Harmonization without consensus: Critical reflections on drafting a substantive patent law treaty

Duke Law Journal

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 85-130

  Reichman, Jerome H ^a   Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 36148962326     PISSN: 00127086     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. See World Intellectual Prop. Org. (WIPO), Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Report, at 1-2, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/11 (June 1, 2005);
2. WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Information on Certain Recent Developments in Relation to the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), at 2-3, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/8 (Mar. 17, 2004);
3. WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), at 2, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/2 (Sept. 30, 2003).
4. See generally WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), Geneva, Switz., Mar. 1-3, 2006 [hereinafter WIPO Open Forum], available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/ scp_of_ge_06_infl.html (hosting the presentation of papers, lectures, and speeches on the international harmonization of patent law).
5. See Gretchen Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law vs. The European Union, 40 IDEA 49, 53 (2000);
6. Erwin F. Berrier, Jr., Global Patent Cosb Must Be Reduced, 36 IDEA 473, 473 (1996).
7. See infra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n for the Prot, of Intellectual Prop. (AIPPI), Question Q174 - Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in the Case of Cross-border Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2003/1 Y.B. 827-28, Oct. 25-28, 2003, available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/resolutions/ Q174_E.pdf (recognizing the need for a fairer and more efficient method of resolving cross-border controversies);
9. European Max-Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Prop., Exclusive Jurisdiction and Cross-Border IP (Patent) Infringement: Suggestions for Amendment of the Brussels I Regulation, in 29(5) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 195, 195-96 (2007) (suggesting the need to amend the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, EC Regulation No 44/2001, to improve the efficiency of transnational dispute resolution).
10. See, e.g., David Perkins & Garry Mills, Patent Infringement and Forum Shopping in the European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 549, 550 (1996) (observing that "the English and German courts reached opposite conclusions in parallel litigation in the two countries"
11. (citing Improver Corp. v. Remington Prods. Inc., 21 IIC 572 (1990), 24 IIC 838 (1993), [1993] GRUR Int. 242 (F.R.G.),
12. and Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., [1990] F.S.R. 181 (Eng. Ch. 1989))). On the validity and infringement of the patent protecting Fosamax, see Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005), holding that the patent is invalid because it was obvious,
13. and Merck & Co. Inc.'s Patents, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1545, [1]-[73] (Eng.),
14. holding that the patent is invalid because it was both obvious and lacked novelty. On the importance of allocating a jurisdiction for a patent dispute, see generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurbdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002),
15. and Mariano Municoy, Symposium, Allocation of Jurisdiction on Patent Disputes in the Models Developed by the Hague Conference in Private International Law: Asymmetric Countries and the Relationship of Private Parties, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 342 (2005),
16. and see also Case C-593/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, [2007] F.S.R. 5 (E.C.J. 2006) (questioning whether conflicting national judgments of validity or infringement should be considered "irreconcilable").
17. In the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit seems torn by the tension between territoriality and the global exercise of patent rights. Compare, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that "considerations of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and other exceptional circumstances constitute compelling reasons to decline [supplemental] jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C] § 1367(c)" over foreign patents),
18. with AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (endorsing de facto extraterritorial application of domestic software patents to conduct occurring in countries that reject software patents), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
19. Bruce A. Lehman, Addressing the Crisis of the Global Patent System, JAPAN ECON. CURRENTS, Jan. 2005, at 5, 5-6, available at http://www.keidanren-usa.org/publications/currents/ docs/JEC_Jan05_132K.pdf.
20. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19,1970,28 U.S.T. 7645,1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
21. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255. In addition, the European Community (EC) is considering the development of a region-wide community patent. See John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 341, 343 (2004);
22. Hanns Ullrich, National, European and Community Patent Protection: Time for Reconsideration 14-22 (European Univ. Inst., Dep't of Law, EUI Working Papers, LAW No. 2006/41, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=963759.
23. Other nations are contemplating or have enacted similar measures. See Agreement Revising the Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organization, tit. I, Feb. 24, 1999, available at http://www.oapi.wipo.net/doc/en/bangui_ agreement.pdf; Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs within the Framework of the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO), 2, § 1, Dec. 10, 1982, available at http://www.aripo.org/Documents/Protocols/harare_agreement. pdf (last amended Aug. 13, 2004);
24. Marcelo J. Vernengo, Kees de Joncheere & Enrique Fefer, Advances in Pharmaceutical Market Integration in Mercosur and Other Latin American Countries, 32 DRUG INFO. J. 831, 834-35 (1998).
25. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 9. The Agreement Revising the Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 9, however, does grant a regional patent. A draft European Patent Litigation Agreement is also under consideration. Draft Agreement on the Establishment of a European Patent Litigation System, Feb. 16, 2004, available at http://www. european-patent-office.org/epo/epla/pdf/ agreement_draft.pdf.
26. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
27. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967);
28. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 2.1.
29. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts. 27-34.
30. See id., art. 1.1;
31. see abo John Sulston, Presentation Before the WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT): International Patent Law Harmonization, Development and Policy Space for Flexibility (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/ scp_of_ge_06_infl.html (discussing the TRIPS flexibilities).
32. See generally CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007);
33. UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK] (providing background and technical information on the TRIPS Agreement);
34. J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (C M. Correa & A. A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
35. See, e.g., Daeshik Jeh, Director, Patent Examination Policy Team, Korean Intellectual Property Office, Presentation Before the WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT): International Patent Law Harmonization and Development: The Experience of the Republic of Korea (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/ scp_of_ge_06_infl.html (discussing the benefits and desirability of harmonization);
36. Kenji Kamata, Japan Intellectual Property Association, Presentation Before the WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT): The Rationale and Benefits of Patent Law Harmonization (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/ scp_of_ge_06_infl.html (same).
37. WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), supra note 1.
38. Karen M. Hauda, The Role of the United States in World-Wide Protection of Industrial Property, in THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKET OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 89, 97 (Frank Gotzen ed., 2003).
39. Id. ("This approach was adopted in an attempt to avoid the controversial hurdles to agreement that were found in the past.");
40. see also Philippe Baechtold, The Future Role of WIPO in the Area of Industrial Property, in THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKET OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 17, at 139, 143 ("[T]here are other issues that require further reflection... [including] the question of patentable subject matter,... the requirement of technical character of the invention, the exceptions from patentability, the introduction of some form of grace period and the issue of equivalents.").
41. In the Fall of 2004, the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization invited comment on a proposal presented by the Group of Friends of Development (led by Argentina and Brazil) for the establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO. WIPO, Gen. Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/ govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf. Since then, many other proposals have been presented and discussed.
42. E.g., WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Report of the Third Session, at 1, PCD A/3/3 (June 11, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_3/ pcda_3_3.pdf;
43. WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Proposal for a Decision of the PCDA on the Establishment of a WIPO Development Agenda, PCD A/2/2 (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_2/pcda_2_2.pdf;
44. see also James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, at 3-4 (2004), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/ journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2004DLTR0009.pdf (criticizing the "one size fits all" approach of WIPO and the TRIPS agreement).
45. WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Proposal for a Decision of the PCDA on the Establishment of a WIPO Development Agenda, supra note 19;
46. WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Report of the Third Session, supra note 19, at 1.
47. For developing countries, the patent standards (articles 27-34) of the TRIPS Agreement became generally operational on January 1, 2000. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 65.2;
48. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 444 (2000).
49. Developing countries, however, that did not previously allow product patents on pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products were given another five years to cover them, subject to a "mail-box" provision for patents arising in the meantime. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts 65.4, 70.8-70.9 (mailbox and minimum exclusive marketing rights).
50. See COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 159-62 (2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter CIPR];
51. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 5-44 (2000);
52. Reichman, supra note 14, at 77-92.
53. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India-Novartis, Patent Law, and Access to Medicines, 356 NEW ENG. X MED. 541, 541 (2007) (discussing Novartis's effort to patent Gleevec);
54. Robert Steinbrook, Thailand and the Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 544-46 (2007) (noting Merck's objection to Thailand's compulsory licensing of an antiretroviral medication).
55. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 394, 408-10 (Keith Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (discussing how patents function as obstacles both to prevent generic products from entering the market and to prevent competition that may lower costs).
56. See, e.g., Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri & Alphonso Gambardella, Markets for Technology, Intellectual Property Rights and Development, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 321, 325-26 ("Strong patent protection provides incentives to codify and organize new knowledge in ways that are meaningful and useful to others.");
57. Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution," 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 48 (2002) ("The ultimate wisdom of measures that relax intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals in developing countries turns on complex matters, including empirical issues about which one can only hazard an educated guess.").
58. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2832 (2006) ("Over-reliance on utility maximization ignores distributional consequences... but intellectual property globalization has made these aspects of the provision of basic knowledge goods increasingly difficult to ignore.");
59. Peter M. Gerhart, Distributive Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 69, 72 ("[A]lthough institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) promote an efficient system of global trade and investment, we have found no way to tax those who benefit from the efficiency of the global system in order to support those who do not.");
60. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lecture, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast.
61. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 73, 73-74 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (discussing the tensions between developed and less-developed countries with respect to the TRIPS Agreement).
62. See generally CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY (2006).
63. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2077-78 (2000);
64. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39-40, 44-46 (Winter/Spring 2003);
65. Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrum, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 133-34 (Winter/Spring 2003).
66. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 431, 433 (2004);
67. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (Winter/Spring 2003).
68. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 3, 17-20.
69. Id. at 44.
70. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.1 (leaving Members "free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice");
71. id, at arts. 7-8 (stressing objectives of promoting innovation and transfer of technology "to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge" and "the public interest in sectors of vital importance to [Members'] socio-economic and technological development").
72. See generally UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 14 (discussing "flexibilities" within the TRIPS regime).
73. See, e.g., CIPR, supra note 22, at 8-9, 21-27;
74. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 4-15;
75. Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and, the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819, 839-42 (2003).
76. For a more optimistic view, see Joseph Straus, The Impact of the New World Order on Economic Development: The Role of Intellectual Property Rights System, 6 J MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2006).
77. See Straus, supra note 33, at 4.
78. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 109-42 (2000);
79. Keith E. Maskus, Kamal Saggi & Thitima Puttitanun, Patent Rights and International Technology Transfer Through Direct Investment and Licensing, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 265, 265.
80. But see Daniel C.K. Chow, The Role of Intellectual Property in Promoting International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH, supra note 26, at 187, 187 (stressing China's ability to attract foreign direct investment despite weak intellectual property rights).
81. See, e.g, Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 227, 229-32
82. [hereinafter Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?];
83. Carlos M. Correa, Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for Developing Countries, 21 SCI. & PUB. POL'Y 369, 377-79 (1994)
84. [hereinafter Correa, Trends in Technology Transfer];
85. see also KEITH E. MASKUS, UNCTAD-ICTSD, ENCOURAGING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 2 (2004).
86. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27.1 (requiring that "patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology" if they meet specified eligibility criteria);
87. id. arts. 65-66. As regards pharmaceutical products in particular, see World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration];
88. Decision by the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WT/IP/C/25 (July 1, 2005).
89. LDCs may postpone implementation of other TRIPS obligations, including the duty to provide patent protection for products other than pharmaceuticals, until 2013. See Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, WT/IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005).
90. During these transition periods, LDCs must continue to respect national treatment and Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligations under articles 3-4 of the TRIPS Agreement. See id. para. 5.
91. See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India's Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923538 ("India became a world leader in high-quality generic drug manufacturing.");
92. Straus, supra note 33, at 6-8.
93. See sources cited supra note 37.
94. See Mueller, supra note 38, at 4, 28, 55.
95. See generally J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11 (1997) (evaluating "the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on [developing countries'] capacity to acquire the knowledge and skills they need to compete on the market for technologically advanced products and processes").
96. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts. 3-4.
97. See Mueller, supra note 23, at 541-43;
98. Mueller, supra note 38, at 55-61.
99. See John Barton, Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strategies, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE 57, 61 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003) (stressing the difficulties of entry - "compounded by the international IP system"-into markets "dominated by multinational oligopolies");
100. Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 369-70 (2002) (discussing differing opinions on local work requirements between developed and developing countries);