Funding mechanisms and policy instruments: How business campaign contributions influence congressional votes

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 57, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 315-324

  Fellowes, Matthew C ^a   Wolf, Patrick J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3543147665     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/106591290405700212     Document Type: Article

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