Targeted killing, norms, and international law

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 711-758

  Fisher, W Jason ^a  

^a United States District Court for the District of New Mexico ^*

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34548640020     PISSN: 00101931     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (309)

1. Chris Downes, 'Targeted Killings' in an Age of Terror: The Legality of the Yemen Strike, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 277, 277-78 (2004);
2. David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 171-72 (2005).
3. Downes, supra note 1, at 277-78; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 171-72.
4. Daniel Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 96 (2006) [hereinafter Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?];
5. Daniel Byman, Targeted Killing, American-Style, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at B13 [hereinafter Byman, American-style] ;
6. Eben Kaplan, Q&A: Targeted Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/ slot3_012506.html?r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print.
7. Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233, 239-42 (2003);
8. Steven R. David, Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing, MIDEAST SEC. & POL'Y STUD., Sept. 2002, at 1-2 [hereinafter David, Fatal Choices];
9. Steven R. David, Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing, 17 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 111, 111-13 (2003) [hereinafter David, Israel's Policy].
10. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 239-42; David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 1-2;
11. David, Israel's Policy, supra note 4, at 111-13.
12. B'Tselem, Statistics: Fatalities, http://www.btselem.org/English/ Statistics/Casualties.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Yemen/USA: Government Must Not Sanction Extra-Judicial Executions, (Nov. 8, 2002) (AI Index AMR 51/168/2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ engamr511682002 (claiming that the U.S. strike on al-Harithi involved "extra-judicial executions in violation of international human rights law");
14. Amnesty Int'l, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Israel Must End Its Policy of Assassinations, AI Index MDE 15/056/2003, July 4, 2003, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde150562003 (discussing Israel's targeted killing actions as "extrajudicial executions" that are inconsistent with its obligations under international human rights law);
15. Amnesty Int'l, Israel and the Occupied Territories: State Assassinations and Other Unlawful Killings, AI Index MDE 15/005/2001, Feb. 21, 2001, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ engmde150052001 [hereinafter "Unlawful Killings"] (referencing Israeli targeted killings as "extrajudicial executions" and "abandonment of human rights principles");
16. Amnesty Int'l, United States of America: An Extrajudicial Execution by the CIA?, AI Index AMR 51/079/2005, May 18, 2005, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr510792005 (stating that the U.S. attack on senior al Qaeda member Haitham al-Yemeni using a Predator drone in Pakistan was an "extrajudicial execution, in violation of international law");
17. Amnesty Int'l, Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security, AI Index MDE 31/006/2003, Sept. 24, 2003, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde310062003 ("the proper standards applicable to [the U.S. action against al-Harithi] were law enforcement standards according to which the US and Yemen should have cooperated to try to arrest [the] suspects rather than kill them.").
18. See, e.g., Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2003/6, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.11 (April 15, 2003) (condemning Israeli military actions against individual terrorists as "extrajudicial executions" and as constituting "a violation of human rights norms");
19. U.N. Econ & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/121 (March 16, 2001) (stating that Israel's use of targeted killing amounts to "political assassination" and "is a fundamental violation of international human rights standards");
20. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Including Palestine, ¶¶ 10, 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/30 (Dec. 17, 2002) (characterizing Israeli attacks on individual terrorists as " assassinations" and describing one Palestinian as "extrajudicially executed").
21. See, e.g., Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary General on the Middle East (June 10, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/printsgstats.asp?nid=387 (referring to Israel's attack on a Hamas-affiliated terrorist as an "attempted extrajudicial killing by Israeli Defense Forces" and reiterating the Secretary General's "consistent opposition to such actions").
22. See, e.g., Expert Opinion of Antonio Cassese on Whether Israel's Targeted Killings of Palestinian Terrorists is Consonant with International Humanitarian Law on Behalf of Petitioners, HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (Israel 1999); Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4; Kretzmer, supra note 1; Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (2005);
23. Yael Stein, By Any Name Illegal and Immoral, 17 ETHICS & INT'L AFF., 127, 128-32 (2003).
24. See, e.g., Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, supra note 3;
25. David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4;
26. Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Assassination and Preventive Killing, 25 SAIS REV. 41 (2005).
27. Matthew C. Wiebe, Assassination in Domestic and International Law: The Central Intelligence Agency, State-Sponsored Terrorism, and the Right of Self-Defense, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 363, 365 (2003)
28. (quoting W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination, 1989 ARMY L. 4, 4 (1989)).
29. See also Downes, supra note 1, at 279-80; Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 11, at 41-43; Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 627-28 (1992);
30. Brenda L. Godfrey, Comment, Authorization to Kill Terrorist Leaders and Those Who Harbor Them: An International Analysis of Defensive Assassination, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 491, 493 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 11, at 41-43; Schmitt, supra note 12, at 641-42; Wiebe, supra note 12, at 366.
32. See Amnesty Int'l, Yemen/USA, supra note 7. See also Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 319, 329-30 (2004).
33. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 235.
34. David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 2. "Governmental approval" in this context refers to an executive finding that (1) declares that targeting an individual terrorist is in the national interest because they pose a significant security threat and (2) authorizes such action. Kaplan, supra note 3.
35. For more on the relationship between law and social norms, see generally ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000);
36. Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 157 (2000);
37. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995);
38. Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997);
39. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996);
40. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
41. Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 1, 5 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996);
42. WARD THOMAS, THE ETHICS OF DESTRUCTION 7 (2001).
43. Ronald L. Jepperson et al., Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 18, at 33, 52; THOMAS, supra note 18, at 20.
44. Michael J. Glennon, How International Legal Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 954-55 (2005); THOMAS, supra note 18, at 43.
45. Glennon, supra note 20, at 940-41.
46. See id. at 956-957.
47. Id. at 957-58.
48. Id. at 971-72, 983. "Desuetude" means "obsolescence through disuse;" the doctrine of desuetude holds that "if a statute or treaty is left unenforced long enough, the courts will no longer regard it as having any legal effect even though it has not been repealed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
49. See generally Katzenstein, supra note 18.
50. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT'L SECURITY 5, 8 (2004).
51. THOMAS, supra note 18, at 20.
52. Ann Florini, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 INT'L STUD. Q. 363, 374-377 (1996).
53. Id. at 375. See generally Ian Johnstone, The Power of Interpretive Communities, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 185 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
54. It should be noted that, because the question of targeted killing's legality involves the legal assessment of a particular tactic's use in particular situations and the motives for entering hostilities become immaterial to such a question once hostilities begin, most legal scholars and practitioners agree that targeted killing's legal status depends on jus in bello principles of proper conduct and not jus ad bellum principles of legitimate entrance into hostilities. Consequently, issues implicating jus in bello are the focus here. See, e.g., M.N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 813 (4th ed. 1997);
55. David Wippman, Redefining Combatants, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 700 (2006) (stating that international law recognizes a strict separation between the law governing the resort to force, jus ad bellum, and the law governing how force is used once hostilities have begun, jus en bello);
56. Proulx, supra note 10, at 812. While the vast majority of international legal scholars and practitioners have chosen to examine targeted killing's legality with the rules relating to jus in bello, some have addressed the question in terms of the rules relating to jus ad bellum. For examples, see generally Downes, supra note 1; Godfrey, supra note 12; Emanuel Gross, Democracy in the War Against Terrorism - The Israeli Experience, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161 (2002);
57. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Re-Leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 446 (2003)
58. (reviewing CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2000)).
59. See supra note 7.
60. See supra note 8.
61. See supra note 9.
62. G.A. Res. ES-10/13, ¶ 2, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emergency Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/13 (Oct. 21, 2003), (condemning Israel's targeted killings as "extrajudicial killings" and calling for their end); G.A. Res. 56/62, ¶ 2, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/62 (Dec. 10, 2001) (referencing Israeli actions against individual terrorists as "extrajudicial killing" and demanding they "cease immediately").
63. See generally Downes, supra note 1; O'Connell, supra note 30. See also Proulx, supra note 10, at 889-90; Stein, supra note 10, at 128-32.
64. Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 178-79.
65. Id. at 179.
66. Id. at 178-79; O'Connell, supra note 30; Proulx, supra note 10, at 889-90; Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges From the "War on Terror," FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2003, at 58-63 (stating that targeted killing appears to transgress the right to life and the right to a fair trial); Stein, supra note 10, at 131.
67. Downes, supra note 1, at 294; Proulx, supra note 10, at 886-89; Rona, supra note 38, at 64-65; Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22 L. & INEQ. 195, 212-13 (2004).
68. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 284-85; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 180-81; Proulx, supra note 10, at 890; Stein, supra note 10, at 130-31.
69. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
70. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 284-87; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 177-85; Proulx, supra note 10, at 886-90; Stein, supra note 10, at 130-31.
71. Guiora, supra note 14, at 330. See also Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 183-86.
72. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 184.
73. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at 238-39 (July 8) (holding that the ICCPR does not cease to apply during hostilities and that the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one's life also applies during hostilities).
74. See id. at 240.
75. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 178-79; O'Connell, supra note 30; Proulx, supra note 10, at 889-90; Rona, supra note 38, at 63-65; Sassoli, supra note 39; Stein, supra note 10, at 131.
76. See, e.g., Demian Casey, Breaking the Chain of Violence in Israel and Palestine: Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings Under International Humanitarian Law, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 311, 318-21 (2005). See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
77. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 259-60; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 205-07.
78. Supplemental Statement by the State Attorney's Office, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel, HCJ 769/02, at 16-17 (Israel 2003), available at http://www.stoptorture.org.il/eng/images/uploaded/ publications/69.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) [hereinafter "Supplemental Statement"]. See also Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 205-07.
79. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 281-82. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter "AP I"]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter "AP II"].
80. See Supplemental Response on Behalf of the State Attorney's Office, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, HCJ 769/02, at 9-10 (Israel 2003), available at http://www.stoptorture.org.il//eng/images/ uploaded/publications/73.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) [hereinafter "Supplemental Response"].
81. See Amnesty Int'l, Yemen/USA, supra note 7, at 22 (quoting a U.S. government official stating that U.S. targeted killing actions "would be governed by the international law of armed conflict").
82. See Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, HCJ 769/02, ¶¶ 21, 60, (Israel 2005) available at http://elyon1.court.gov. il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.HTM (holding that the international law of armed conflict governs the use of targeted killing against terrorists in the Palestinian territories);
83. Israel v. Barghouti, DC 092134/02 (Israel 2002), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/12/ State%20of%20Israel%20vs%20Marwan%20Barghouti-%20Ruling%20by%20Jud (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) (holding that the State of Israel is governed by the international law of armed conflict in its hostilities with terrorists in the Palestinian territories); Supplemental Statement, supra note 50, at 7, 14, 22-23.
84. See Cassese, supra note 10, at 2 (stating that "the applicable law in the discussion of the relevant issues is the body of international customary and treaty rules relating to international armed conflicts. . . .").
85. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 255-56.
86. Id. (quoting COMMENTARY, THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952)).
87. See, e.g., Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 4; Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 256; Rona, supra note 38, at 58-61.
88. See supra notes 56, 57.
89. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Hague Convention [IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Regulations Annexed Thereto art. 25, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. See also Cassese, supra note 10, at 4.
90. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land arts. 1-3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat, 2277, T.S. No. 539. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm.
91. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 269-71; Cassese, supra note 10, at 10-11; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 191-92.
92. See Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, supra note 54, at ¶ 26.
93. See Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 43; AP I, supra note 51.
94. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 269-71; Cassese, supra note 10, at 7; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 192-93; Proulx, supra note 10, at 881-82.
95. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 10, at 10, 15-18; Proulx, supra note 10, at 884-87; Stein, supra note 10, at 129.
96. See e.g., Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 48-49; Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 11, at 48-49.
97. See Cassese, supra note 10, at 10; Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 33-36; Proulx, supra note 10, at 884-87; Stein, supra note 10, at 129.
98. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 10, at 15, 18.
99. See, e.g., id. at 7, 18.
100. See, e.g., id. at 9, 18.
101. See, e.g., id. at 15-19.
102. Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 48; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 192-94.
103. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 192-94. Israel regards the following specific persons as taking direct part in hostilities: persons posing an immediate danger; persons providing immediate support to persons posing an immediate danger; persons dispatching other persons to pose an immediate danger; persons preparing devices for acts of terror; persons providing essential ingredients of devices of terror; persons planning an act of terror, whether the operational idea or practical details; persons recruiting certain other persons to carry out acts of terror; and persons making operational decisions related to acts of terror. Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 11, at 48-49.
104. See, e.g., Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 49-50.
105. Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 48 (quoting Inter-American Human Rights Committee, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights) (emphasis omitted).
106. See, e.g., Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 256-58; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 195-97.
107. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 195-97.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 195.
110. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 257 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995)).
111. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 258 (quoting Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V./II.95, doc. 7 rev. 271, ¶ 152 (1997)).
112. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 258-59; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 196.
113. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 275-77; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 197.
114. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 197-98 (quoting AP II, supra note 51).
115. Id. at 198.
116. See id.
117. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 275-78, 281-82; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 197-99.
118. See Cassese, supra note 10, at 10-11; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 200.
119. Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 200-01.
120. See, e.g., Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 53-56; Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, supra note 54, ¶ 42.
121. Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 200 (quoting AP I, supra note 51, art. 51(5)(b)).
122. See, e.g., Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 57; Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 280.
123. Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 52; Proulx, supra note 10, at 887-89; Stein, supra note 10, at 133-35.
124. Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 52; Proulx, supra note 10, at 887-89; Stein, supra note 10, at 133-35.
125. Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 52; Proulx, supra note 10, at 887-89; Stein, supra note 10, at 133-35.
126. See, e.g., Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 53, 55, 61; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 200-02.
127. Supplemental Response, supra note 52, at 55 (quoting Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, art. 9(2)b(4), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90).
128. See, e.g., Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 200-04.
129. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Israel Must End, supra note 7, at 1 (referring to Israel's policy of "assassinating Palestinians whom they suspect of involvement in attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians"); Godfrey, supra note 12 (referring to targeted killing as "assassination" and "defensive assassination");
130. Joshua Raines, Osama, Augustine, and Assassination: The Just War Doctrine and Targeted Killings, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (using "targeted killing" and "assassination" interchangeably); Stein, supra note 10, at 128 (stating that targeted killing "should be defined as assassination").
131. Wiebe, supra note 12, at 365 (quoting Major Tyler J. Harder, Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Order 12,333: A Small Step in Clarifying Current Law, 172 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002)).
132. Schmitt, supra note 12, at 632.
133. Hague Convention [IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Regulations Annexed Thereto art. 23(b), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
134. J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: "Targeted Killings" Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1074-75 (2002); Schmitt, supra note 12, at 631.
135. See Hague Convention [IV], supra note 103, art. 23(b).
136. AP I, supra note 51, art. 37.
137. Id.
138. See Schmitt, supra note 12, at 633-35.
139. Id. at 634-35 (citing AP I, supra note 51, art. 37).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Supplemental Statement, supra note 50, at 50-55; Cassese, supra note 10, at 11; Kendall, supra note 104, at 1076-78; Schmitt, supra note 12, at 632-36.
142. See, e.g., Katzenstein, supra note 18, at 11-17; Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 889-91 (1998).
143. Martha Finnemore, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 153, 155, 157-58 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
144. THOMAS, supra note 18, at 8.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 9-10.
147. Finnemore, supra note 113, at 158. Constructivists assume that norms create permissive conditions for action by affecting interests but do not determine action; new or changed norms alter interests and, in doing so, enable new or different behaviors but do not ensure that they occur. Id.
148. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 112, at 895.
149. Id. at 897.
150. Id. at 902-03.
151. Id. at 904-05.
152. Nina Tannenwald, Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, 29 INT'L SECURITY 5, 9 (Spring 2005).
153. Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52:3 INT'L ORG. 613, 614-17 (1998).
154. See Florini, supra note 28.
155. Id. at 377, 384-85.
156. Id. at 378.
157. Id. at 374-75.
158. Id.; Finnemore, supra note 113, at 158; THOMAS, supra note 18, at 30-31.
159. Finnemore, supra note 113, at 158; THOMAS, supra note 18, at 30-31.
160. Finnemore, supra note 113, at 174; Florini, supra note 28, at 376-77.
161. See Florini, supra note 28, at 376.
162. Id. at 376-77; Finnemore, supra note 113, at 174. For an example of a norm building upon and gaining strength from previously emerging and logically compatible norms, see MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION 6, 166-72 (2003) (discussing the norm permitting humanitarian intervention's relationship with the norms prohibiting slavery and colonization, and the norm requiring self-determination).
163. See RICHARD M. PRICE, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABOO 156-59 (1997).
164. Note that, unlike realists, constructivists view environmental factors as merely part of the norm development story and not as determinative of behavioral change. Florini, supra note 28, at 377.
165. See David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 1.
166. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR AGAINST TERROR 67-69 (2004); Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, supra note 3, at 96, 106;
167. David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 5, 19-20.
168. David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 6-7;
169. Michael Eisenstadt, 'Preemptive Targeted Killings' as a Counterterror Tool: An Assessment of Israel's Approach, PEACEWATCH, Aug. 28, 2001, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php? CID=2033.
170. David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 7.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 7-8.
174. NBC News / Wall Street Journal Poll, Sept. 15-16, 2001, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/terror9.htm. The NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll asked the following: "Currently, there is an executive order that prohibits United States military and intelligence agencies from conducting assassinations of enemies abroad. Do you think that the United States military and intelligence agencies should or should not be allowed to conduct assassinations of enemies abroad?" The responses were: "Should be allowed, 70%." "Should not be allowed, 20%." "Not sure, 10%." Id.
175. See also Mutagim, Ma'ariv Poll, July 27, 2001, available at http://www.kahane.org/polls/polls1.htm;
176. David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 7-8.
177. See David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 8; Eisenstadt, supra note 137.
178. David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 8.
179. Id. at 9, 11; Eisenstadt, supra note 137; Michael P. Scharf, In the Cross Hairs of a Scary Idea, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2004, at B1.
180. See David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 9.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Id. at 9, 12.
183. Id. at 9-10.
184. Id. at 10.
185. See, e.g., Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, supra note 3;
186. Edward H. Kaplan et al., What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model, 28 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 225 (2005).
187. See Kaplan, supra note 151, at 230-34.
188. See Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, supra note 3, at 103-05.
189. Id.
190. Florini, supra note 28, at 374-75.
191. See id. at 381-82 (describing how U.S. norm entrepreneurship successfully forced the Cold War Soviet Union's to accept an intrusive military transparency policy promoted by the United States).
192. Id. at 375. Note, for example, the United Kingdom's and France's adoption of the norm prohibiting landmines, which gave rise to a wave of emulation by other States. Price, supra note 123, at 635. Note also that the notion that powerful States and States touching on a subject matter in a unique way can shape norms due to their status is not new and that even international law has long recognized such: [I]t is inescapable that some states are more influential and powerful than others and that their activities should be regarded as of a greater significance. This is reflected in international law so that custom may be created by a few states, provided those states are intimately connected with the issue at hand, whether because of their wealth and power or because of their special relationship with the subject-matter of the practice . . . . SHAW, supra note 30, at 62-63.
193. See SHAW, supra note 30, at 62-63.
194. Price, supra note 123, at 635.
195. Florini, supra note 28, at 375.
196. Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, supra note 3, at 106.
197. Florini, supra note 28, at 375.
198. Id.
199. Id. That is not to suggest, as realists would, that powerful States may simply impose their norms on others. THOMAS, supra note 18, at 8. Prominence is necessary but not sufficient for a norm to succeed and power is an important aspect of norm prominence but it is not solely determinative of it. Florini, supra note 28, at 375. For example, consider the failure of the United States, acting as a norm entrepreneur, to "conventionalize" nuclear weapons and counter the beginnings of the nuclear taboo in the 1950s. Tannenwald, supra note 122, at 7, 23-26.
200. See Florini, supra note 28, at 375.
201. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 238-40.
202. Id. at 238-39 (quoting Israeli Defense Force spokesperson).
203. Amnesty Int'l, Israel and the Occupied Territories: State Assassinations and Other Unlawful Killings, supra note 7, at 7 (quoting Ephraim Sneh, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister).
204. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8, at 17 (quoting Ephraim Sneh, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister).
205. Israel: Targeted Killings to Continue, CBS NEWS, Mar. 7, 2006, http://cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/07/world/printable1376132.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
206. See THE 9/11 COMMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 116-17, 126-27, 130-33 (2004).
207. Id.
208. Josh Meyer, CIA Expands Use of Drones in Terror War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, available at http://www.commondreams.org/ headlines06/0129-05.htm (last visited April 22, 2007).
209. BBC, Yemenis Told to Shun al-Qaeda, Nov. 6, 2002, available at http:www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2412217.stm (last visited April 22, 2007).
210. David Johnson & David E. Sanger, Bush Authorized 'Targeted Killings,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/06/international/middleeast/06yeme.html (last visited April 22, 2007).
211. Eben Kaplan, Backgrounder, FOREIGN AFF., Mar. 2, 2006, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9627/#7 (last visited April 22, 2007).
212. Scharf, supra note 145, at 2 (quoting Bush Administration official).
213. O'Connell, supra note 30, at 454 (quoting Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs of the Department of Defense).
214. For an example of this phenomenon, see the discussion of Tannenwald's work on the development of the nuclear weapons taboo, supra note 164.
215. See, e.g., David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 20;
216. Global Condemnation for Strike: US: 'It Was Heavy Handed,' HA'ARETZ, July 23, 2002, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/ hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=189886 (last visited Feb. 24, 2007);
217. Rantissi Killing: World Reaction, BBC NEWS, Apr. 18, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3635907.stm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
218. See, e.g., Andrew McGregor, The Assassination of Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev: Implications for the War on Terrorism, TERRORISM MONITOR, July 15, 2004, at 4, available at http://www.jamestown. org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2368259;
219. China: Constitution, Government and Legislation, JURIST, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/china.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2007);
220. Human Rights Watch, Country Studies: The Human Rights Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures in Ten Countries, Mar. 25, 2003, available at http://hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck4.htm;
221. U.S. Dep't of State, China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, Feb. 26, 1999, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ asia/jan-june99/state_report_2-26.html.
222. Florini, supra note 28.
223. See Ward Thomas, The New Age of Assassination, SAIS REV., Winter-Spring 2005, at 27-28, 31.
224. War, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, July 28, 2005, available at http://plato.stanford. edu/entries/war/;
225. Just War Theory, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 2006, http://www.iep.utm.edu/j/justwar.htm.
226. See War, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 184;
227. Just War Theory, supra note 184;
228. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, at xiv (1977).
229. See supra Part I, Subparts B-E.
230. WALZER, supra note 185, at 129.
231. ELSHTAIN, supra note 136, at 65.
232. WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 40-41 (1981).
233. See David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 17;
234. Daniel Statman, Targeted Killing, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 179, 186, 187 (2004).
235. See David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 3, 17 (noting that "Israeli attacks are characterized by their professionalism, [and] efforts to minimize innocent casualties . . . ."); Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 11, at 46 (quoting Principles of Military Ethics of Fighting Terror, Principle B.1(4), which includes a proportionality provision).
236. Id. at 17.
237. Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, supra note 3, at 95-96.
238. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 136, at 21-22, 66-67, 69; see generally Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 11, at 46.
239. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 8, at 18 (quoting Shaul Mofaz, Israeli Chief of Staff).
240. Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 11, at 46 (quoting Principles of Military Ethics of Fighting Terror, Principle B.1(4)).
241. BRIAN OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON WAR AND JUSTICE 111-12 (2000).
242. WALZER, supra note 185, at 146.
243. See MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 136 (2004).
244. See WALZER, supra note 185, at 145-46. Walzer has stated elsewhere that "it would seem odd to say that it is legitimate to attack a group of terrorists-in-training in a camp in Afghanistan, say, but not legitimate to go after the man who is planning the operation for which the others are training. That can't be right." WALZER, supra note 199, at 140.
245. See Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 718-28 (2004).
246. See David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 17; Statman, supra note 190, at 186-187.
247. See WALZER, supra note 185, at 183.
248. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 136, at 21-22, 66-67, 69. See generally Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 11.
249. WALZER, supra note 185, at 153. See also OREND, supra note 197, at 118.
250. ELSHTAIN, supra note 136, at 67-69; WALZER, supra note 199, at 136-37.
251. WALZER, supra note 199, at 137.
252. See David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 17; Statman, supra note 190, at 186-187.
253. Amnesty International, Unlawful Killings, supra note 7, at 7 (quoting IDF Officer).
254. Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, at 1.
255. Kasher & Yadlin, supra note 11, at 46 (quoting Principle of Military Necessity).
256. See Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, supra note 3, at 100, 106;
257. B'tselem, Palestinians Killed During the Course of Targeted Killing in the Occupied Territories, available at http:www.btselem.org/English/ statistics/casualties-data.asp?category=17 (last visited April 22, 2007).
258. See WALZER, supra note 185, at 153; OREND, supra note 197, at 118.
259. See David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 19-20; Statman, supra note 190, at 186, 187.
260. David, Fatal Choices, supra note 4, at 19-20.
261. Thomas, supra note 183, at 28-29.
262. THOMAS, supra note 18, at 53-54.
263. Id.
264. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 225 (4th ed. 1967).
265. THOMAS, supra note 18, at 55-56.
266. Id. at 56.
267. Id. at 57-58.
268. Id. at 64-66.
269. Id. at 61-62.
270. Id. at 62-63.
271. This is so because a terrorist attack perpetrated by State actors would likely lead to war between the victim State and aggressor State and render the use of targeted killing as a counter-terrorism tactic irrelevant vis-à-vis the warring States.
272. See FINNEMORE, supra note 132, at 21; Thomas, supra note 183, at 29-32.
273. Thomas, supra note 183, at 30.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 31.
276. FINNEMORE, supra note 132, at 78-85, 97, 129-40.
277. See generally KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000). While Russia and China, concerned with the implications of a growing intervention trend on their situations with break-away provinces, and less powerful States fearful that they may be the subjects of intervention have frequently expressed concern about the precedent being set by a widening intervention norm, those expressions have not led to a return to the "sovereignty over all else" discourse of yesteryear. See id. at 101-27, 215-44. Moreover, such expressions have not been concrete and consistent; for example, consider Russia and China's support for the military intervention in East Timor in 1999 and 2000.
278. See S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999); Richard Holbrooke (A Newshour with Jim Lehrer broadcast Sept. 16, 1999, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec99/holbrooke_9-16.html).
279. See id.; FINNEMORE, supra note 132, at 129-37.
280. It should be noted that these norms do not represent the only important norms with which a norm permitting the use of targeted killing for counter-terrorism purposes can logically cohere. A targeted killing norm would also likely be logically compatible with the norms permitting self-defense and prohibiting major war, among others. With respect to the norm prohibiting major war, see JOHN MUELLER, RETREAT FROM DOOMSDAY: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF MAJOR WAR 9, 217-19, 227, 240, 245 (1989).
281. Johnstone, supra note 29, at 190-91.
282. Id. at 191; FINNEMORE, supra note 132, at 149-50.
283. See Johnstone, supra note 29, at 186.
284. For reasons involving reputational concerns, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article, States feel compelled to engage in such discourse. Id. at 187-89.
285. Id. at 192-93.
286. FINNEMORE, supra note 132, at 152 (quoting Alasdair Iain Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, 45 INT'L STUD. Q. 487, 496 (2001)).
287. See Johnstone, supra note 29, at 192.
288. See id. at 193.
289. FINNEMORE, supra note 132, at 24-51.
290. Johnstone, supra note 29, at 193-201.
291. Thomas, supra note 183, at 36-37.
292. See supra Part II.C.2.
293. Thomas, supra note 183, at 37.
294. Kenneth Watkin, Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian Law Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted Killing, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 281, 313 (2005).
295. See RICHARD ENGLISH, ARMED STRUGGLE: THE HISTORY OF THE IRA 211-12, 346-47 (2003).
296. Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, supra note 3, at 110.
297. The Inspector General Act of 1978 established a system for monitoring the integrity of the administrative process in the United States. William S. Fields, The Enigma of Bureaucratic Accountability, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 505, 505-06 (1994)
298. (reviewing PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT - INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993)). Pursuant to the Act, Offices of Inspector Generals (OIG), of which there are sixty-one, covering nearly every federal agency, undertake investigations, and coordinate and recommend policies "(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in" an agency's operation. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5a U.S.C. § 2 (2006). OIGs also inform the heads of agencies of "problems and deficiencies . . . and the necessity for and progress of corrective action." Id. Additionally, OIGs provide semiannual reports to Congress. Id. § 5. In order to carry out these functions, OIGs possess a variety of information gathering powers, including subpoena powers. Id. § 6(a)(4). To ensure the independence of OIGs, the President appoints inspectors general "solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations." Id. § 3(a). For more in-depth overviews of the OIG in the United States, see LIGHT, supra;
299. Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473 (1985);
300. Kurt W. Muellenberg & Harvey J. Volzer, Inspector General Act of 1978, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1049 (1980).
301. "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) governs searches and electronic surveillance inside the United States that target foreign governments, international terrorist networks and their agents." Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 531, 531 (2006). "FISA provides simplified procedures for obtaining and executing foreign intelligence warrants." Id. at 533.
302. The Act requires that the U.S. Attorney General approve an application for an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President 18 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf, which is a special court composed of Article III judges that meets secretly in a sealed, secure room in Washington, D.C., Schulhofer, supra, at 534. An application to the FISC must demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign agent. Id. at 533. It must also contain a certification from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or an officer of the United States that the President has appointed, and the Senate has confirmed, having responsibilities in the area of national security or defense, that the information sought is foreign intelligence information and cannot reasonably be obtained via normal investigative means.
303. Legal Authorities, supra, at 18. In addition, the government's application must state the means that it proposes to use to obtain the information sought and the basis for its belief that a foreign agent is using or is about to use the facilities at which the surveillance will be directed. Id.
304. For an overview of FISA and the workings of the FISC, see also Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306 (2004).
305. Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, supra note 3, at 111.
306. This notion, which weighs the harm to be prevented against the harm military forces and innocent bystanders may potentially suffer, reflects a cost-benefit calculus that is analogous to that employed by Professors Dershowitz and Posner in discussing the legalization and regulation of coercive interrogation. Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 275 (2004);
307. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 671 (2006). Dershowitz suggests that coercive interrogation may be assessed through the prism of Jeremy Bentham's "felicific calculus": According to Bentham's formula, if an act results in the "pleasure" of the many it is generally good even if it results in the infliction of pain upon the individual; "[t]ake the balance which if on the side of pleasure, will give the general good tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same community." In other words, it is acceptable to inflict pain and suffering on the few so long as the wants and needs of the many are served. Dershowitz, supra, at 276 n.8. Posner and Vermeule, more specifically, liken the cost-benefit calculus of coercive interrogation to that of police shootings. Given the similarities that can be drawn between police shootings and targeted killings, these authors' work is particularly relevant to the discussion herein. They state: The costs of police shootings are extremely high - people are wounded or killed, unnecessarily when the police make errors, as they unavoidably do - but the benefits are also high: innocent lives are saved. Rather than banning police shootings because of the high costs of error, governments regulate them. . . . The cost-benefit calculus must consider not only the probability of averting harm, but the magnitude of the harms averted. . . . Ideally, police officers will use aggressive measures only when the gains to the public safety exceed the costs to the people who are subject to the measures (whether they are innocents who are misidentified or criminals). Posner & Vermeule, supra, at 686-87, 700.
308. For a more in-depth discussion of cost-benefit analysis by Posner, see generally Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001).
309. Stated another way, the international legal community might impose the following cost-benefit-based threshold for determining when targeted killing may be employed: the government may not use targeted killing unless it is reasonably certain that the killing of a particular person could prevent imminent harm that is likely to kill at least x people, where x is a number representing the balance of costs and benefits from targeted killing. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 254, at 701 (establishing a similar formula for coercive interrogation).