Bureaucratic capacity and bureaucratic discretion: Does congress tie policy authority to performance?

American Politics Research

Volumn 35, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 790-807

  MacDonald, Jason A ^a   Franko Jr , William W ^a  

^a KENT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency capacity; Bureaucracy; Bureaucratic discretion; Congress; Delegation; Policy authority; Public policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 34848868174     PISSN: 1532673X     EISSN: 15523373     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X07301654     Document Type: Article

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