Management buyouts, supervision and employee discretion

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 54, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 447-474

  Amess, Kevin ^a   Brown, Sarah ^b   Thompson, Steve ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT; ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE; SKILLED LABOR; WORKPLACE;

EURASIA; EUROPE; UNITED KINGDOM; WESTERN EUROPE;

EID: 34547657486     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: 14679485     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00424.x     Document Type: Article

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