Supreme court auditing of the US courts of appeals: An organizational perspective

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 607-624

  Lindquist, Stefanie A ^a   Haire, Susan B ^b   Songer, Donald R ^c  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548777007     PISSN: 10531858     EISSN: 14779803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mul022     Document Type: Article

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