Discussion of "limited commitment in multi-agent contracting"

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 377-385

  Hemmer, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547746763     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2007.tb00109.x     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Demski, J. S., and G. Feltham. 1970. The use of models in information evaluation. The Accounting Review(October).
2. Feltham, G. A., and C. Hofmann. 2007. Limited commitment in multi-agent contracting. Contemporary Accounting Research24 (2): 345-75.
3. Feltham, G. A., and J. Xie. 1994. Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task principal/agent relations. The Accounting Review69 (3): 429-53.
4. Hemmer, T. 2004,. Lessons lost in linearity: A critical assessment of the general usefulness of LEN models in compensation research. Journal of Management Accounting Research16: 149-62.
5. Hemmer, T. 2006. On the subtleties of the principal-agent model. In Essays on Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski, eds. R. Antle, F. Gjesdal, and P. Liang.
6. Holmström, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics10: 74-91.
7. Holmström, B., and P. Milgrom. 1987. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica55: 303-28.
8. Holmström, B., and P. Milgrom. 1991. Multitask principal-agent analysis: Incentive contracts asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization7: 524-52.
9. Villadsen, B. 1995. Communication and delegation in collusive agencies. Journal of Accounting and Economics19 (2-3): 315-44.