The federal government as a constitutional niche in affirmative action cases

UCLA Law Review

Volumn 54, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1931-1961

  Winkler, Adam ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 34948858078     PISSN: 00415650     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (186)

1. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006);
2. Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005) [hereinafter Rosen, Tailoring];
3. Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical Examination of Term Limits, Judicial Campaign Codes, and AntiPornography Ordinances, 21 J.L. & POL. 223 (2005);
4. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005) [hereinafter Schauer, Institutional First Amendment];
5. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004);
6. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term - Comment: Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998).
7. See Rosen, Tailoring, supra note 1, at 1515-16;
8. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 1, at 1257-58.
9. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
10. Rosen, Tailoring, supra note 1, at 1516.
11. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 328.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 329.
16. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006) ('"[J]udicial deference . . . is at its apogee' when Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support armies." (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)) ).
17. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (allowing prisons to infringe inmates' fundamental constitutional rights whenever the burdensome policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests).
18. In the mid-1900s, the U.S. Supreme Court gradually interpreted nearly all of the protections of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states as well as the federal government. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 499-505 (3d ed. 2006).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 26-29.
21. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
22. Id. at 227.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
26. See id. at 498.
27. See U.S. CONST, amend. V.
28. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
29. 448 U.S. 448 ( 1980) (plurality opinion).
30. Id. at 472.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (outlawing slavery); id. at amend. XIV (guaranteeing equal protection of the laws);
32. id. at amend. XV (barring denial of the right to vote on the basis of race).
33. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472.
34. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
35. Id.
36. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
37. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion).
38. See id. at 167;
39. id. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring);
40. id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. For strict scrutiny cases, see, for example, Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1991);
43. Sims v. Montgomery County Commission, 873 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
44. For intermediate scrutiny cases, see, for example, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994).
45. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
46. Id. at 227.
47. Id. at 223-24.
48. Id. at 224.
49. No preliminary injunction cases and no decisions in which a subsequent court ruled on the merits of the same constitutional claim were included.
50. See Adam Winkler, Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28 LOY. L.A. L REV. 923, 956-57 (1995).
51. See Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1582-83 (2002).
52. See Wallace v. Calogero, 286 F. Supp. 2d 748 (E.D. La. 2003);
53. Santiago v. Miles, 774 F. Supp. 775 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
54. See United States v. Travis, 837 F. Supp. 1386 (E.D. Ky. 1993).
55. At p = .041, this variation was statistically significant.
56. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 272 (1990).
57. For additional insights into the potential qualitative differences in state and federal lawmaking, see John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons From Environmental Regulation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer & Autumn 1997, at 203, 218;
58. William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 723 (1995);
59. Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 921, 940 (1998);
60. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 81 TEX L. REV. 1, 77 (2004).
61. See Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
62. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
63. See Martinez v. City of St. Louis, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
64. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 167;
66. id. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring);
67. id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 185-86;
69. id. at 189 (Powell, J., concurring);
70. id. at 195 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 184-85 (plurality opinion) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
72. Id. at 185 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).
73. Id. at 185 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 486 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)).
74. Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 193.
76. 969 F.2d 1273 (1st Cir. 1992).
77. Id. at 1277.
78. 239 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2001).
79. Id. at 220.
80. 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 982.
82. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 989 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1993);
83. Martin v. City of St. Louis, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2003);
84. N. State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Dept., 862 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. N.C. 1994).
85. 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
86. Id. at 318.
87. Id. at 318-19 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 569 (1990)).
88. 785 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 477.
91. Id.
92. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
94. Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 970-71 (8th Cir. 2003).
95. 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 1165.
97. 17 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (D. Minn. 1998).
98. Id. at 1034 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. See, e.g., Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a public contracting preference due to a lack of evidence of prior discrimination);
100. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (invalidating a university scholarship program limited to African American students for being overbroad);
101. Mallory v. Harkness, 895 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring one-third of appointees to a judicial nominating commission to be women or minorities).
102. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
103. 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).
104. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
105. 190 F.3d at 1064-65.
106. Id. at 1066.
107. Id. at 1067 (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990)).
108. 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating a racial preference used for undergraduate admissions to the University of Michigan).
109. 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2002).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 960-61.
112. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
113. See, e.g., Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism," 92 CAL. L REV. 1441, 1463 (2004).
114. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (1994).
115. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
116. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE, at xiii (1998) ("[J]ustices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of others, of the choices they expect others to make, and of the Institutional context in which they act.");
117. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992);
118. John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 566 (1992).
119. The separation-of-powers game is mostly studied in the context of statutory interpretation, but, as Barry Friedman argues, also has salience in constitutional cases. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 313-16 (2005).
120. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 90, at 37.
121. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997);
122. Susan B. Haire et al. Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 143, 147 (2003) ("Like all professionals, judges prefer to be held in high esteem by their colleagues and may desire promotion and elevation to a higher court." (citations omitted)). Some studies have found that judges were more likely to be promoted to an appeals court if they upheld the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
123. See Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183 (1991);
124. Gregory C. Sisk et al. Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1383 (1998) (observing a correlation between judges upholding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and judges' likelihood of being promoted to the circuit level).
125. See William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 592-93 (2004) (describing President Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan).
126. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 39 (2002) ("In 1866, after the war was over and Andrew Johnson was in the White House, Congress reduced the size of the Court to seven . . . . Many believe that the reduction in size to seven was enacted precisely to deprive Andrew Johnson of appointees who might oppose congressional measures.").
127. See id. at 25-37 (describing congressional action stripping courts of jurisdiction and effectively extinguishing any chance of a judicial ruling on the constitutionality of Reconstruction);
128. Maxim O. Mayer-Cesiano, Comment, On Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Proper Scope of Inferior Federal Courts' Independence From Congress, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 559, 560 (2006) (discussing legislation to strip federal courts of habeas jurisdiction for Guantanamo detainees).
129. The U.S. Congress has considered, but has not yet adopted, bars on federal courts' jurisdiction to hear challenges to the federal Defense of Marriage Act, see H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005), and challenges to the mandatory recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools,
130. see Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005);
131. Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. §§ 101-02 (2005).
132. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 85 (1991);
133. Marcia Coyle, Federal Judicial Pay Continues to Erode, NAT'L L.J, July 31, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp? id=1154077532466.
134. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 345-46 (1988).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
136. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
137. Id. at 490-91.
138. See Ex Parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
139. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 372 (1997).
140. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 487-88 (1999);
141. see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "racial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the state and local than at the federal level");
142. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II - Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990).
143. Schragger, supra note 1, at 1822.
144. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
145. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (2000).
146. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (2000);
147. see Friedman, supra note 104, at 372.
148. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 1, at 1259.
149. Id. at 1266.
150. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
151. Id. at 515.
152. 482 U.S. 78(1987).
153. Id. at 84-85 (quoting Prownier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
154. Id. at 89.
155. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 515.
156. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
157. Id. at 918.
158. Id. at 920.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 919.
162. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
163. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
164. Wittner, 87 F.3d at 919.
165. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
166. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
167. Id. at 328-29.
168. Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 459, 470 (2004).
169. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978)).
170. Id. at 328.
171. 190 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999).
172. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996).
173. See supra Part II.C.1.
174. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
175. See id.
176. See sources cited supra note 44.
177. See Norman R. Williams II, Note, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of Judicial Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 985 (1994).
178. See Godby v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 996 F. Supp. 1390 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
179. 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).
180. The policy was detailed in Bob Jones University v. United Staus, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), in which the Supreme Court upheld the denial of a tax exemption to the fundamentalist Christian university.
181. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
182. See id. at 508-09.
183. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
184. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
185. See generally Schragger, supra note 1.
186. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing against incorporation of the Establishment Clause).