Self-reporting and ex post asymmetric information

Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

Volumn 77, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 141-153

  Feess, Eberhard ^a   Heesen, Eva ^b  

^a RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Ex post asymmetric information; Law enforcement; Self reporting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036863839     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-001-0539-0     Document Type: Article

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