Takeover motives in a weak regulatory environment surrounding a market shock: A case study of New Zealand with a comparison of Gondhalekar and Bhagwat's (2003) US findings

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 53-67

  Anderson, Hamish D ^a   Marshall, Ben R ^a  

^a MASSEY UNIVERSITY   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Mergers and acquisitions motives; Regulation; Stock market crash

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548242210     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-007-0021-3     Document Type: Article

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