Cooperation is less likely to evolve in a finite population with a highly skewed distribution of family size

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 274, Issue 1620, 2007, Pages 1861-1865

  Lessard, Sabin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Coalescence times; Cooperation; Evolutionary stability; Fixation probability; One third law; Prisoner's Dilemma

Indexed keywords

COALESCENCE; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; PRISONER DILEMMA; REPRODUCTIVE STRATEGY; SKEWNESS; TIT-FOR-TAT;

ARTICLE; EVOLUTION; FAMILY SIZE; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; POPULATION RESEARCH; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PRISONER;

EID: 34548490070     PISSN: 09628452     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2007.0366     Document Type: Article

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