Optimal Unemployment Insurance: A Survey

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 66, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 442-465

  Karni, Edi ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033464684     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1061155     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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