Are prudential supervision and regulation pillars of financial stability? Evidence from the Great Depression

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 273-302

  Mitchener, Kris James ^a  

^a SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548329635     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/511323     Document Type: Article

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