Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets

International Finance

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 25-59

  Kamin, Steven B ^a  

^a Federal Reserve Board Division of International Finance   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL FLOW; CREDIT PROVISION; FINANCIAL MARKET; IMF; INVESTMENT INCENTIVE;

EID: 3543054588     PISSN: 13670271     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1367-0271.2004.00128.x     Document Type: Article

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