Learning from structural adjustment: Why selectivity may not be the key to successful programmes in Africa

Journal of International Development

Volumn 19, Issue 7, 2007, Pages 927-948

  Noorbakhsh, Farhad ^a   Paloni, Alberto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Africa; Aid; Conditionality; Policy lending; Political economy; Selectivity; World Bank

Indexed keywords

AID POLICY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; POLICY REFORM; POLITICAL ECONOMY; STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT; WORLD BANK;

AFRICA;

EID: 35649000152     PISSN: 09541748     EISSN: 10991328     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jid.1357     Document Type: Article

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