Effective property rights, conflict and growth

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 137, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 127-139

  Gonzalez, Francisco M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Conflict; Diversion; Growth; Investment; Property rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 36048992486     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.011     Document Type: Article

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