The knowledge argument and objectivity

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 135, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 145-177

  Howell, Robert J ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Frank Jackson; Knowledge argument; Objectivity; Philosophy of mind; Qualia; Subjectivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547828055     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9077-0     Document Type: Article

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