Genetic algorithms and non-ESS solutions to game theory models

Animal Behaviour

Volumn 74, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1005-1018

  Hamblin, Steven ^a   Hurd, Peter L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

Author keywords

animal communication; conventional signalling; ES set; ESS; game theory; genetic algorithm

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; GAME THEORY; GENETIC ALGORITHM;

ANIMALIA;

EID: 35148842361     PISSN: 00033472     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.01.013     Document Type: Article

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