Corruption and the provision of public output in a hierarchical asymmetric information relationship

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 727-755

  Dhami, Sanjit ^a   Al Nowaihi, Ali ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547640813     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00328.x     Document Type: Article

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