Motives in the acquisitions of NASDAQ targets during the aftermath of the 1987 crash

Financial Review

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 553-569

  Gondhalekar, Vijay ^a   Bhagwat, Yatin ^a  

^a GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Crash; Hubris; Synergy; Takeovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548267978     PISSN: 07328516     EISSN: 15406288     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6288.00060     Document Type: Article

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