On optimal unemployment compensation

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1612-1630

  Pavoni, Nicola ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Equity and social programs; Moral hazard; Recursive contracts; Unemployment insurance

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547658037     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.06.006     Document Type: Article

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