
10. Ben Hajjar, the commander of the Rabita al-Islamiyya li al-Da'wa wa al-Jihad (The Islamic League for Propagation and Holy Struggle, LIDD), maintained in an interview with Al-Hayat (5 February 2000, p. 8) that those who opposed the electoral option were few prior to 1992. However, when the FIS was "hit twice" (June 1991 and January 1992), these extremists were the only leaders left to guide the movement.
11. There is disagreement among writers on the subject as to whether Chebouti led the MIA or the MEI in 1992-1993. However, published interviews with Algerian Islamists refer to Chebouti's group as the Islamic State Movement. See al-Tawil, Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya, pp. 59-62 and 107-108. But Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History, (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1996) never mentions the MEI, while Luis Martinez, La Guerre civile en Algérie (The Civil War in Algeria) (Paris: Karthala, 1998), p. 116, says the MEI was formed by Said Mekhloufi in 1993.
12. There is disagreement among writers on the subject as to whether Chebouti led the MIA or the MEI in 1992-1993. However, published interviews with Algerian Islamists refer to Chebouti's group as the Islamic State Movement. See al-Tawil, Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya, pp. 59-62 and 107-108. But Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History, (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1996) never mentions the MEI, while Luis Martinez, La Guerre civile en Algérie (The Civil War in Algeria) (Paris: Karthala, 1998), p. 116, says the MEI was formed by Said Mekhloufi in 1993.
13. There is disagreement among writers on the subject as to whether Chebouti led the MIA or the MEI in 1992-1993. However, published interviews with Algerian Islamists refer to Chebouti's group as the Islamic State Movement. See al-Tawil, Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya, pp. 59-62 and 107-108. But Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History, (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1996) never mentions the MEI, while Luis Martinez, La Guerre civile en Algérie (The Civil War in Algeria) (Paris: Karthala, 1998), p. 116, says the MEI was formed by Said Mekhloufi in 1993.
14. Mansouri Meliani was arrested in July 1992 and executed in 1993, while Nuredin Salamna was killed in February 1992.
15. For the details behind these meetings, see Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, pp. 268-274, and al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 104-108. Although the two accounts may contradict each other on some of the details, they both confirm that Abdelkader Chebouti was the agreed-upon amir for the armed Islamist movement.
16. For the details behind these meetings, see Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, pp. 268-274, and al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 104-108. Although the two accounts may contradict each other on some of the details, they both confirm that Abdelkader Chebouti was the agreed-upon amir for the armed Islamist movement.
17. In a published interview, Muhammad bin Hussein, an Algerian activist who was in direct contact with some of the attendees at the Tamesguida conference, maintains that during the meeting, the armed groups pledged their allegiance to Abdelkader Chebouti and agreed to work as the armed wing of the FIS. See interview in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 105-106.
18. These suspicions mainly revolved around Said Mekhloufi because of his previous position within the Algerian security services.
19. Zitouni, Hidayat Rabb al-'Alamin, p. 16.
20. Séverine Labat, Les Islamistes algériens: entre les urnes et le maquis (The Algerian Islamists: Between the Ballot-Box and Insurgency), Paris: Seuil, 1995, pp. 308-309.
21. This information is inferred from a GIA communiqué dated 4 October 1994, in which Mahfouz Tajeen, who was the fifth amir of the GIA (for less than a month), listed the names of nine amirs to lead nine separate zones (see Al-Hayat, 5 October 1994). The tradition of dividing Algeria into separate zones each with its own amir is not uncommon in the armed Islamist movement. It was done under Mustapha Bouyali, who divided Algeria into 10 zones and also by the AIS, which divided Algeria into at least six zones.
22. The names and sizes of these groups could be gathered from the series of communiqués in 1996 declaring splits from the GIA as well as from reports of groups laying down their arms in 1999 (see Al-Hayat 1 January 1996, 3 and 23 March 1996, 8 June 1999, and 9 and 14 September 1999).
23. Madani Mezraq, the national amir of the AIS since 1995, maintains that several attempts were made in 1992 and 1993 to bring the GIA and other groups together to form a unified armed movement under the leadership of the FIS. However, the GIA did not respond to these initiatives. Instead, "we began to hear claims that it is not appropriate to fight under the banner of parties, and the FIS should change its name because it contains opportunists." See Al-Hayat, 26 July 1996.
24. FIS communiqué # 22, dated 19 March 1992 and signed by Abdelrazak Rejjam, declared that the FIS is pursuing "political jihad" to get the country out of the crisis. Another FIS communiqué, issued in July 1992, called for opening a "new page" based on the following conditions: release of all prisoners; cancellation of all rulings and procedures against the FIS; resumption of the electoral process; and the correction of all the mistakes of the regime since 1991 (see Al-Hayat, 8 July 1992). In January 1993, Rabeh Kebir (in an interview with Al-Hayat on 11 January 1993) stated that the FIS has yet to declare jihad, but it would do so if the regime maintained its repressive policy.
25. FIS communiqué # 22, dated 19 March 1992 and signed by Abdelrazak Rejjam, declared that the FIS is pursuing "political jihad" to get the country out of the crisis. Another FIS communiqué, issued in July 1992, called for opening a "new page" based on the following conditions: release of all prisoners; cancellation of all rulings and procedures against the FIS; resumption of the electoral process; and the correction of all the mistakes of the regime since 1991 (see Al-Hayat, 8 July 1992). In January 1993, Rabeh Kebir (in an interview with Al-Hayat on 11 January 1993) stated that the FIS has yet to declare jihad, but it would do so if the regime maintained its repressive policy.
26. See interviews with Abdelkarim Ghamati and Qamerdin Kharbane in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, p. 95 and p. 103 respectively.
27. Although the three leaders of the Islamic State Movement were Abdelkader Chebouti, Said Mekhloufi, and Azzedin Ba'a, only Mekhloufi attended the conference, purportedly with the consent of Chebouti, who had to step aside due to ill health. Ba'a refused to unify ranks with the GIA and opted to lead the MEI by himself.
28. The jaza'ira is a title given in the early 1980s to those who believed that the Islamist movement must adapt its ideas and activities to the Algerian context, as opposed to adhering to general principles that supposedly apply at all times and in all places. The jaza'ira is juxtaposed to the salafiyya current in the movement, which represents a more orthodox understanding of Islam and the role of the movement.
29. The three leaders did not inform the imprisoned leaders of the FIS or the leaders abroad of their intention to join the GIA. According to Madani Mezraq (in an interview with Al-Hayat on 26 July 1996), the three leaders acted alone.
30. After Abdelhaq Layada was arrested by Moroccan security forces in July 1993, he was replaced by Aisa Benamar. However, he did not officially take over and was arrested the following month. Cey Murad Ahmed (also known as Seif Allah and Ja'far al-Afghani) became the new amir. The latter was killed in February 1994 and replaced by Cherif Gousmi (also known as Abi Abdallah Ahmed). See Zitouni, Hidayat Rabb al-'Alamin, pp. 14-16.
31. This unification conference was videotaped and the event is vividly described by al-Tawil in Al-Haraka, pp. 145-152. During the conference, the point was made several times that all the parties involved, including the jaza'ira representatives, must give up any previously held religious "innovation" (bid'a) and adhere to the salafiyya tradition. Cherif Gousmi suggested that the GIA be renamed to include the word salafiyya (i.e. Al-Jama 'a al-Islamiyya al-Salafiyya al-Musalaha), but in the end the GIA was deemed sufficient.
32. The entire communiqué consists of ten points. See al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 152-154.
33. These initiatives are described in Willis, The Islamist Challenge, pp. 312-320. Although dialogue was conducted behind the scenes, it became clear through a series of declarations from both sides in 1993 as well as press reports in early 1994 that efforts to end the conflict peacefully were underway. See Middle East International (London), 7 January 1994, 4 March 1994, and 15 April 1994.
34. These initiatives are described in Willis, The Islamist Challenge, pp. 312-320. Although dialogue was conducted behind the scenes, it became clear through a series of declarations from both sides in 1993 as well as press reports in early 1994 that efforts to end the conflict peacefully were underway. See Middle East International (London), 7 January 1994, 4 March 1994, and 15 April 1994.
35. See communiqué # 42 dated November 14, 1993 and signed by Abdelrazak Rejjam. It is available at http://www.msstate.edu/archives/history/africa/algeria/isf93.txt. It declares that the ruling tyranny is calling for dialogue to buy time to pursue its war against the Muslims. The FIS rejects dialogue and will not accept any alternative to the Islamic state.
36. See Al-Hayat, 25, 26 and 27 August 1993; the quoted passage is from the 27 August issue.
37. See interview with Ben Aicha in Al-Hayat, 8 June 1996. There are conflicting figures as to the size of the AIS. Luis Martinez, "Les enjeux des negociations entre l'AIS et l'armee" ("The Stakes in the Negotiations Between the AIS and the Army"), Politique Etrangère (Paris), 62, 4, Winter, 1997/1998) puts the number at between 7,000 and 8,000.
38. See interview with Ben Aicha in Al-Hayat, 8 June 1996. There are conflicting figures as to the size of the AIS. Luis Martinez, "Les enjeux des negociations entre l'AIS et l'armee" ("The Stakes in the Negotiations Between the AIS and the Army"), Politique Etrangère (Paris), 62, 4, Winter, 1997/1998) puts the number at between 7,000 and 8,000.
39. The authorities at one point put the number at 5,000, while those close to the AIS put the figure at 10,000 (Al-Hayat, 15 July 1999).
40. See interview with Madani Mezraq in Al-Hayat, 26 July 1996; communiqué by Mezraq in Al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 168-169; and interview with Abdallah Anas, a FIS leader abroad, in Al-Hayat, 28 March 1995.
41. See interview with Madani Mezraq in Al-Hayat, 26 July 1996; communiqué by Mezraq in Al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 168-169; and interview with Abdallah Anas, a FIS leader abroad, in Al-Hayat, 28 March 1995.
42. See interview with Madani Mezraq in Al-Hayat, 26 July 1996; communiqué by Mezraq in Al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 168-169; and interview with Abdallah Anas, a FIS leader abroad, in Al-Hayat, 28 March 1995.
43. See the AIS joint communiqué, which consists of five points, in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 169-171.
44. Labat. Les Islamistes algériens, pp. 308-309.
45. See published interview with Abdelkarim Ghamati in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, p. 174.
46. The GIA claimed responsibility for his execution in its London-based newsletter, al-Ansar, no. 113, 7 September 1995.
47. See interview with Qamerdin Kharbane in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 175.
48. See AIS communiqué #2 (under a new unified leadership) in Al-Hayat, 21 March 1995.
49. See AIS communiqué in Al-Hayat, 21 July 1994.
50. See al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 74-76.
51. AIS communiqué #12 in Al-Hayat, 18 August 1994. Also see Al-Hayat, 26 August 1994.
52. AIS communiqué #12 in Al-Hayat, 18 August 1994. Also see Al-Hayat, 26 August 1994.
53. The statement was issued on 1 April 1995. See the text in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 303-304. Ahmed Ben Aicha, the AIS amir in the Western region, justified the insurgency in the following terms: "when we were threatened with death, we had no other choice but to take up the gun" (in Al-Hayat, 3 February 2000).
54. The statement was issued on 1 April 1995. See the text in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 303-304. Ahmed Ben Aicha, the AIS amir in the Western region, justified the insurgency in the following terms: "when we were threatened with death, we had no other choice but to take up the gun" (in Al-Hayat, 3 February 2000).
55. See FIS communiqué in Al-Hayat, 26 August 1994. Kamal Qamazi, a principal FIS leader, also attributes the violence in Algeria to "the coup against the people's choice" (see interview in Al-Hayat 12 January 2000). See similar statements by Ali Jeddi, another prominent FIS figure, in Al-Hayat, 14 January 2000.
56. See FIS communiqué in Al-Hayat, 26 August 1994. Kamal Qamazi, a principal FIS leader, also attributes the violence in Algeria to "the coup against the people's choice" (see interview in Al-Hayat 12 January 2000). See similar statements by Ali Jeddi, another prominent FIS figure, in Al-Hayat, 14 January 2000.
57. See FIS communiqué in Al-Hayat, 26 August 1994. Kamal Qamazi, a principal FIS leader, also attributes the violence in Algeria to "the coup against the people's choice" (see interview in Al-Hayat 12 January 2000). See similar statements by Ali Jeddi, another prominent FIS figure, in Al-Hayat, 14 January 2000.
58. See their response to Rabeh Kebir published in Al-Hayat, 27 August 1993.
59. Al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, p. 79.
60. See GIA communiqué #36 in al-Ansar (London), no. 101, 15 June 1995.
61. See GIA communiqué in Al-Hayat, 15 September 1994. Also see similar statements made after the Rome "National Contract" in Al-Ansar, no. 80, 19 January 1995 and no. 100, 12 May 1995.
62. See GIA communiqué in Al-Hayat, 15 September 1994. Also see similar statements made after the Rome "National Contract" in Al-Ansar, no. 80, 19 January 1995 and no. 100, 12 May 1995.
63. This 21-page letter was issued in March 1995 and distributed in a pamphlet entitled Kalimat Haqq li man Yahimmahu al-Amr (Truthful Words to Whomever is Concerned), NP. Similar statements can be found in Al-Hayat, 26 August 1994 and 9 April 1995.
64. See Al-Wasat (London), no. 138, 19 September 1994. See similar statements by GIA amirs in Al-Ansar, no. 16, 28 October 1993 and in Al-Hayat, 25 July 1995.
65. See Al-Wasat (London), no. 138, 19 September 1994. See similar statements by GIA amirs in Al-Ansar, no. 16, 28 October 1993 and in Al-Hayat, 25 July 1995.
66. See Al-Wasat (London), no. 138, 19 September 1994. See similar statements by GIA amirs in Al-Ansar, no. 16, 28 October 1993 and in Al-Hayat, 25 July 1995.
67. Zitouni, Hidayat Rabb al-'Alamin, p. 27.
68. Zitouni, Hidayat Rabb al-'Alamin, p. 27.
69. The increasing explicitness of GIA threats must be seen in the context of ongoing dialogue between the FIS and other political parties hosted by the St Egidio community in Rome, which produced the "National Contract". For the March 1995 communiqué, see Al-Hayat, 21 March 1995; for communiqué #30 (dated 4 May 1995), see Al-Ansar, no. 96, 12 May 1995; for the communiqué threatening eight FIS leaders, see Al-Hayat, 10 May 1995; for the open letter to Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhaj, see Al-Ansar, no. 101, 15 June 1995; and for the declaration of war on the AIS, see Al-Hayat, 7 February 1996.
70. The increasing explicitness of GIA threats must be seen in the context of ongoing dialogue between the FIS and other political parties hosted by the St Egidio community in Rome, which produced the "National Contract". For the March 1995 communiqué, see Al-Hayat, 21 March 1995; for communiqué #30 (dated 4 May 1995), see Al-Ansar, no. 96, 12 May 1995; for the communiqué threatening eight FIS leaders, see Al-Hayat, 10 May 1995; for the open letter to Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhaj, see Al-Ansar, no. 101, 15 June 1995; and for the declaration of war on the AIS, see Al-Hayat, 7 February 1996.
71. The increasing explicitness of GIA threats must be seen in the context of ongoing dialogue between the FIS and other political parties hosted by the St Egidio community in Rome, which produced the "National Contract". For the March 1995 communiqué, see Al-Hayat, 21 March 1995; for communiqué #30 (dated 4 May 1995), see Al-Ansar, no. 96, 12 May 1995; for the communiqué threatening eight FIS leaders, see Al-Hayat, 10 May 1995; for the open letter to Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhaj, see Al-Ansar, no. 101, 15 June 1995; and for the declaration of war on the AIS, see Al-Hayat, 7 February 1996.
72. The increasing explicitness of GIA threats must be seen in the context of ongoing dialogue between the FIS and other political parties hosted by the St Egidio community in Rome, which produced the "National Contract". For the March 1995 communiqué, see Al-Hayat, 21 March 1995; for communiqué #30 (dated 4 May 1995), see Al-Ansar, no. 96, 12 May 1995; for the communiqué threatening eight FIS leaders, see Al-Hayat, 10 May 1995; for the open letter to Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhaj, see Al-Ansar, no. 101, 15 June 1995; and for the declaration of war on the AIS, see Al-Hayat, 7 February 1996.
73. The increasing explicitness of GIA threats must be seen in the context of ongoing dialogue between the FIS and other political parties hosted by the St Egidio community in Rome, which produced the "National Contract". For the March 1995 communiqué, see Al-Hayat, 21 March 1995; for communiqué #30 (dated 4 May 1995), see Al-Ansar, no. 96, 12 May 1995; for the communiqué threatening eight FIS leaders, see Al-Hayat, 10 May 1995; for the open letter to Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhaj, see Al-Ansar, no. 101, 15 June 1995; and for the declaration of war on the AIS, see Al-Hayat, 7 February 1996.
74. Willis, The Islamist Challenge, p. 353; al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 212-213.
75. Willis, The Islamist Challenge, p. 353; al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 212-213.
76. Agence France-Presse International, 21 January 1996.
77. The FIS-AIS consistently condemned the sabotaging of schools and attacks on women related to security service men. See Al-Hayat, 26 August 1994, 20 March 1995, 14 December 1995, 16 October 1996, and 6 January 1997.
78. See Madani Mezraq's letters issued in March and April 1995 in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 298-299 and 303-304.
79. See their communiqué in Al-Hayat, 5 July 1995. In addition to the departure of these figures, Anwar Haddam, who heads the FIS Parliamentary Delegation Abroad and is a sympathizer with the GIA, began to condemn GIA violence that resulted in the loss of civilian lives. See Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 19 December 1995.
80. See their communiqué in Al-Hayat, 5 July 1995. In addition to the departure of these figures, Anwar Haddam, who heads the FIS Parliamentary Delegation Abroad and is a sympathizer with the GIA, began to condemn GIA violence that resulted in the loss of civilian lives. See Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 19 December 1995.
81. George al-Rasi, Al-Islam al-Jaza'iri: min al-Amir 'Abd al-Qadir ila Umara' al-Jama'at (Algeria's Islam: From Amir Abdelkader to the Commanders of the [Armed] Groups) (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1997), pp. 432-433.
82. See Madani Mezraq's communiqué confirming Rabeh Kebir as only official spokesman of the FIS Abroad in Al-Hayat, 26 April 1995. Ahmed Ben Aicha, the AIS amir in the Western region, issued a similar statement on 13 August 1996 (see Al-Hayat, 28 August 1996).
83. See Madani Mezraq's communiqué confirming Rabeh Kebir as only official spokesman of the FIS Abroad in Al-Hayat, 26 April 1995. Ahmed Ben Aicha, the AIS amir in the Western region, issued a similar statement on 13 August 1996 (see Al-Hayat, 28 August 1996).
84. See GIA communiqués in Al-Hayat, 13 September 1994 and in Al-Ansar, no. 100, 8 June 1995.
85. See GIA communiqués in Al-Hayat, 13 September 1994 and in Al-Ansar, no. 100, 8 June 1995.
86. Between 1992 and 1995, approximately 950 schools were sabotaged (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 July 1995). Government reports also indicate that between 1995 and 1998, there were approximately 5,400 sabotage operations that included the gas and electric company (722 attacks), post and telephone infrastructures (434 attacks), and roads and bridges (260 attacks). See Al-Hayat, 4 September 1999.
87. Between 1992 and 1995, approximately 950 schools were sabotaged (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 July 1995). Government reports also indicate that between 1995 and 1998, there were approximately 5,400 sabotage operations that included the gas and electric company (722 attacks), post and telephone infrastructures (434 attacks), and roads and bridges (260 attacks). See Al-Hayat, 4 September 1999.
88. For the dates and places of these massacres, refer to the quarterly chronology sections of The Middle East Journal. For a description of some of the massacres, see Amnesty International (MDE 28/23/97, November 1997) and The Times (London), 22 & 23 October 1997.
89. For the dates and places of these massacres, refer to the quarterly chronology sections of The Middle East Journal. For a description of some of the massacres, see Amnesty International (MDE 28/23/97, November 1997) and The Times (London), 22 & 23 October 1997.
90. See Maghreb Confidentiel (Paris), 28 September 1995, and Abdelallah al-Jazairi, "Safhat al-Tughma al-Sawda' fi al-Jaza'ir al-Bayda" (The Black Page of Tyranny in White Algeria) in Al-Ma'lif al-Siyasi (London?), #25, 1997 (the latter contains the case against the state put forward by an Algerian Islamist).
91. See Maghreb Confidentiel (Paris), 28 September 1995, and Abdelallah al-Jazairi, "Safhat al-Tughma al-Sawda' fi al-Jaza'ir al-Bayda" (The Black Page of Tyranny in White Algeria) in Al-Ma'lif al-Siyasi (London?), #25, 1997 (the latter contains the case against the state put forward by an Algerian Islamist).
92. These include Beni Messous, Sidi Rais, and Bentalha. The latter is an outlying suburb of Algiers, where a massacre took place on the night of 22 September 1997, resulting in the death of approximately 200 people.
93. This argument is put forward most strongly by Amnesty International (MDE 28/23/97, November 1997).
94. Former Algerian Prime Minister Abdelhamid al-Ibrahimi recently accused these militias of being behind the massacres against supporters of the FIS (see interview with him in Al-Wasat (London), no. 372, 15 March 1999).
95. Ahmad Mahaba, "Azmat al-Jaza'ir bayn al-Tadwil wa al-Wifaq al-Watani" (The Algerian Crisis between Internationalization and National Reconciliation), Al-Siyasa al-Dawaliyya (Cairo), no. 131, January 1998. Also see The Economist (London), 27 September 1997.
96. Ahmad Mahaba, "Azmat al-Jaza'ir bayn al-Tadwil wa al-Wifaq al-Watani" (The Algerian Crisis between Internationalization and National Reconciliation), Al-Siyasa al-Dawaliyya (Cairo), no. 131, January 1998. Also see The Economist (London), 27 September 1997.
97. See communiqué in Al-Hayat, 25 July 1994.
98. See communiqué #26 in Al-Ansar, no. 87, 9 March 1995; communiqué #28 in Al-Ansar, no. 95, 4 May 1995; and communiqué in Al-Hayat, 10 March 1995.
99. See communiqué #26 in Al-Ansar, no. 87, 9 March 1995; communiqué #28 in Al-Ansar, no. 95, 4 May 1995; and communiqué in Al-Hayat, 10 March 1995.
100. See communiqué #26 in Al-Ansar, no. 87, 9 March 1995; communiqué #28 in Al-Ansar, no. 95, 4 May 1995; and communiqué in Al-Hayat, 10 March 1995.
101. Communiqué #41 in Al-Hayat, 14 February 1996.
102. Communiqué #48 in Al-Hayat, 13 September 1996.
103. Communiqué #49 in Al-Hayat, 3 November 1996.
104. The Middle East Contemporary Survey, (Tel Aviv/Boulder: Moshe Dayan Center/Westview Press, 1996) volume 20, 1996, p. 235.
105. Labat, Les Islamistes algériens, p. 270; Luis Martinez, La guerre civile en Algérie (The Civil War in Algeria), Paris, Karthala, 1998, p. 134; Muhammed Qawas, Ghazwat "Al-Inqadh": Ma'rakat al-Islam al-Siyasi fi al-Jaza'ir (The Invasion of the FIS: The Battle of Political Islam in Algeria), (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1998), p. 181.
106. Labat, Les Islamistes algériens, p. 270; Luis Martinez, La guerre civile en Algérie (The Civil War in Algeria), Paris, Karthala, 1998, p. 134; Muhammed Qawas, Ghazwat "Al-Inqadh": Ma'rakat al-Islam al-Siyasi fi al-Jaza'ir (The Invasion of the FIS: The Battle of Political Islam in Algeria), (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1998), p. 181.
107. Labat, Les Islamistes algériens, p. 270; Luis Martinez, La guerre civile en Algérie (The Civil War in Algeria), Paris, Karthala, 1998, p. 134; Muhammed Qawas, Ghazwat "Al-Inqadh": Ma'rakat al-Islam al-Siyasi fi al-Jaza'ir (The Invasion of the FIS: The Battle of Political Islam in Algeria), (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1998), p. 181.
108. Zitouni, Hidayat Rabb al-'Alamin, p. 9.
109. Passage quoted in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 276-277. Jamal Zitouni, in Hidayat Rabb al-'Alamin, p. 46, also claimed that it is "a duty of Muslims to rise against the ruler, remove and disobey him if he commits apostasy". In another passage (on page 47), he maintained that since the GIA offers an alternative authority, the people should not enter into the guardianship of infidels and apostates; they have a duty to listen and obey the amir of the GIA.
110. Passage quoted in al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 276-277. Jamal Zitouni, in Hidayat Rabb al-'Alamin, p. 46, also claimed that it is "a duty of Muslims to rise against the ruler, remove and disobey him if he commits apostasy". In another passage (on page 47), he maintained that since the GIA offers an alternative authority, the people should not enter into the guardianship of infidels and apostates; they have a duty to listen and obey the amir of the GIA.
111. See Al-Hayat, 14 February 1996.
112. In the communiqué that forbade people from attending school, the GIA declared that "continuing with schooling is aiding the tyrants achieve stability. . .It is known in (Islamic) law that it is not permissible to work in the institutions of apostate rulers. . ." (Al-Hayat, 6 August 1994).
113. See GIA communiqué threatening to "spill the blood" of anyone outside of their home on election day in Al-Hayat, 23 November 1996.
114. Sura VIII, Al-Anfal, verse 39: "wa qatiluhum hata la takuna fitnatun wa-yakuna al-din kulluhu li-llah."
115. In November and December 1995, the LIDD and Larbaa militias split from the GIA. For other splits and accusation of kharijism, see communiqués in Al-Hayat, 3 February 1996, 3 and 23 March 1996, 23 July 1996, 17 September 1998, and 28 December 1999; and Al-Sharq al-Awsat 24 November 1996. The kharijites or khawarij (seceders) were a sect in Islam that emerged in early Islamic history. They were known for being extreme in their interpretations of Islamic texts, and their belief that Muslims can be excommunicated if they do not uphold the pillars of the faith.
116. In November and December 1995, the LIDD and Larbaa militias split from the GIA. For other splits and accusation of kharijism, see communiqués in Al-Hayat, 3 February 1996, 3 and 23 March 1996, 23 July 1996, 17 September 1998, and 28 December 1999; and Al-Sharq al-Awsat 24 November 1996. The kharijites or khawarij (seceders) were a sect in Islam that emerged in early Islamic history. They were known for being extreme in their interpretations of Islamic texts, and their belief that Muslims can be excommunicated if they do not uphold the pillars of the faith.
117. See communiqué #35 in Al-Ansar, no. 101, 15 June 1995.
118. After initially denying the deed, the GIA sent a two-hour videotaped confession of Abdelwahab Lamara, a leader in the GIA, in which he admitted that Muhammed Said and others conspired on several occasions to take over the leadership of the GIA. In the last attempt, they conspired with the former amir of the GIA, Mahfouz Tajeen, to oust Jamal Zitouni and replace him with Said. A day after the "confession", both Tajeen and Lamara were executed. See al-Tawil, Al-Haraka, pp. 240-242.
119. Al-Hayat, 21 February 1996.
120. The Egyptian al-Jihad group withdrew its support for the GIA after "it was proved to us that it became involved in dangerous (Islamic) legal deviations. . ." Similarly, the Libyan al-Jama'a al-Muqatila withdrew its support because the GIA, after Jamal Zitouni took over, "has committed excesses and violations of Islamic law that have piled up day after day. . .." See both communiqués in Al-Hayat, 10 June 1996.
121. Agence France-Presse International (AFP), 3 September 1997. See similar statements in Al-Hayat, 7 May 1998.
122. Al-Hayat, 3 February 2000.
123. Interview with Al-Hayat, 8 February 2000, p. 8.
124. See Agence France-Presse International, 17 October 1997.
125. The communiqué was published in Al-Ansar on 27 September 1997. Also see Agence France-Presse International, 26 September 1997.
126. The decision to declare a ceasefire, according to a top chief in the AIS, was taken on 11 July 1997 (see interview with Al-Hayat, 28 December 1999, p. 14). The content of the ceasefire agreement has yet to be made public. What is clear is that there were no substantial concessions granted to the AIS, such as the rehabilitation of the FIS. According to an AIS chief close to Madani Mezraq, the FIS did not participate in the 1997 negotiations, nor did the AIS demand the reinstitution of the FIS as a political party (Al-Hayat, 29 December 1999). Abdelkader Boukhamkham, a FIS leader that was involved in previous rounds of negotiations, also stated "we were not contacted at all by the authorities" (see interview with Al-Hayat, 31 October 1999).
127. The decision to declare a ceasefire, according to a top chief in the AIS, was taken on 11 July 1997 (see interview with Al-Hayat, 28 December 1999, p. 14). The content of the ceasefire agreement has yet to be made public. What is clear is that there were no substantial concessions granted to the AIS, such as the rehabilitation of the FIS. According to an AIS chief close to Madani Mezraq, the FIS did not participate in the 1997 negotiations, nor did the AIS demand the reinstitution of the FIS as a political party (Al-Hayat, 29 December 1999). Abdelkader Boukhamkham, a FIS leader that was involved in previous rounds of negotiations, also stated "we were not contacted at all by the authorities" (see interview with Al-Hayat, 31 October 1999).
128. The decision to declare a ceasefire, according to a top chief in the AIS, was taken on 11 July 1997 (see interview with Al-Hayat, 28 December 1999, p. 14). The content of the ceasefire agreement has yet to be made public. What is clear is that there were no substantial concessions granted to the AIS, such as the rehabilitation of the FIS. According to an AIS chief close to Madani Mezraq, the FIS did not participate in the 1997 negotiations, nor did the AIS demand the reinstitution of the FIS as a political party (Al-Hayat, 29 December 1999). Abdelkader Boukhamkham, a FIS leader that was involved in previous rounds of negotiations, also stated "we were not contacted at all by the authorities" (see interview with Al-Hayat, 31 October 1999).
129. See interview with unnamed AIS leader in Al-Hayat, 28 December 1999, p. 14.
130. Agence France-Presse International, 24 September 1997.
131. Madani Mezraq's letter and the presidential communiqué were televised, which was an unprecedented step in the direction of official acknowledgment of the 1997 ceasefire. See Al-Hayat, 5 and 8 June 1999 for the full text of Mezraq's letter and the presidential response.
132. Al-Hayat, 1 July 1999.
133. Al-Hayat, 20 January 2000.
134. Al-Hayat, 12 January 2000.
135. Al-Hayat, 31 December 1999.
136. Al-Hayat, 6 June 1999.
137. In July 2000, during the first year anniversary of the Law of Civil Reconciliation, rebels intensified their attacks on state forces and civilians to highlight the failure of President Bouteflika's initiative (Al-Hayat, 11 July 2000). One of the principal groups behind the continuing violence is Hassan Hattab's al-Jama'a al-Salafiya li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Qital, which mainly consists of about 1,200 to 1,500 militants and targets security forces in East Algeria - Tizi Ouzo, Bouira, and Boumerdes. There were reportsat the beginning of 2000 that Hassan Hattab was negotiating with the military to end the violence. However, he put those rumors to rest with a communiqué dated 15 January 2000, in which he affirmed that there would be "no dialogue, no ceasefire, and no reconciliation with the apostates" (see Al-Hayat, 16 and 23 January 2000). Another group, al-Baqun 'ala al-'Ahd (Those Who Keep Their Oath), which consists of about 150 militants, also refuses to abide by the ceasefire. In London, a group of FIS activists shifted their support to non-GIA armed groups and began issuing a newsletter entitled Sawt al-Jabha (The Voice of the Front) in which they carry the communiqués of al-Baqun 'ala al-'Ahd and al-Jama'a al-Salafiya li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Qital.
138. In July 2000, during the first year anniversary of the Law of Civil Reconciliation, rebels intensified their attacks on state forces and civilians to highlight the failure of President Bouteflika's initiative (Al-Hayat, 11 July 2000). One of the principal groups behind the continuing violence is Hassan Hattab's al-Jama'a al-Salafiya li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Qital, which mainly consists of about 1,200 to 1,500 militants and targets security forces in East Algeria - Tizi Ouzo, Bouira, and Boumerdes. There were reportsat the beginning of 2000 that Hassan Hattab was negotiating with the military to end the violence. However, he put those rumors to rest with a communiqué dated 15 January 2000, in which he affirmed that there would be "no dialogue, no ceasefire, and no reconciliation with the apostates" (see Al-Hayat, 16 and 23 January 2000). Another group, al-Baqun 'ala al-'Ahd (Those Who Keep Their Oath), which consists of about 150 militants, also refuses to abide by the ceasefire. In London, a group of FIS activists shifted their support to non-GIA armed groups and began issuing a newsletter entitled Sawt al-Jabha (The Voice of the Front) in which they carry the communiqués of al-Baqun 'ala al-'Ahd and al-Jama'a al-Salafiya li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Qital.
139. In July 2000, during the first year anniversary of the Law of Civil Reconciliation, rebels intensified their attacks on state forces and civilians to highlight the failure of President Bouteflika's initiative (Al-Hayat, 11 July 2000). One of the principal groups behind the continuing violence is Hassan Hattab's al-Jama'a al-Salafiya li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Qital, which mainly consists of about 1,200 to 1,500 militants and targets security forces in East Algeria - Tizi Ouzo, Bouira, and Boumerdes. There were reportsat the beginning of 2000 that Hassan Hattab was negotiating with the military to end the violence. However, he put those rumors to rest with a communiqué dated 15 January 2000, in which he affirmed that there would be "no dialogue, no ceasefire, and no reconciliation with the apostates" (see Al-Hayat, 16 and 23 January 2000). Another group, al-Baqun 'ala al-'Ahd (Those Who Keep Their Oath), which consists of about 150 militants, also refuses to abide by the ceasefire. In London, a group of FIS activists shifted their support to non-GIA armed groups and began issuing a newsletter entitled Sawt al-Jabha (The Voice of the Front) in which they carry the communiqués of al-Baqun 'ala al-'Ahd and al-Jama'a al-Salafiya li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Qital.