One formula, two experiences: Political divergence of Hong Kong and Macao since retrocession

Journal of Contemporary China

Volumn 16, Issue 52, 2007, Pages 359-387

  Lo, Sonny Shiu Hing ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CIVIL SOCIETY; CORRUPTION; DEMOCRACY; POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT; SOVEREIGNTY;

ASIA; BEIJING [CHINA]; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; HONG KONG; MACAU; TAIWAN;

EID: 34547588978     PISSN: 10670564     EISSN: 14699400     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10670560701314214     Document Type: Article

References (93)

1. For the Court of Final Appeal debate, see Xiao Weiyun and others, 'Why the Court of Final Appeal was wrong: Comments of the mainland scholars on the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal', in Johannes M. M. Chan, H. L. Fu and Yash Ghai, eds, Hong Kong's Constitutional Debate: Conflict Over Interpretation (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp. 53-60.
2. For details, see John P. Burns, Government Capacity and the Hong Kong Civil Service (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 173-176.
3. For Tung's resignation, see Ming Pao no. 13, (10 March 2005). One magazine reported that Tung had offered to resign twice shortly after the July 2003 protests. See Next Magazine no. 708, (2 October 2003), pp. 46-52.
4. 'Mayday in Macao marks violent protest', Worker Freedom, (19 May 2006), available at: http://www.infoshop.org/inews/ article.php?story=20060519070104643
5. Sing Tao Daily, (8 December 2006).
6. 'Month in review', (1 March 2006), available at: http://www.macaubusiness.com/index.php?id=411 (accessed 11 December 2006).
7. On political leadership, see Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith and Richard Beckhard, eds, The Leader of the Future (New York: The Peter Drucker Foundation, 1996).
8. For an analysis of state-society interactions in Hong Kong, see Alvin Y. So, Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
9. Taiwan President Chen Shuia-bian's family members were involved in corruption scandals, thus undermining his own image and unfortunately Taiwan's democratic politics. For a critique of Chen's family corruption and his 'incompetence', see 'Moment of truth', China Post (Taiwan), (10 December 2006).
10. A discussion of the British legacies can be found in Ming Chan, 'The legacy of British Administration of Hong Kong: A view from Hong Kong', The China Quarterly 151, (September 1997).
11. Macao's transition was discussed in Herbert S. Yee, Macao in Transition: From Colony to Autonomous Region (London: Palgrave, 2001).
12. John Flowerdew, The Final Years of British Hong Kong: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal (London: Macmillan, 1998).
13. Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., Hong Kong in Transition (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986).
14. Joanne Jaw-ling Chang, 'Settlement of the Macao issue: Distinctive features of Beijing's negotiating behavior', Occasional Papers/ Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies no. 4, (1988), p. 6.
15. See Next Magazine no. 462, (15 January 1999), p. 39
16. and Next Magazine no. 567, (18 January 2001), p. 48.
17. Yee, Macao in Transition, ch. 3, pp. 41-62.
18. For the Chief Executive's policy address that appealed to the civil servants to improve their work attitude, see Macau Daily News, (15 November 2005).
19. See Macao Yearbook 2002 (Macao: The Government Information Bureau of the Macao Special Administrative Region, 2002), pp. 164-166.
20. For triad wars, see Joao De Pina-Cabral, Between China and Europe: Person, Culture and Emotion in Macao (London: Continuum, 2002), pp. 205-221.
21. South China Morning Post, (9 February 2002). Also see Oriental Daily, (27 May 2002), p. A25. Also see Macau Government Information Bureau, 'Tender committee for gaming concession tender announced the provisional results of the tender', (8 February 2002).
22. MSAR Government Census and Statistics Office Data, available at: www.dsec.gov.mo, TVB News, (14 December 2004).
23. For Ho Yin's role in the 1966 riots in Macao, see Anthony R. Dicks, 'Macao: Legal fiction and gunboat diplomacy', in Goran Aijmer, ed., Leadership on the China Coast (London: Curzon Press, 1984).
24. The author's meeting with Ho in Macao, October 2003.
25. During the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, when health secretary Yeoh Eng-kiong was criticized for misleading the public for his comment that the virus did not spread to the community, Tung initially did not take any action. Similarly, when the former Financial Secretary Anthony Leung was involved in a car purchase scandal in March 2003, Tung did not ask him to resign.
26. She claimed that direct elections contributed to Hitler's rise to political power in Nazi Germany and that Hong Kong taxi drivers were uninterested in the debate over Article 23 of the Basic Law. Critics reacted strongly to her public remarks. To be fair to Ip, however, she was a lonely Principal Official promoting the national security legislation. This was almost an impossible task destined to encounter unprecedented criticisms and eventual failure. Many other Principal Officials did not really assist her in the promotion and explanation of the national security legislation. For a critique of the accountability system, see Paul Chan, 'The "accountability" system and political development in Hong Kong', Journal of Comparative Asian Development 4(2), (Fall 2005), pp. 477-506.
27. For a more positive view, see Lo Shiu-hing, 'The emergence of constitutional conventions in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region', Hong Kong Law Journal 35(1), (2005), pp. 103-128.
28. Anthony B. L. Cheung, 'The changing political system: Executive-led government or "disabled" governance?', in Lau Siu-kai, ed., The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration: The First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002), pp. 41-68.
29. Michael E. DeGolyer, 'How the stunning outbreak of disease led to a stunning outbreak of dissent', in Christine Loh, ed., At the Epicentre: Hong Kong and the SARS Outbreak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), pp. 117-138.
30. Ma was born in 1919 and he opened his business in Hong Kong in 1938. He moved to conduct his business in Macao in 1941. Ma became the Chairman of the Macao Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1948. He is now a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the PRC. See http://www.china.aorga.cna/English/features/58210.htm (accessed 11 December 2006).
31. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) described the MSAR as a 'limited democracy'. See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ mc.html (accessed 16 November 2005).
32. For an analysis of the 2005 Legislative Assembly elections, see Bruce Kwong, 'Democratization and patron-client politics in Macao: The 2005 Legislative Assembly elections', Journal of Comparative Asian Development 4(2), (Fall 2005), pp. 455-476.
33. For details, see 'Mayday in Macao marks violent protest', (19 May 2006), available at: http://www.infoshop.org/inews/article.php?story= 20060519070104643 (accessed 11 December 2006).
34. Herbert S. Yee, 'The mass political culture of Macao and Hong Kong', in Danny S. L. Paau, ed., Reunification with China: Hong Kong Academics Speak (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1998).
35. Herbert S. Yee, 'Mass political culture and political development in post-1999 Macao', in Macao on the Threshold of the Third Millennium (no author) (Macao: Macao Ricci Institute, 2003), pp. 127-149.
36. For church-state relations in Hong Kong, see Beatrice Leung and Chan Shun-hing, Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003). On 22 February 2006, Pope Benedict XVI announced that he would create 15 cardinals, including the promotion of Bishop Zen.
37. See Father Raymond J. De Souza, 'Pope promotes critic of China to cardinal', National Post (Canada), (23 February 2006), p. A17.
38. Also see Doug Crets, 'Vatican beckons as Zen named cardinal', The Standard, (23 February 2006).
39. Ming Pao, (9 March 2005).
40. Carrie Chan, 'Media focus brief for new Tsang aide', The Standard, (8 February 2006).
41. When the author taught Hong Kong and also Macao politics at the University of Hong Kong in 1996 and 1997, some undergraduate students expressed their total lack of interest in Macao and often asserted that Macao was far more 'backward' than Hong Kong in many aspects. Such a deep-seated bias began to change from 1998 to 2004 when the HKSAR was plunged into chaotic governance. This student perception of Macao actually reflected the parochial and the Greater Hong Kong mentality of many Hongkongers, who are generally but unfortunately playing down the political and economic development of their neighbor Macao.
42. For example, see Next Magazine no. 864, (28 September 2006), pp. 46-50.
43. For the legitimacy crisis in Hong Kong before the handover, see Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989).
44. For the early efforts made by the HKSAR government to build institutions, see Kuan Hsin-chi, 'Institution building in the Hong Kong SAR', China Perspectives no. 20, (November/December 1998), pp. 29-38.
45. A paper prepared by the Federation in July 2005 proposed that the upper house would have special veto powers over the issues affecting the central government and theHKSAR, but this proposal appears to give excessive power to the Hong Kong Senate, which under its proposal will perhaps interpret the Basic Law on matters affecting both Hong Kong and the central government. See 'A bicameral system for Hong Kong', available at: http://www.bpf.org.hk/bpf/BPFReports/reports.htm (accessed 16 November 2005).
46. For my proposal on the bicameral model, see Lo Shiu Hing, 'Bicameral model as the best option for Hong Kong's future', published on the website of the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation, available at: http://www.hkdf.org/newsarticles.asp?show=newsarticles&newsarticle= 171 (accessed 16 November 2005). I proposed that the upper house should have veto power a number of times every year over bills passed by the lower house. After the veto is exercised, both houses will set up a joint committee to hammer out solutions along theAmericanmodel.
47. Also see Sonny Lo, 'Consider a Hong Kong Senate',Letter to the Editor, South China Morning Post, (7 November 2005) and 'Hong Kong's democratic breakthrough is to establish the bicameral system', Hong Kong Economic Times, (10 November 2005), p. A40.
48. Wu Zhiliang, ed., Macao Police (in Chinese) (Guangdong: Guangdong People's Publisher, 1998).
49. TVB News, (20 March 2005). Such remarks were made by Executive Council member Cheng Yiu-tong and also DAB vice-chairman Tam Yiu-chung.
50. Herbert S. Yee, 'Money politics and political mobilization in Macao', Asian Survey 37, (1997), pp. 944-960.
51. See Raymond Yao, 'As you were', Far Eastern Economic Review, (6 May 1974), p. 15.
52. East week, (26 May 2004), p. 19.
53. Ibid, p. 20.
54. Observations made by Johnny Lau Yui-shui on 4 June 2003 during a briefing he offered to some legislators on Beijing's policy toward the HKSAR. Chen's rising prominence could be seen on the fifth anniversary of Macao's handover on 20 December 2004 when he delivered a speech in Macao on behalf of the Hong Kong Macao Affairs Office. In March 2005, Chen also made public remarks in front of Hong Kong reporters in Beijing on whether the new Chief Executive would serve Tung's remaining term or the full five year term of office.
55. Critics questioned Lau Siu-kai's credibility as his CPU appeared to fail to understand the depth of public discontent prior to the massive protests on 1 July 2003. Its sub-group on 'social cohesion' failed dismally, perhaps to some extent hamstrung by another CPU adviser Tsang Tak-sing who according to news reports disregarded the views critical of the Tung regime in the group discussions. Patron-client politics in the HKSAR under Tung severely undermined its own governance due to intolerance of political dissent and public grievances - a tragedy that has been learnt by Tung's successor Donald Tsang. Patron - client politics do persist in Macao, but the Chief Executive and high-ranking elites have maintained a high degree of tolerance of dissenting views. The political divergence between Hong Kong under Tung and Macao under Ho was prominent. The crux of the problem of Hong Kong's governance is that once societal elites are co-opted into the policy-making apparatus, they tend to be less tolerant of opposing views than ever before. In Macao, however, this political pitfall has been avoided by many co-opted societal and political elites, who regard public criticisms as a healthy check on the executive's power. Political moderation rather than arrogance has marked the top echelon of the MSAR polity. Also see Sonny S. H. Lo and Herbert S. Yee, 'Legitimacy building in the Macao Special Administrative Region: Colonial legacies and reform strategies', Asian Journal of Political Science 13(1), (June 2005), pp. 51-80.
56. For a study of the political role of the Liaison Office in Hong Kong elections, see Shiu-hing Lo, Wing-yat Yu and Kwok-fai Wan, 'The 1999 District Councils elections', in Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, eds, Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 139-165.
57. However, an event involving a PLA soldier shoplifting in Hong Kong's Disneyland was viewed by a critic as a sign that the PLA needs moral education. See Editorial, 'The story of a PLA soldier in Hong Kong', Cheng Ming no. 246, (February 2006), p. 3.
58. In contrast, comments made by Liaison Office officials on Hong Kong affairs tend to be more provocative and sensitive. For example, in March 2000, when Wang Fengchao criticized the Cable TV program for interviewing Annette Lu, Taiwan's pro-independence Vice-President-elect, his remarks triggered public concerns that he interfered with media freedom in Hong Kong.
59. For united front work in China's Hong Kong, see Jamie Allen, Seeing Red: China's Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong (Singapore: Butterworth-Heinemann Asia, 1997), especially ch. 3, pp. 68-111;
60. Holly Porteous, 'Beijing's united front strategy in Hong Kong', Commentary no. 72, (Winter 1998);
61. and Benson Wong Wai Kwok, 'Can cooptation win over the Hong Kong people? China's united front work in Hong Kong since 1984', Issues & Studies 33(5), (May 1997). United front work refers to the attempt of the PRC government to isolate its enemies but win the support of the vast majority of Hong Kong people.
62. For the definition of united front work, see Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 3.
63. Hu's admonishment of Tung and his cabinet was covered by TVB News, (20 December 2004).
64. See Sing Tao Daily, (22 December 2005). Lau Chin-shek has moderated his political views and stance since he had to visit his ailing mother in mainland China in the late 1990s. His vote share in the direct elections held for the Legislative Council also declined gradually, pointing to his gradual political eclipse.
65. TVB News, (28 December 2005).
66. For example, Szeto Wah of the Democratic Party and Lee Cheuk-yan of the Confederation of Trade Unions were involved in the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The former was one of the leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic and Democratic Movement in China, playing a crucial role in the 'Operation Yellow Bird' that rescued mainland democrats out of the PRC. The latter was arrested by the mainland police in 1989 for his links with the mainland democrats, but was released later due to the intervention of the British government. Historically, Hong Kong was also a base for the republican revolution that eventually toppled the Qing dynasty.
67. For details, see Tsai Jung-fang, Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842-1913 (New York: Columbia University Press 1993), pp. 238-269.
68. The formation of the pro-democracy political parties and the pro-Beijing as well as pro-business parties could be traced back to the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen incident. See Lo Shiu-hing, The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 137-176;
69. and Sonny Lo, 'Legislative cliques, political parties, political groupings and electoral system', in Joseph Y. S. Cheng and Sonny S. H. Lo, eds, From Colony to SAR: Hong Kong's Challenges Ahead (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995), pp. 51-70.
70. For details of Anson Chan's tensions with Tung Chee-hwa, see Lo Shiu-hing, Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay (New York: Nova Science, 2001), pp. 126-131.
71. Chan's participation in the parade in support of democracy on 4 December 2005 drew immense media attention as she said that she would hope to see Hong Kong becoming a democracy in her lifetime. Her visit to Britain after her making public comments in Hong Kong challenging Tsang was a move fuelling further speculations that she might be not only pro-British but also have hidden motivations. For the 4 December parade, see Cheng Ming no. 338, (December 2005), pp. 65-66.
72. Mao wrote that 'in human history, antagonism between classes exists as a manifestation of the struggle of opposites'. See Mao Zedong, Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1971), p. 125.
73. Although Anthony Cheung is regarded as a 'pro-democracy' academic, he was appointed by the Tung regime to a committee determining the salaries of civil servants. His appointment to the ExCo by Donald Tsang was not received warmly by a majority of democrats - a signal that Cheung has been viewed by the pan-democratic camp as making a political shift to support the regime in power. For the co-optation of the Hong Kong democrats into the HKSAR polity, see Lo Shiu-hing, 'Political opposition, co-optation and democratization: The case of Hong Kong', in Li Pang-kwong, ed., Political Order and Power Transition in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997), pp. 127-157.
74. One commentator said Lam remained too politically cautious and supportive of the remarks of pro-Beijing elites. See Joe Chung Cho-Hong, On the Road to Unaccountability: The Best Paid Officials in the World Demonstrate How to Defend the Indefensible (Hong Kong: Ha Fei Yee, 2002), p. 288.
75. On the Principal Official Accountability system introduced to Hong Kong in July 2002, see Lo Shiu-hing, 'The emergence of constitutional conventions in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region', pp. 103-128.
76. For an argument that the new ministerial system 'caused greater political-administrative disjunction and actually compounded the crisis of governance' in the HKSAR, see Anthony B. L. Cheung, 'Hong Kong's post-1997 institutional crisis: Problems of governance and institutional incompatibility', Journal of East Asian Studies 3(1), (2003), pp. 135-167.
77. The bicameral model's concrete proposals were absent in the HKSAR government's reform plan. See The Fifth Report of the Constitutional Task Force: Package of Proposals for the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2008, available at: http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/cab-review/eng/report5/ index.htm (accessed 28 December 2005).
78. TVB News, (22 December 2005). However, Zen attended a meeting with the pan-democratic camp on 4 November, coming to a consensus that they would not accept a political reform plan without any time-table. See Cheng Ming no. 338, (December 2005), p. 68.
79. As a matter of fact, patronage was also a Western political tradition. See Samuel E. Finer, 'Patronage and the public service: Jeffersonian bureaucracy and the British tradition', in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 106-125.
80. The use of guanxi is a fundamental feature of East Asian, and indeed Chinese, politics. See Haruhiro Fukui, 'Introduction: On the significance of informal politics', in Lowell Ditmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N. S. Lee, eds, Informal Politics in East Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 12.
81. A good discussion of the functions of guanxi can be seen in Scott D. Seligman, Chinese Business Etiquette (New York: Warner, 1999), pp. 180-196.
82. For a detailed examination of guanxi politics in the HKSAR, see Bruce Kwong, Elections and Patron-Client Politics in Hong Kong, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong, 2004.
83. Chou Yangsun and Andrew Nathan, 'Democratizing transition in Taiwan', Asian Survey 27(3), (March 1987), pp. 284-288.
84. Also see Cheng Tun-jen, 'Democratizing the quasi-Leninist regime in Taiwan', World Politics 41(4), (July 1989), pp. 471-499
85. Chu Yun-han, 'Taiwan's unique challenges', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds, Democracy in East Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 133-146
86. Lo Shiu-hing, 'Liberalization and democratization in Taiwan: A class and functional perspective', in Anek Laothamatas, ed., Democratization in Southeast and East Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), pp. 226-227.
87. For a discussion of the successful Macao administration, see Ming Chan and Sonny Lo, 'A commentary on the fifth anniversary of the Macao Special Administrative Region', Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly no. 333, (December 2004), pp. 8-14.
88. TVB News, (28 December 2005). In 2000, Liu Bolong remarked that 'Macao needs a capable leader to lead the Macao Special Administrative Region into a new era'. This hope has been realized in post-retrocession Macao. See James C.Hsiung, ed., Hong Kong the Super Paradox: Life after Return to China (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 299.
89. Comments made by pro-democracy legislator Ng Kuok-cheong at a forum held by the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Macao on 16 October 2003.
90. The concept of political development is discussed in Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 33-44
91. and Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, Political Change and Underdevelopment (London: Macmillan, 1985).
92. Ronnie Chan Kai-chung, a business tycoon, claimed that the HKSAR is 'the most communist city in China'. See Ming Pao, (15 December 2004). During the legal controversy over the listing of the Housing Authority's Link Trust, Chief Executive Tung said that the issue was 'politicized'. TVB News, (20 December 2004).
93. After the Ao scandal, some legislators demanded that the Legislative Assembly should set up committees to scrutinize the government's granting of land and construction projects, but some legislators vehemently opposed the idea. See Macao Daily News, (5 January 2007).