Evaluating Israel's strategy of low-intensity warfare, 1949-2006

Security Studies

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 319-349

  Maoz, Zeev ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548479944     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410701547782     Document Type: Article

References (176)

1. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and its International Dimension, 1946-2004," Journal of Peace Research 42 no. 5 (November 2005): 623-35.
2. Zeev Maoz,"'Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics: A Structural History of National and Dyadic Conflict, 1816-1992," International Studies Review 6, no. 2 (December 2004): 107-133. Since that study was published, Israel initiated another war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006.
3. Avi Kober, Military Decision in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-1982 [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1995).
4. Zeev Maoz, "The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy", International Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 44-77.
5. Doron Almog, "Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism", (paper, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs). http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/person.cfm?item id=846&ln=fellow&program=ISP. Accessed 24 April 2007.
6. Doron Almog, "The Israeli Strategy of Deterrence as a Model of Accumulated Deterrence" (master's thesis, University of Haifa, 1995)
7. Uri Bar Joseph, "Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli Strategic Thinking," Security Studies 7, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 145-81.
8. Avner Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Po'alim, 1995);
9. Israel Tal, National Security: The Israeli Experience (Westport, CT: Preager, 2000).
10. Stuart Kinross, "Clausewitz and Low Intensity Conflict," Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 1 (March 2004): 36-37
11. Roger Beaumont, "Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 541 (September 1995): 20-35
12. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 18-25. This is distinguished from High Intensity Conflict (HIC) operations which entail sustained and large scale clashes between significant formations of two or more military (or proto military) organizations.
13. United States Army, Field Manual 100-20-Low-Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1981), 1-1.
14. Zeev Maoz, Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment (Boston: Unwin Hymann, 1990), 142-55.
15. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 387
16. Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little Brown, 1987), 302-07
17. Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 346
18. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 50-51.
19. Kinross, "Clausewitz and Low Intensity Conflict."
20. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961).
21. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005)
22. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
23. Laqueur, " The Age of Terrorism "
24. Pape, Dying to Win
25. Crenshaw "The Causes of Terrorism"
26. Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 52-53 classify the goals of terrorists as regime change, territorial change, policy change, and status quo maintenance. However, these are more general objectives and it is not clear how terrorism is tied to these objectives, unless we connect to them the middle-range goals discussed above.
27. David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 161-94.
28. Yehoshafat Harkabi, War and Strategy [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1991), 124-5. Note that power asymmetry is not a necessary condition in LIC. Some states may choose to employ LIC as a strategy that is designed to limit warfare even if their power is equally matched. Wars of attrition may be of that sort. Even in such cases, the choice of attrition strategy by one side reflects a temporary weakness, and attrition is used to help the weaker side regroup and regain its strength.
29. See Maoz, Paradoxes of War, 142-49
30. Alan Stam, Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 53
31. Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 18-19.
32. Alex P. Schmidt and Ronald P. Crelinsten (Eds.) Western Responses to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 1993)
33. Enders and Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism.
34. "Current security" refers to attacks that entail limited violence and do not threaten existential values, the sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Israel.
35. "Basic security" refers to major military threats to Israel's existence, its territorial integrity, or its Jewish character.
36. See Yigal Allon, A Curtain of Sand [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Ha'Kibbutz Ha'Meuchad, 1968), 16-17
37. Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, 53.
38. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 47-230.
39. Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, Bound by Struggle: The Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 180-84.
40. Benny Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
41. Judith P. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).
42. See Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 231-97 for a historical overview of Israel's LIC experience over the 1949-2004 period. Tables on 269-71 provide a general summary of changes in the type of LIC-related challenges that Israel has faced at different points in time and the modal strategy it has chosen to confront these challenges.
43. There is no comprehensive study of Israel's LIC experience. Several sources cover elements of this strategy and portions of that experience. See Morris, Israel's Border Wars, and David Tal, The Current Security Conception of Israel: Its Origins and Development, 1949-1956 [Hebrew] (Sdeh Boker: Ben Gurion University Press, 1998) provide detailed histories of the 1948-56 period.
44. Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) discusses the 1949-70 period in the context of conventional deterrence theory.
45. Ranan D. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence: The Evolution of the Israeli Decision Regime Governing the Use of Limited Military Force (Lanham, MD: Lexington Press, 2005), and Kuperman, "Rules of Military Retaliation and Their Practice by the State of Israel," International Interactions 27, no. 3 (September 2001): 297-326 focuses on the decision making processes governing Israeli reprisals over the 1949-82 period.
46. As of yet, there exist no studies of the guerrilla war in Southern Lebanon during the 1985-2000 period; nor are there systematic studies of Israel's anti-terrorism policy and its management of popular unrest and civil disobedience. Sources covering the first intifada of 1987-1992 include Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Intifada [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Schocken, 1990)
47. Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990)
48. and Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada: Causes and Effects. [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Papyrus).
49. Sergio Catigiani, "The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap Between the Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics During the Al Aqsa Intifada" Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (March 2005): 57-75 offers a useful discussion of Israel's strategies during the Al Aqsa Intifada.
50. Morris, Israel's Border Wars. 244-55.
51. Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Towards a Policy of Countermeasures (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1980).
52. Ibid. Alson discusses Israel's anti-terrorism policy in the 1970s. Unfortunately, with the exception of Kuperman's studies there exist no systematic scholarly studies of the economics of Israel's anti-terrorist policies for later periods.
53. See Kuperman, Cycles of Violence.
54. Yagil Levy, The Other Army of Israel [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2003), 173-74, 418-20
55. Offer Shelah, The Israeli Army: A Radical Proposal [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan Publishers, 2003), 99-107.
56. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8-26. This is distinguishable from specific deterrence that is an attempt to fend off an imminent threat-typically in the context of a crisis.
57. Moshe Dayan, "Military Action During Peacetime," [Hebrew] Ba'Mahaneh, 14 and 21 September 1955.
58. Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 60.
59. Tal, National Security, 52.
60. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence, 140-47
61. The concept of "escalation dominance" in the jargon of nuclear strategy refers to a capability to top the level of damage inflicted by the enemy's capability or to top the enemy's level of accuracy in a counter-force nuclear strike. See Morgan, Deterrence Now
62. Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
63. and Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). I extend this concept to refer to a behavioral doctrine that focuses both on capabilities and on demonstrated resolve in the service of general deterrence. 35Specific deterrence concerns a threat of retaliation if the challenger violates a specific aspect of the status quo, short of an all-out attack on the defender. Compellence concerns a policy of sustained, yet limited, use of force designed to induce the opponent to discontinue some actions it has been carrying out prior to and during the exercise of force by the compeller. Alternatively, a policy of compellence may be designed to force an opponent into doing something it has not been doing and which the compeller wants carried out.
64. See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966)
65. Morgan, Deterrence Now
66. Alexander L. George and William Simmons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (2nd edition) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994);
67. Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1991). The distinction between compellence and deterrence is analytic in nature. In practice, it may be difficult to distinguish policies aimed at compellence from those aimed at deterrence. This applies to Israel's LIC strategies as well.
68. Tal, National Security, 26-39.
69. Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 28, 46-54, 135-38;
70. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 238, 245.
71. Quoted in Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 177.
72. Meeting in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 February 1953, quoted in Tal, The Current Security Conception of Israel, 68.
73. Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 178.
74. Ibid., 166-72.
75. Quoted in Tal, National Security, 68.
76. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 281.
77. See also Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 50-52;
78. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence, 87.
79. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 55-56;
80. Mohammed Hassenin Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (London: A. Deutsch, 1986), 66-68;
81. Anthony Nutting, Nasser (New York: Dutton., 1972), 67.
82. The Samu raid had a major effect on Jordan's perceptions of Israel and its intentions and played key role in Jordan's decision to enter the Six Day War. See Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 76-84.
83. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 106-107;
84. Michael Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 46-49.
85. On the impact of this incident on Syria see Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley and Los Angeles. University of California Press, 1988), 127-8.
86. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 115;
87. Abd el Ghani Gamassy, The Ramadan War (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1993), 99.
88. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 244-46;
89. Abu Iyad (Khalaf Salah), Without a Homeland: Conversations with Eric Rouleau [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Mifrasim, 1983), 95-96.
90. David A. Korn, Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970 (Boulder, [s CO: S] Westview Press, 1992), 198, 233;
91. Yaacov Bar Simantov, The Arab-Israeli War of Attrition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 163.
92. Alan Dowty, Middle East Crisis: U.S. Decision Making in 1958, 1970, and 1973 (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984);
93. Allison Astorino-Courtois, "Clarifying Decisions: Assessing the Impact of Decision Structures on Foreign Policy Choices during the 1970 Jordanian Civil War," International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 4 (December 1998): 733-54;
94. Maoz and Mor, Bound by Struggle, 189.
95. Astorino-Courtois, "Clarifying Decisions."
96. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence, 107-08.
97. Maoz, Syria and Israel, 142-44;
98. Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, 227-28.
99. Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, 249-50.
100. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 146-47.
101. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 206-12, 221-26.
102. On Hizballah's modus operandi during Israel's occupation of Southern Lebanon see Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, 111-16;
103. Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997);
104. William Harris, Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extension (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997): 316-17;
105. and Augustus Richard Norton, "Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon," Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no. 1 (Autumn, 2000): 29-30.
106. Zeev Maoz, "Can Israel Think Before Shooting?" Alternet, 20 July 2006, http://www.alternet.org/story/39237 (accessed 24 April 2007);
107. Reinoud Leenders, "How the Rebel Regained His Cause: Hizbullah and the Sixth Arab-Israeli War," [x MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies x] 6 (Summer 2006): 46-7.
108. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
109. Some scholars argued that Israel's overflights in Southern Lebanon provoked the Hizballah into the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers in the summer of 2006, thus providing a convenient pretext for its large scale attack on Lebanon. This, however, is not supported by any evidence. See Virginia Tilley, "Israel in Lebanon: The Foreign Policy Logics of Jewish Statehood," [x MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies x] 6 (Summer 2006): 156.
110. Dayan issued this directive to the [s IDF s] General Staff following a meeting with Ben Gurion. The directive is cited in Mordechai Bar-On, Challenge and Quarrel: The Road to Sinai, 1955-57 [Hebrew] (Beer-Sheva: Beer-Sheva University Press, 1991), 39-40;
111. Morris, Israel's Border Wars;
112. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence, 87.
113. Gideon Rafael, Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy (London: Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 31.
114. See sources for data on number of operations and casualties in Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 239, 245. See also section on Estimating Israeli Use of Limited Force below.
115. Arie Naor, Begin in Power: A Personal Testimony [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot Publishers, 1993), 268.
116. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 90-108; Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War, 76-84.
117. Avi Shlaim and Raymond Tanter, "Decision Process, Choice, and Consequences: Israel's Deep Penetration Bombing in Egypt, 1970," World Politics 30, no. 4 (July 1978): 483-516;
118. Korn, Stalemate;
119. Bar-Simantov, The Arab-Israeli War of Attrition.
120. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 253;
121. Ely Karmon, "Fight on All Fronts: Hizballah, the War on Terror, and the War in Iraq," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, research memorandum no. 45, (December 2003): 9-10;
122. Norton, "Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon," 29.
123. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 255;
124. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, 122-23;
125. Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, 169-204;
126. Norton, "Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon."
127. Levy, The Other Army of Israel, 68-78.
128. Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 185-87;
129. Shlomo Aronson and Dan Horowitz, "The Strategy of Controlled Retaliation: The Israeli Model" [Hebrew] State and Government 1, no. 1: 77-99;
130. Zaki Shalom, Policy in the Shadow of Controversy: Israel's Current Security Policy, 1949-1956 [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry Publishing House, 1996), 27-33;
131. Tal, The Current Security Conception of Israel, 89-90.
132. Ranan D. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence; Kuperman, "The Effect of Domestic and Foreign Pressure on Israeli Decisions to Use Limited Military Force," Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 5 (October 2003): 677-94.
133. Ephraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel's National Security, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 142.
134. Tom Segev, 1949: The New Israelis [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Domino Press, 1984).
135. Israel's population grew from 650,000 in 1948 to 1,650,000 in 1953, an increase of 150 percent in four years. See Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldschider, The Population of Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 31.
136. Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, 40-44;
137. Zehava Ostfeld, An Army is Born: Principal Stages in the Building of the Army Under the Leadership of David Ben-Gurion [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry Publishing House, 1994).
138. Avner Yaniv, "Introduction," in Avner Yaniv, ed., National Security and Democracy in Israel (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 1-10;
139. Levy, The Other Army of Israel, 58.
140. Levy, The Other Army of Israel, 58-60.
141. Tal, The Current Security Conception of Israel, 83-84.
142. Colonel Meir Amit, Head of [s IDF s] Operations, memo, cited in Tal, The Current Security Conception of Israel, 85.
143. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1976), 115.
144. Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, 111.
145. Shabtai Tevet, The Tanks of Tammuz (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 82;
146. Hanoch Bar-Tov, Dado: Twenty Years and Twenty More Days [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Zmorah Bitan Modan Publishers, 1978), 1: 95-99.
147. Rami Tal, "Interview with Moshe Dayan (1976-77)," Yediot Aharonot [Hebrew], 18 April 1997;
148. Eitan Haber, Today War Will Break Out: The Memoirs of Brig. Gen. Israel Lior, Military Aide de-Camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir (Tel-Aviv: Edanim, 1987), 95-96.
149. Ami Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces, and Defence Policy, 1963-67 (London: Routledge, 2007), 86-7;
150. Oren, Six Days of War, 33-34.
151. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Imperfect Spies: The History Israeli Intelligence (London: Sidgwick and Jacobson, 1989), 204;
152. Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel's SecretWars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services (London: Futura Publications, 1991).
153. Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz, and Shaul Mishal, "Tactical Prevention of Suicide Bombings in Israel," Interfaces 36, no. 6 (November/December 2006): 553-61.
154. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence.
155. This appears also to have characterized the process leading to the decision to respond to the abduction of Israeli soldiers by Hizballah on 12 July 2006. See the interim report of the Vinograd Inquiry Commission that was released on 30 April 2007. The Vinograd Commission, "The Second Lebanon War: Interim Report" [Hebrew], http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/reports.html#null. (accessed 2 May 2007).
156. Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," World Politics 43, no. 1 (October, 1990): 77-110.
157. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence;
158. Gad Barzilai and Bruce Russett, "The Political Economy of Israeli Military Action." In Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds., The Elections in Israel, 1988 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 13-35;
159. Barry M. Blechman, "The Impact of Israel's Reprisals on the Behavior of Arab States," Journal of Conflict Resolution 16, no. 2 (June 1972): 155-181.
160. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence.
161. Blechman, "The Impact of Israel's Reprisals on the Behavior of Arab States."
162. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence. The Quantitative History of the Arab Israeli Project Website is available at: http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/ zmaoz/quanthist.htm.
163. In my, Defending the Holy Land, 239-46, I present charts of the annual series of the number of low-intensity exchanges between Arab states, non-state actors (for example, Fedayeen attacks in the 1950s and 1960s, Palestinian terrorist attacks since 1965, and Hizballah attacks over the 1983-2000 period) and Israeli operations over the same period. He also shows the series on the Arab and Israeli fatalities incurred during these LIC events.
164. Updated data (not included in this study) extends the last wave to the beginning of 2007.
165. This ratio is very similar to the fatality ratio in the Arab-Israeli Wars. See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982);
166. Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).
167. Kuperman, Cycles of Violence, 125-47.
168. Barzilai and Russett, "The Political Economy of Israeli Military Action."
169. See also Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics ofWar and Peace (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) for a similar measure in his analysis of the use of force by democracies.
170. Almog, The Israeli Strategy of Deterrence as a Model of Accumulated Deterrence. This proposition is probably supported by the events of the summer of 2006 in Lebanon and Gaza.
171. Harborn and Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and its International Dimension";
172. Renata Dwan and Caroline Holmqvist, "Major Armed Conflicts," in [x SIPRI 2005 Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security x] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
173. The outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada and the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers by Hizballah on 12 July 2006 may be taken as powerful counter-examples to this argument. But the causes of the Intifada are not all that obvious. Many claim that the Palestinians launched it not due to the perception of Israeli vulnerability due to its Oslo concessions, but precisely because they believed that Israel had violated most of its obligations under the Oslo Accord. See for example Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (January 2002);
174. Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of Revolt," Survival 43, no. 3 (September 2001): 47-60.
175. Likewise, Hizballah's kidnapping can be seen as a retaliation to Israel's policy of kidnapping Lebanese operatives in the 1990s. See Zeev Maoz, "Five Years of Intifada: The War that Everybody Lost," (paper, annual meeting of the Israeli Association of International Studies, Jerusalem, 5 June 2006).
176. Maoz, "Five Years of Intifada."