Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 670-698

  McGarry, John ^a   O'Leary, Brendan ^b  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35648931953     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mom026     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (163)

1. For examples of integrationist thinking, see BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND INEQUALITY (Polity Press 2000);
2. PAUL BRASS, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM: THEORY AND COMPARISON (Sage 1991);
3. DONALD HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (Univ. Calif. Press 1991);
4. BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: ELECTORAL ENGINEERING FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001);
5. Philip G. Roeder, Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization, 43 WORLD POL. 196 (1991).
6. Consociational theory is most closely associated with the work of Arend Lijphart. See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS (Univ. Calif. Press 1968);
7. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (Yale Univ. Press 1977);
8. Arend Lijphart, Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing Systems, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 275 (Will Kymlicka ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) [hereinafter Lijphart, Self-Determination];
9. Arend Lijphart, The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY 37 (Andrew Reynolds ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
10. For other instances of consociational thinking, see ERIC NORDLINGER, CONFLICT REGULATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES (Occasional Papers in Int'l Aff., Ctr for Int'l Aff., Harvard Univ. 1972);
11. Brendan O'Leary, Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments, in FROM POWER-SHARING TO DEMOCRACY: POST-CONFLICT INSTITUTIONS IN ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 3 (Sid J. R. Noel ed., McGill-Queen's Univ. Press 2005);
12. JOHN MCGARRY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT: CONSOCIATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS (Oxford Univ. Press 2004);
13. KENNETH DOUGLAS MCRAE, CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN SEGMENTED SOCIETIES (McClelland & Stewart 1974).
14. For an example of the former view, see DAVID MILLER, MARKET, STATE AND COMMUNITY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET SOCIALISM 237 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989).
15. For an example of the latter view, see John McGarry, Political Settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa, 46 POL. STUD. 853 (1998).
16. Here, we treat accommodation and consociation as synonyms, but this decision is slightly misleading. Elsewhere we have divided accommodation strategies into three categories: (a) territorial pluralism (meaningful territorial self-government for communities as well as power sharing in the federal or union government); (b) consociation (executive power sharing, self-government, proportionality and minority vetoes); and (c) credible multiculturalism (proportionality and self-government). See John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary & Richard Simeon, Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? (Sujit Choudhry ed., Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2008).
17. For examples of this view, see Yahia Said, Federal Choices Needed, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, Mar. 2-8, 2006, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/784/sc6.htm (last visited May 28, 2007);
18. Tulin Daloglu, End Sectarian Violence, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A17;
19. Int'l Crisis Group, The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict (Middle East Report No. 52, Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/ middle_east_north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/ 52_the_next_iraqi_war_sectarianism_and_civil_conflict.pdf.
20. According to Yahia Said, "international actors have not been innocent bystanders. They have contributed to sectarianism in many ways, including by subscribing to a 'realist' narrative that argues that Iraq is an artificial state; that the groups comprising it were only held together by tyranny, and that disintegration is a byproduct of liberation from authoritarianism. This narrative, which is antithetical to nation-building, has been embraced by sectarian politicians in Iraq and has found its reflection in post-invasion policies, including the dissolution of the army and the new constitution." Said, supra note 5.
21. See also Daloglu, supra note 5 (accusing the United States of enforcing an "ethnic and sectarian calculus onto the infrastructure of the Iraqi Governing Council");
22. and Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 5, at i and 23 (arguing that the U.S.-led coalition prized "communal identities over national-political platforms").
23. See, e.g., Kanan Makiya, Present at the Disintegration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at 13, 4§ (Constitution must be "overhauled");
24. Donald Horowitz, The Sunni Moment, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2005, at A20 (must be "fundamentally changed");
25. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 5, at 11 (calling for Constitution to be "totally revised").
26. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 5, at 11.
27. The latest integrationist blueprint, emblematic of the conventional wisdom, is the bipartisan report of the U. S. Iraq Study Group: JAMES A. BAKER III & LEE H. HAMILTON, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT: THE WAY FORWARD - A NEW APPROACH (Vintage Books 2006).
28. For a critique of the report, see Brendan O'Leary, Iraq's Future 101: The Failings of the Baker-Hamilton Report, 6 STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Mar. 2007, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Mar/ o%27learyMar07.pdf (last visited May 28, 2007).
29. This is the message conveyed generally by Horowitz, supra note 7,
30. Daloglu, supra note 5,
31. and the Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 5.
32. See also Toby Dodge, State Collapse and the Rise of Identity Politics, in IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 23 (Markus E. Bouillon, David M. Malone & Ben Rowswell eds., Lynne Rienner 2007).
33. For examples of the consociational approach applied to Iraq, see generally THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ (Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry & Khaled Salih eds., Univ. of Pennsylvania Press 2005), particularly at 47-142.
34. IRAQ CONST. art. 113 (guaranteeing autonomy for Kurdistan); IRAQ CONST. arts. 116-117 (defining the powers of an autonomous region); IRAQ CONST. arts. 118-119, 121 (defining protections for smaller communities).
35. Leslie Gelb, The Three State Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2003, at A27 (late edition). See also Joseph Biden & Leslie Gelb, Unity through Autonorny in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at A19 (late edition).
36. PETER W. GALBRAITH, THE END OF IRAQ: HOW AMERICAN INCOMPETENCE CREATED A WAR WITHOUT END (Simon & Schuster 2006).
37. Michael E. O'Hanlon, Voluntary Ethnic Re-location in Iraq, L.A.TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, available at http://www.mathoum.com/press9/285S23.htm.
38. See Dodge, supra note 10, at 25; Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 5;
39. see also Reidar Visser, Iraq's Partition Fantasy, Open Democracy, May 19, 2006, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/ partition_3565.jsp (last visited June 1, 2007).
40. See Dodge, supra note 10, at 2 5.
41. See Visser, supra note 16.
42. Brendan O'Leary, Power-Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, supra note 11, at 47;
43. GALBRAITH, supra note 14;
44. Biden & Gelb, supra note 13, at A19.
45. O'Leary, supra note 2, at 15-16.
46. See Lijphart, Self-Determination, supra note 2.
47. For an integrationist criticism of this approach, see ROGERS BRUBAKER, ETHNICITY WITHOUT GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 2006).
48. Lebanon is an example of a corporate consociation. It currently allocates three of its most important political offices - the presidency, premiership, and speaker of the legislature - to a Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shi'a Muslim, respectively. This creates a hierarchy among the three communities, as the offices to which they are entitled are not equal in stature, but it also creates a hierarchy between the three communities and communities that are not accommodated, such as Lebanon's Druze, or the various crosscutting communities (environmentalists, socialists, feminists) who prefer to stress a programmatic politics rather than one based on religion.
49. See Lijphart. Self-Determination, supra note 2;
50. O'Leary, supra note 2;
51. and McGARRY & O'LEARY, supra note 2.
52. Makiya, supra note 7;
53. Adeed Dawisha & Karen Dawisha, How to Build a Democratic Iraq, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 36 (2003);
54. Dawn Brancati, Is Federalism a Panacea for Post-Saddam Iraq?, 25 WASH. Q. 14 (2004);
55. Andreas Wimmer, Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq, 45 SURVIVAL 124 (2003).
56. See Wimmer, supra note 25, at 123: "federalization may heighten, rather than reduce the risks of gross human rights violations, especially for members of ethnic minorities living under the rule of the majority government in a federal unit."
57. See also Imad Salamey & Frederic Pearson, The Crisis of Federalism and Electoral Strategies in Iraq, 6 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 190 (2005).
58. See Makiya, supra note 7; Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 5, at ii.
59. IRAQ CONST. art. 140.
60. Id. art. 119.
61. BAKER & HAMILTON, supra note 9 (arguing that the referendum on Kirkuk be postponed); for comments,
62. see O'Leary, supra note 9.
63. Biden & Gelb, supra note 13, at A19.
64. Technically, the Dayton Accords divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two federal units, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, respectively. However, the former is divided into Croat and Bosniak-controlled cantons. The Dayton Peace Accords on Bosnia (1995), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/ bosagree.html.
65. Biden & Gelb, supra note 13, at A19.
66. See Phebe Marr, Iraq's Identity Crisis, in IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 41, 45-49 (Markus E. Bouillon, David M. Malone & Ben Rowswell eds., Lynne Rienner 2007).
67. The name change occurred in May 2007, and was explained by the party as reflecting the successful revolutionary overthrow of the Ba'athist regime. It may have also reflected a wish on the part of its leadership to distance the party from its formation in, and past sponsorship by, Ayatollah Khomeni's Iran.
68. Integrationists often point to intragroup divisions in order to criticize consociationalism, and, in Iraq, they point to internal divisions among both Kurds and Shi'a Arabs. However, while the Kurds clearly have internal party-based divisions, these exist alongside a consensus on collective self-government. The Kurdish perspective is that internal divisions can be managed within a self-governing Kurdistan. There is not yet a similar consensus on collective self-government among Shi'a Arabs.
69. As a constitutional adviser to the Kurdistan Regional Government in the making of Iraq's Constitution, and, therefore, as someone privileged to see both public and private texts, O'Leary attributes the emergence of this approach to a memorandum written by the UN specialist South African professor Nicholas Haysom, which resembled some of the features of the Spanish Constitution.
70. IRAQ CONST. art. 140.
71. The Iraqi Constitution provides for a referendum if there is "a request by one-third of the council members of each governorate intending to form a region" or "a request by one-tenth of the voters in each of the governorates intending to form a region." Id. art. 119.
72. For the tripartite solution, see Biden & Gelb, supra note 13, at A19.
73. RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 113-114 (McGill-Queen's Univ. Press 1999).
74. Horowitz, supra note 7.
75. See Dodge, supra note 10, at 35.
76. Visser, supra note 16, He claims that Iraqi nationalism remains "flourishing" and that "even today, in a climate of growing sectarian terrorism calculated to obliterate the idea of coexistence, many Iraqis stubbornly refuse to reveal their ethno-religious identity when interrogated by western journalists. Many simply say they are Iraqis." There are, of course, good reasons why Iraqis may refuse to reveal their identities to foreigners and other Iraqis.
77. See Dodge, supra note 10, at 29.
78. For a more detailed construction and defense of the constitution's clauses on natural resources, see Brendan O'Leary, Federalizing Natural Resources, in IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 189 (Markus E. Bouillon, David M. Malone & Ben Rowswell eds., Lynne Rienner 2007).
79. IRAQ CONST. art. 110-111.
80. Id. arts. 111 & 115.
81. Id. arts. 111 & 121.
82. Id. art. 112 (emphasis added).
83. Id. arts. 115 & 121.
84. Some supporters of a centralized Iraq, in which Baghdad would control natural resources, argue with breathtaking early revisionism that the Constitution actually mandates their preferred world. This appears to be the curious position of the oil minister, Hussain al-Shahristani, appointed in 2006, who claimed on assuming office that the federal government's (alleged) control over exploration extended to all oil fields in the country, including those that are not yet in production: Steve Negus, Iraq Faces Clash with Kurds Over Oil Deals, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), May 23-24, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3d56aa60-ea7c-11da-9566-0000779e2340.html.
85. The Turkish government has taken a similar line, seeking through its official spokesmen to play down the extent to which Iraq's Constitution gives any control over oil to Iraq's regions: Turkey Wary of Iraqi-Kurd Plans to Export Oil, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR (F.R.G.), June 27, 2007, available at http://www.pukonline.com/ eng/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1182.
86. This position is vigorously contested by the Kurdistan Regional Government. Telephone interview by Brendan O'Leary with Khaled Salih, official spokesman, Kurdistan Regional Government, (May 30, 2007).
87. Makiya, supra note 7.
88. Id.
89. Said, supra note 5.
90. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 5, at ii.
91. Horowitz, supra note 7, at A20.
92. For example, Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group alleges that "the Kurds are using the historic opportunity of rolling back Arab domination to sue for independence through the acquisition of Kirkuk and its oil wealth." Joost R. Hiltermann, Kirkuk and the Kurds: A Difficidt Choice Ahead, ASSYRIAN INT'L NEWS AGENCY, May 22, 2007, available at http://www.aina.org/news/200705229921.htm. However, he has no stated sources for this view; it is mere surmise - though widely shared among critics of the Kurds.
93. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 5, at ii.
94. Id.
95. Dawisha & Dawisha, supra note 25, at 38.
96. The Dayton Peace Accords on Bosnia, supra note 32.
97. Biden & Gelb, supra note 13, at A19. Bosnia-Herzegovina now has a single army, with ethnically homogeneous units.
98. Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, http://www.ieciraq.org/English/ Frameset_english.htm.
99. Iraqi Voters Back New Constitution, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4374822.stm#map (last visited June 29, 2007).
100. Reidar Visser also acknowledges that the Kurdish desire for autonomy is more widespread than elsewhere but argues that there are intra-Kurdish divisions on the question. See Visser, supra note 16.
101. IRAQ CONST. art. 126(4) states that it may not be amended "if such amendments take away from the powers of the regions" except with the approval of the concerned region's legislature and its people voting in a referendum. IRAQ CONST. art. 142, which suspends article 126 for the transitional period, states that constitutional change requires the support of a majority of voters and must not be rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates. As the Kurds make up the overwhelming majority of voters in three governorates, this translates into a Kurdish veto.
102. One integrationist response from a leading Iraqi integrationist is that Iraqi voters did not read the Constitution and, therefore, did not know what they were voting for: (response from Rend Rahim al-Francke, President, Iraq Foundation, response to question by John McGarry at "Advancing Rights in the New Iraq" conference, in Ottawa, Canada, Mar. 2, 2006). In our view, Iraqis may not have read the text but they broadly knew what they were doing when they followed the guidance of their political leaders as to how to cast their ballots.
103. See Dodge, supra note 10, at 35.
104. See generally Jack Snyder, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND NATIONALIST CONFLICT (W.W. Norton 2000);
105. Rogers Brubaker, NATIONALISM REFRAMED (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
106. E.g., in Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia, Russia, and Azerbaijan.
107. E.g., Trans-Dniestria; Abkhazia; South Ossetia; Nagorno-Karabakh; and, before its forced reincorporation into Russia, Chechnya.
108. See Marr, supra note 34, at 51.
109. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 5, at 32. It may be hoped that this myth has been shattered by recent election results, which should eventually force a Sunni Arab rethink on the merits of centralization.
110. See also Marr, supra note 34, at 48.
111. Dawisha & Dawisha, supra note 25 at 38. In spite of Adeed and Karen Dawisha's argument, it is not the case that natural resources in federations are always under the control of federal authorities, as the examples of Canada and the U.S. show.
112. IRAQ CONST. art. 112.1.
113. See, e.g., James Glanz, Iraqi Sunni Lands Show New Oil and Gas Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2007, at A1 (with "Iraqi Sunni" referring to Arabs). This is an article that brings U.S. readers up to date on what has been well known by the informed for a long time.
114. Biden & Gelb, supra note 13, at A19.
115. Horowitz, supra note 7, at A20.
116. IRAQ CONST. art. 119.
117. Id. art. 121.
118. Id. art. 126.
119. Id. art 115. It may appear unthinkable that politicians would ever surrender jurisdictional responsibilities or miss the opportunity to acquire more, but there is evidence to the contrary from comparative experience. In Canada, only Quebec has opted to take up its own pension plan, and all other Canadian provinces have been happy with the federal plan.
120. See An Act Respecting the Qu-acebec Pension Plan, R.S.Q. 1965 (1st sess.), c. 24, §10. There are many other examples, under Canada's practice of asymmetrical federalism, of Quebec being the only province to exercise a degree of autonomy that is available to all provinces.
121. This is one reason why Laith Kubba supports the Constitution. He believes it provides for a centralized Arab Iraq linked to a decentralized federacy of Kurdistan: Interview with Laith Kubba, Personal Advisor to former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'afari,. at the "Iraq: Preventing another Generation of Conflict" conference, in Ottawa, Canada (May 11-12, 2006).
122. Our point, here, is that each of Iraq's communities has the right to choose how it should be governed, but not the right to choose how others should be governed. The current preference of many Sunni Arabs is for all of Iraq, including Kurdistan and the Shi'a South, to be ruled from Baghdad. This is an illegitimate preference, as it would entail imposing centralization on communities that do not want it.
123. Integrationists should like flexible arrangements for asymmetrical decentralization, as it seems suited to their view that identities, and associated political aspirations, are fluid.
124. IRAQ CONST. art. 14.
125. Id. art. 4.
126. Id.
127. Id. art. 125.
128. Makiya, supra note 7.
129. Brancati, supra note 25, at 18.
130. See Salamey & Pearson, supra note 26.
131. For an explanation of "demos-enabling2: Federations, see Al C. Stepan, Federalisrn and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, 10(4) J. DEMOCRACY 19 (1999).
132. The Dayton Peace Accords on Bosnia (1995), supra note 32;
133. Biden & Gelb, supra note 13, at A19.
134. BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. 1995, art. V.
135. These arrangements also work at cross-purposes with the international community's expressed aim of encouraging Bosnia-Herzegovina's ethnically cleansed to return home. See also text accompanying note 23.
136. The Ta'if Accord, 1989, pt. II, §A(4) & pt. II, §B (Leb.).
137. See Brendan O'Leary, Foreword to MICHAEL KERR, IMPOSING POWER-SHARING: CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND LEBANON passim (Irish Acad. Press 2006). Although critics of consociation everywhere cite the example of Lebanon to buttress their arguments, it is not at all clear that the Lebanese precedent supports their interpretation. Consociation maintained peace in Lebanon for most of the period between 1943 and the outbreak of civil war in 1975, and it is instructive that the Ta'if Accord went back to (modified) consociational arrangements. The weaknesses of Lebanon's consociation had something to do with its corporate features, but the civil war was largely a result of the destabilizing influence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which produced a significant influx of Palestinian refugees, rather than consociation. Lebanon's current problems (as of June 2007) appear related to the same cause; arguably, what Lebanon needs is liberal consociation rather than no consociation.
138. IRAQ CONST. art. 138.
139. Id. art. 76.
140. The majoritarian-decision making rule for cabinet composition does not represent the triumph of integrationist principles of nonpartisanship. Rather, it reflects the preference of the Shi'a majority for an executive that it could control.
141. The electoral system is not a part of the Iraqi Constitution, but the Constitution stipulates that any election should provide for the "representation of all components of the Iraqi people," which suggests a proportional representation system, as does the provision mandating that at least one in four Iraqi assembly members must be women-which obliges a proportional representation system because single-gender districts or constituencies would violate the constitutional mandate for equality between the sexes. IRAQ CONST. art. 49. Any electoral system that is not based on proportional representation, such as the single-member plurality or alternative-vote systems that are favored by integrationists, would have the effect of under-representing minorities, particularly small minorities, and could be subject to court challenges.
142. Salamey & Pearson, supra note 26.
143. See O'Leary, supra note 19.
144. The cabinet's thirty-six members include nineteen Shi'a Arabs, eight Sunni Arabs, eight Kurds and one Christian.
145. BELG. CONST. art. 99 (guaranteeing that there be as many French-speaking members as Dutch-speaking members in the Council of Ministers, with the possible exception of the prime minister);
146. BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. 1995, art. V.1(a) (providing that the presidency be comprised of one Croat and one Bosniak, each elected from the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and one Serb, elected from the territory of Republika Srpska);
147. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, §§ 16-18 (Guaranteeing ministerial representation to members of all significant parties in the legislature that wish to avail of the opportunity to join the cabinet, and guaranteeing that the first and deputy first ministerships be shared between representatives of the nationalist and unionist communities).
148. IRAQ CONST. art. 76.
149. Id. art. 70.
150. The two deputy premerships also disappear after the transitional period.
151. Donald Rothchild, Reassuring Weaker Parties after Civil Wars: The Benefits and Costs of Executive Power-Sharing Systems in Africa, 4 ETHNOPOL. 247 (2005);
152. Ian O'Flynn & David Russell, POWER-SHARING: NEW CHALLENGES FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES (Pluto Press 2005).
153. Invented in 1878 by Belgian mathematician and lawyer Victor d'Hondt, the d'Hondt method is a highest-averages formula for allocating seats in party-list proportional representation. See Brendan O'Leary, Bernard Grofman & Jorgen Elklit, Divisor Methods for Sequential Portfolio Allocation in Multi-Party Executive Bodies: Evidence from Northern Ireland and Denmark, 49 Am. J. POL. SCI. 198. (2005).
154. Id.
155. I The D'Hondt method would have to be supplemented by a rule that prevents opportunistic party fragmentation aimed at seizing key portfolios.
156. The Federation Council is referred to in IRAQ CONST. art. 62, whereas the Supreme Court is referred to in arts. 92-94.
157. Stepan, supra note 95.
158. IRAQ CONST. art. 93; it is our view, shared by Peter Galbraith
159. (GALBRAITH, Supra note 14), that, because the federal Bill of Rights is not specified as an exclusive competence of the federal Supreme Court, legal supremacy over the Bill of Rights belongs to any established region. Consequently, it is to regional constitutions that we must look - where regions are established - for the best protections of minorities.
160. IRAQ CONST. art. 90
161. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-19, §6 (1985).
162. Formerly dominated communities in severely divided polities may embrace integration for ethnocentric purposes if they come to see themselves as potentially dominant. This is how we understand Moqtada al-Sadr's support for a centralized Iraq.
163. I. William Zartman, The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments, 1 GLOBAL REV. ETHNOPOL. 8 (2001).