External influences on economic reform: Reform as a regional public good

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 660-673

  Grier, Kevin ^a   Sutter, Daniel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS PAN AMERICAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Foreign investment; Public goods; Reform

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547686231     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.10.004     Document Type: Article

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