Women's rights under international human rights treaties: Issues of rape, domestic slavery, abortion, and domestic violence

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 507-525

  Rudolf, Beate ^a   Eriksson, Andrea ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34547946933     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mom022     Document Type: Article

References (133)

1. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 213, 222 (Harvard Univ. Press 1989)
2. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects, and "Personal Laws," 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I•CON) 181 (2006)
3. Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. IN'TL L. 613, 634-635 (1991)
4. Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Crossing Borderlands of Inequality with International Legal Methodologies - The Promise of Miltiple Feminisms, 44 GERMAN YB. INT'L L. 113, 126 (2001)
5. ODDNÝ MJÖLL ARNARDÖTTIR, EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION UNDER TIE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (M. Nyhoff 2003).
6. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 237;
7. Hilary Charlesworth, Human Rights as Men's Rights, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS - INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 103, 110 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., M. Nyhoff 1995)
8. Natalie Hevener Kaufman & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Critiquing Gender-Neutral Treaty Language: The Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in id., 114, 124;
9. Christine Chinkin, Shelley Wright & Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Approaches to International Law: Reflections from Another Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 17, 25 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., Hart 2005).
10. 2003-XII EUR. CT.H.R. 1., appl. no. 39272/98, decision of Dec. 4, 2003.
11. The prosecution's final decision stated: "What is decisive in the present case is that it has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that physical or psychological force was used against the applicant and the sexual intercourse took place against her will and despite her resistance.... (emphasis added), see M.C. v. Bulgaria, 646 EUR. CT. H.R. 150 (2003), at para. 65.
12. Pursuant to article 152 (1) ofthe Bulgarian Criminal Code, rape denotes "sexual intercourse with a woman (1) incapable of defending herself, where she did not consent; (2) who was compelled by the use of force or threats; (3) who was brought to a state of helplessness by the perpetrator." According to Bulgarian judicial practice, the three subparagraphs can only be applied alternatively, each of them referring to a separate factual situation. "Helplessness" is interpreted very narrowly, covering only the lack of capacity to resist because of disability, old age, illness, or use of alcohol, medicine, or drugs. Lack of consent is an element inherent not only in the first subparagraph, but in the whole provision, cf. the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at paras. 75-83.
13. On this point, the factual situation was not entirely clear. The Court decided to accept the applicant's characterization of the Bulgarian judicial practice because it was based on "reasonable arguments" that the government could not disprove. In particular, the government did not submit copies of judgments applying a more extensive interpretation, and the government's own submissions on this point were contradictory; see M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at paras. 172-174.
14. For article 3, the Court referred to the following cases: A. v. UK, 1998-VI EUR. CT. H.R. 2692, para. 22;
15. Z. and Others v. UK [GC], 2001-V EUR. CT. H.R. 1, paras. 73-75;
16. E and Others v. UK, appl no. 33218/96, judgment of Nov. 26, 2002, not reported. For article 8, the Court referred to the cases of X and Y v. the Netherlands, 91 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) 1, paras. 23-24, 27 (1985)
17. and August v. UK, appl. no. 36505/02, decision of Jan. 21, 2003, notreported;
18. see M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at paras. 149-50.
19. 'With respect to article 3, the Court referred to Assenov v. Bulgaria, 1998-VIII EUR. CT. H.R. 3264, para. 102;
20. and Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002-1 EUR. CT. H.R. 25. With respect to article 8, it referred to Osman v. UK, 1998-VIII EUR. CT. H.R. 3124, para. 128;
21. see M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at paras. 151-152. For a comprehensive analysis of the case law on the duty to investigate, see KOLJA ALTERMANN, ERMITTLUNGSPFLICHTEN DER STAATEN AUS DER EMRK [THE STATES' DUTIES TO INVESTIGATE UNDER THE ECHR] 137 (Nomos 2006).
22. For details of this concept, see YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (Intersentia 2002)
23. and HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (Kluwer 1996).
24. The concept was first developed in the context of "negative obligations," i.e., obligations to abstain from an interference with a right. See De Wilde, Ooms, and Versyp v. Belgium ("Vagrancy Case"), 12 EUR. CT. H.R. para. 93 (1971)
25. Golder v. UK, 18 EUR. CT. H.R. para. 18 (1975)
26. and Handyside v. UK, 24 EUR. CT.H.R. (ser. A), paras. 48-49 (1976) (on the protection of morals). The concept was transposed to positive obligations in X and Y v. Netherlands, supra note 7, para. 24.
27. Handyside v. UK, supra note 10, para. 49.
28. The Court referred to Christine Goodwin v. UK [GC], 2002-VI EUR. CT. H.R. 1, para. 74. See M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at para. 155.
29. On this decision and the Court's approach, see Beate Rudolf, Case note on Christine Goodwin v. UK and I. v. UK, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. (•CON) 717 (2003).
30. "Consent" is specifically required by article 375, § 1 and 2 of the Belgian Criminal Court; Sect. 1(1) of the British Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, reprinted in M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at paras. 90, 100, respectively. In France, the courts have interpreted the requirement of "violence, coercion, threats or surprise" as encompassing the victim's begging the perpetrator to stop. See Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, judgment of July 10, 1973, 1973 BULLETIN CRIMINEL no. 322. With respect to the U.S., the Court pointed, inter alia, to Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d. 1161 (Pa. 1994) and Richards v. State, 457 So.2d 893 (Ala. 1985).
31. Recommendation (2002) 5 on the Protection of Women against Violence, adopted on Apr. 30, 2002, available at https://wcm.coe.int/ ViewDoc.jsp?id=280915&Lang=en (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
32. Trial Chamber of the ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, case no. IT-95-17/1-T, judgment of Dec. 10, 1998, para. 180: "(A)ll jurisdictions surveyed by the Trial Chamber require an element of force, coercion, threat, or acting without the consent of the victim" (emphasis added).
33. M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at para. 164 (referring, indirectly inter alia, to the findings in People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1189 (Ca. 1994).
34. Id. at para. 178.
35. Id. at para. 184.
36. Id. at para. 183.
37. Id. at paras. 179-182.
38. Id. at para. 185.
39. See Bulgarian Criminal Code, supra note 5.
40. See text accompanying note 6.
41. See, e.g., Aydin v. Turkey, 1997-VI EUR. CT. H.R., 1866, para. 85 (rape as torture because it was used to elicit information)
42. Selmouni v. France, 1999-V EUR. CT. H.R. 149, para. 92 (rape considered under article 3, but occurrence not proved)
43. Bati v. Turkey, 2004-IV EUR. CT. H.R. 249 (extracts) para. 115 (rape considered under article 3 but point not pursued because of proof of other acts amounting to torture)
44. Veznedaroǧlu v. Turkey, appl. no. 323 57/96, judgment of Apr. 11, 2000, not published, para. 3 5 (rape alleged: Violation of article 3 because of lack of investigation).
45. See, e.g., Z. and Others v. UK, supra note 7, paras. 74-75 (physical, and possible sexual abuse)
46. and D.P. and J.C. v. UK, appl. no. 38719/97, judgment of Oct. 10, 2002, para. 109, not published (rape and other forms of sexual abuse).
47. See, e.g., X. and Y v. the Netherlands, supra note 7 (rape)
48. and August v. UK, supra note 7(nonviolent homosexual abuse of a disturbed child).
49. For the Court, the applicant's age only constituted an additional factor, aggravating the state's failure to conduct an effective inquiry. See M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at para. 183.
50. As expressed by the Court in M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at para. 150.
51. S.W. v. UK, 335-B EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) para. 44 (1995)
52. and C.R. v. UK, 335-C EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A), para. 42 (1995) (on the nonapplicability of article 7 [nonretroactivity of criminal law] on a change of jurisprudence leading to the criminalization of marital rape).
53. Vo v. France [GC], (2005) 40 EUR. CT. H.R. 12, para. 84 (concerning the protection of an embryo "in the name of human dignity" because it "belongs to the human race").
54. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV EUR. CT. H.R., para. 309 (concerning extensive discriminatory measures based on ethnic origin, race, and religion).
55. Christine Goodwin v. UK [GC], supra note 12, at para. 90.
56. Jalloh v. Germany [GC], EUR. CT. H.R., appl. no. 54810/00, judgment of July 11, 2006, not reported, para. 68, with further references to the Court's case law.
57. M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at para. 165 (emphasis added).
58. See also Joanne Conaghan, Extending the Reach of Human Rights to Encompass Victims of Rape: M.C. v. Bulgaria, 13 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 145, 155-56 (2005).
59. The Court's approach does not amount to prescribing the full definition of a crime; cf. Cesare Pitea, Rape as a Human Rights Violation and a Criminal Offence: The European Court's Judgement in M.C. v. Bulgaria, 3. J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 447, 454 (2005).
60. In this vein, see, for example, III/1 KLAUS STERN, DAS STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 988 s THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE F EDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] (C.H. Beck 1988) (for German constitutional law).
61. 2006-43 EUR. CT. H.R. 16, appl. no. 73316/01, judgment of July 26, 2005, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int (last visited on Apr. 29, 2007).
62. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (UNODC), TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: GLOBAL PATTERNS 33 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ trafficking_persons_report_2006-04.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
63. For a comprehensive overview of international migration and the trafficking in persons, see UNODC, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 38;
64. and INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ORGANISATION, WORLD MIGRATION 2005: COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 379 (2005), available in part at http://www.iom.int (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
65. In the words of the ECtHR:"... today's slaves are predominantly female and usually work in private households." Siliadin v. France, supra note 37, at para. 88 (emphasis added).
66. X and Y v. the Netherlands,supra note 7.
67. M.C. v. Bulgaria,supra note 3, at para. 162 (emphasis added).
68. Articles 215-213 and 215-214 of the French Criminal Code, respectively. For a translation of these provisions see Siliadin v. France, supra note 37, at para. 46.
69. Siliadin v. France, supra note 37, at paras. 36-40.
70. Id. at paras. 41-43 and 146.
71. Id. at paras. 77-81 (citing positive obligations under articles 3 and 8).
72. Id. at paras. 82 and 112.
73. Id. at para. 89, referring to article 4 of the Forced Labor Convention, 39 L.N.T.S. 35 (1930); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, art. 1 Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; and articles 19 and 32 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989).
74. Siliadin v. France, supra note 37, at para 89.
75. Article 1(1) ofthe Convention on Slavery, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (1926). In Siliadin v. France, supra note 42, at para. 122, the Court mistakenly referred to it as the "1927 Slavery Convention."
76. Siliadin v. France, supra note 37, at para. 122.
77. Id. at para. 124, with reference to Seguin v. France, appl. no. 42400/98, decision of Mar. 7, 2000, not reported, and to the Commission's report in Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, 44 EUR. CT. H.R. (1980) (ser. B), paras. 78-80.
78. Supra note 50.
79. Siliadin v. France, supra note 37, at paras. 143-144, with particular reference to X. and Y. v. the Netherlands, supra note 7, paras. 21-27.
80. See supra note 43.
81. Siliadin v. France, supra note 37, at para. 147.
82. See also Virginia Mantouvalou, Servitude and Forced Labour in the 21st Century: The Human Rights of Domestic Workers, 35 INDUSTRIAL L.J. 395, 412 (2006).
83. but see Note on Siliadin v. France, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REP. 660, 663-664 (2005).
84. Supra note 40.
85. Siliadin v. France, supra note 37, at para. 118.
86. Id.
87. Huamán v. Peru, Communication No. 1153/2003, views adopted by the Committee on Human Rights on Nov. 22, 2005, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/ 2003.
88. Id. at para. 2.2.
89. Id. at para. 2.4.
90. Id. at para. 2.6.
91. Id. at para. 6.3.
92. Id., with reference to General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (1992), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/ 1/Rev.7, 150 (2004). In light of this finding, the committee considered it unnecessary to examine whether Peru also violated the applicant's right to life (article 6),
93. Huamán v. Peru, supra note 61, at para. 6.3. In his individual opinion, committee member Hipolito Solari-Yrigoyen disagreed with this approach, maintaining that applicant's life had been put at risk, and that this was indeed incompatible with that provision.
94. Huamán v. Peru, supra note 61, at para. 6.5.
95. Id. at para. 6.6.
96. Cf., e.g., the committee's Concluding Observations on the State report of Peru, CCPR/CO/70/PER (Nov. 15, 2000), para. 20.
97. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-154 (1973).
98. Huamán v. Peru, supra note 61, at para. 5.3.
99. Given the committee's conclusions on Peru's report (supra note 61), the finding would presumably have differed had no right to therapeutic abortion existed under domestic law.
100. For a cautious interpretation in this sense, see CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19 (Violence against Women), para. 24 (m), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 66, at 251.
101. Communication No. 2/2003, views adopted by the CEDAW-Committee on Jan. 26, 2005, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 32nd session, U.N. Doc. A/60/38 (Part I) 27 (2006).
102. G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Dec. 22, 2000).
103. For details, see Sixth Periodic Report of Hungary to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/HUN/ 6, 48-50 (2006).
104. A.T. v. Hungary, supra note 73, at para. 9.3.
105. On Violence against Women (1992), U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 66, at 246, in particular para. 6.
106. Id. at para. 11.
107. A.T. v. Hungary, supra note 73, at para. 9.2, with reference to General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 77, at para. 9.
108. This fact had already been the object of the committee's concluding comments on the fourth and fifth periodic report submitted by Hungary, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, U.N. Doc. A/57/38, Part III, 189, 192-193 (2002).
109. A.T. v. Hungary, supra note 73, at para. 9.3.
110. See the Committee's General Recommendation 19, supra note 77.
111. A.T. v. Hungary, supra note 73, at para. 9.4,
112. with reference to its Concluding Comments on Hungary (2002), supra note 80, at para. 322.
113. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/ 104, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Dec. 20, 1993), 6th recital, as affirmed by the Declaration of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing Declaration), U.N. Doc. A/CONF./177/20, para. 8 (1995)
114. and Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará), O.A.S.Doc. A-61, 2nd recital (Mar. 5, 1995).
115. Cf. article 4(3), Directive 2004/113/EC, implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, 2004 O.J. (L 373) 37;
116. and article 2 (2)(a), Directive 2006/54/EC, on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), 2006 O.J. (L 204) 33 (both defining sexual harassment as a form of discrimination).
117. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 25 (article 4, para. 1: Temporary special measures), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 66, at 283, para. 8.
118. Charlesworth, supra note 2, at 103, 106;
119. Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 2, at 626;
120. Ursula A. O'Hare, Realizing Human Rights for Women, 21 Hum. RTS. Q. 364, 365 (1999)
121. Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 36, 38 (1993)
122. for an overview on the debate, see Donna Sullivan, The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in WOMEN's RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 126;
123. Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (1999/2000)
124. and Doris Buss, Austerlitz and International Law: A Feminist Reading at the Boundaries, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 87, 94.
125. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (2004), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 66, at 192, para. 8.
126. First recognized as such in Tyrer v. UK, 26 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A), para. 31 (1978).
127. The committee has expressly held that "the Covenant should be interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied in context and in light of present-day conditions." Judge v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Oct. 20, 2003), para. 10.3.
128. For the debate in the U.S., see The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I-CON) 519 (2005).
129. M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 3, at para. 165 (emphasis added).
130. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13981 (1994).
131. The civil rights remedies provided for by subtitle C of the Violence Against Women Act were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
132. See Siliadin v. France, supra note 37, at paras. 144 and 148;
133. in A.T. v Hungary, supra note 73, at paras. 9.3 and 9.4, the CEDAW committee called for both criminal and civil remedies.