Debt restructuring and economic recovery: Analysing the Argentine swap

World Economy

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 377-398

  Dhillon, Amrita ^a   García Fronti, Javier ^a   Ghosal, Sayantan ^a   Miller, Marcus ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS;

ARGENTINA; SOUTH AMERICA;

EID: 33644872569     PISSN: 03785920     EISSN: 14679701     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00789.x     Document Type: Editorial

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