Why party and how much? the Soviet State and the party finance

Public Choice

Volumn 130, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 437-456

  Belova, Eugenia ^a   Lazarev, Valery ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Institutions; One party regime; Public finance; Soviet Union

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847298473     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9096-y     Document Type: Article

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