Can Co-optation Win over the Hong Kong People? China's United Front Work in Hong Kong since 1984

Issues and Studies

Volumn 33, Issue 5, 1997, Pages 102-137

  Wong, Wai Kwok ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Accountability; Co optation; Pro China elite; Representation; United front work

Indexed keywords

EID: 0343252326     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (80)

1. Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 13; Michael Saward, Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1992), 1-2.
2. Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 13; Michael Saward, Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1992), 1-2.
3. Saward, Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy, 5-6.
4. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 161; Simon Barraclough, "Co-optation and Elite Accommodation in Malaysian Politics," Contemporary Southeast Asia 6, no. 4 (March 1985): 308.
5. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 161; Simon Barraclough, "Co-optation and Elite Accommodation in Malaysian Politics," Contemporary Southeast Asia 6, no. 4 (March 1985): 308.
6. Barraclough, "Co-optation and Elite Accommodation," 308.
7. Ibid.
8. For detailed analysis on how the (British) Hong Kong government and Chinese government have claimed "legitimacy" over the Hong Kong people, see Ian Scott, "Legitimacy and Its Discontent: Hong Kong and the Reversion to Chinese Sovereignty," Asian Journal of Political Science 1, no. 1 (June 1993): 55-75.
9. Saward, Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy, 46.
10. Tong Zhan, "The United Front Work System and the Nonparty Elite," in Decision Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders, ed. Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 66. Tong states that the CCP Central Committee's United Front Department engages in the selection and recommendation of non-Communist parties' members to be members of the NPC and the CPPCC. Unlike the practice in mainland China, united front work in Hong Kong is mainly dominated by the State Council's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO) and the Xinhua Hong Kong branch.
11. Peter Harris adopts the social analysis of Pareto and interestingly remarks that Hong Kong's elite consists of "business" foxes and "traditional" lions (in the sense that foxes are cunning speculators and manipulators who take risks, while lions are solid, conservative traditionalists who put a premium on social stability). Judging from the performance of local social and economic elite since the 1980s, this remark is valid to a certain extent. See Peter Harris, Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books [Asia], 1988), 45.
12. Tung criticized the post-colonial Hong Kong political setting as too "politicalizing," and stated that Hong Kong should resume the traditional Confucian method of governance in which zhongyong zhidao (equilibrium principle) would be heavily stressed. See Tung Chee-hwa's Lunar New Year's Speech produced and broadcasted by the Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), February 7, 1997.
13. See Chalmers Johnson, "The Mousetrapping of Hong Kong: A Game in Which Nobody Wins," Asian Survey 24, no. 9 (September 1994): 887-98. Johnson argues that the PRC succeeded in monitoring the united front campaign to establish its position during the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong's future from 1982 to 1984. See also Lo Shiu Hing, "The Politics of Co-optation in Hong Kong: A Study of the Basic Law Drafting Process," Asian Journey of Public Administration 14, no. 1 (June 1992): 3-24. Lo comments that the fundamental goal of united front work is to absorb the pro-Beijing industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. However, China's co-optation strategy has inevitably led to public distrust due to the lack of representation in the co-optive mechanisms.
14. See Chalmers Johnson, "The Mousetrapping of Hong Kong: A Game in Which Nobody Wins," Asian Survey 24, no. 9 (September 1994): 887-98. Johnson argues that the PRC succeeded in monitoring the united front campaign to establish its position during the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong's future from 1982 to 1984. See also Lo Shiu Hing, "The Politics of Co-optation in Hong Kong: A Study of the Basic Law Drafting Process," Asian Journey of Public Administration 14, no. 1 (June 1992): 3-24. Lo comments that the fundamental goal of united front work is to absorb the pro-Beijing industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. However, China's co-optation strategy has inevitably led to public distrust due to the lack of representation in the co-optive mechanisms.
15. See Yazhou zhoukan (The International Chinese Newsweekly), December 10, 1995, 40; and South China Morning Post, November 29, 1995, 1. It is even reported that before the Legislative Council direct election in September 1995, some pro-China capitalists and industrialists visited Beijing and told officials that three "pro-masses" parties - the Democratic Party, the Pro-China Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, and the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood - wanted to advocate significant improvement in social welfare during their electoral campaigns. As a result, Chen Ziying, deputy director of the State Council's HKMAO, severely condemned the Hong Kong government as if the British Hong Kong government did not properly control the budget for social welfare: "It's like a Formula One car which is going to crash and kill all six million people." Such a remark led to public outcry.
16. See Yazhou zhoukan (The International Chinese Newsweekly), December 10, 1995, 40; and South China Morning Post, November 29, 1995, 1. It is even reported that before the Legislative Council direct election in September 1995, some pro-China capitalists and industrialists visited Beijing and told officials that three "pro-masses" parties - the Democratic Party, the Pro-China Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, and the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood - wanted to advocate significant improvement in social welfare during their electoral campaigns. As a result, Chen Ziying, deputy director of the State Council's HKMAO, severely condemned the Hong Kong government as if the British Hong Kong government did not properly control the budget for social welfare: "It's like a Formula One car which is going to crash and kill all six million people." Such a remark led to public outcry.
17. Lee Chu-ming [Martin Lee] and Szeto Wah, Dui Jibenfa dejiben kanfa (Basic opinions on the Basic Law) (a brochure published by Lee and Szeto in Hong Kong, 1988), 5.
18. It may be argued that some "moderate" democrats such as Frederick Fung Kin-kee and Chang Ka-mun, who were chairman and member of the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, respectively, were appointed to be Hong Kong affairs advisors in 1993 and Preparatory Committee members in 1995. Fung was even elected as a Provisional Legislature member in December 1996. Nevertheless, they have adopted pragmatic and compromising attitudes toward Chinese maneuvers in Hong Kong that have attracted criticism. Emily Lau Wai-hing sharply condemned them as supporting "China's oppressive rule in the name of democracy" in the Legco's motion to condemn the Preparatory Committee on March 13, 1996. See Eastern Express, March 14, 1996, 1.
19. Zijing (Bauhinia Monthly), no. 12 (September 1991): 13. The pro-China media and many local pro-China elite have been creating and using political slogans to devalue local democratic and liberal forces, such as feng-Zhong bifan (opposing China in full swing) and kang-Zhong luan-Gang (resisting China and disturbing Hong Kong).
20. Zhang Haizhong, "To Fulfill Our Smooth and Stable Transition," Zijing, no. 52 (January 1995): 16.
21. "What Is a Patriot According to 'Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong'," ibid., no. 55 (April 1995): 37.
22. Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu (Xu Jiatun: Hong Kong memoirs) (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, 1993), vol. 1:156.
23. Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), 298.
24. See Huang Wenfeng, "I Was Living and Working in the Hong Kong Branch of the New China News Agency for Forty-Two Years," Dong zhoukan (Eastern Magazine) (Hong Kong), no. 89 (July 6, 1994): 158-62. Huang is a retired Xinhua official and wrote this memoir about his work, commenting on China's Hong Kong policies in Hong Kong since the 1950s.
25. Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, updated 5th edition (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), 236; Dangdai shishi zhoukan (Contemporary), November 25, 1989, 20; December 2, 1989, 20-21; and December 9, 1989, 20-21.
26. Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, updated 5th edition (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), 236; Dangdai shishi zhoukan (Contemporary), November 25, 1989, 20; December 2, 1989, 20-21; and December 9, 1989, 20-21.
27. Quoted in Xian Yuanlong, Xinhua shi toushi (The focus of the Xinhua) (Hong Kong: Wide Angle, 1987), 44.
28. After the PRC replaced Taiwan as a member of the United Nations in 1971, this led to a tide of "sense of belonging to the motherland" among local college and university students. For example, many universities and colleges held "China Week" to introduce Chinese history, economy, and politics. Some groups even visited mainland China. However, such activities only stimulated a few "patriotic" students. See ibid., 48-49.
29. Xu, Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu 1:123.
30. Joseph Chan Man and Chin-Chuan Lee, "Power Change, Co-optation, Accommodation: Xinhua and the Press in Transitional Hong Kong," The China Quarterly, no. 126 (June 1991): 294.
31. Xu, Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu 1:127.
32. Ibid., 130-31.
33. Dangdai shishi zhoukan, January 13, 1990, 14.
34. Zijing, no. 55 (April 1995): 41.
35. Joseph Cheng Yu-shek, "The Legislative Council's Elections in Hong Kong: A Retrospective of the 1991 Election and Preparation for the 1995 Election," in Xianggang zhengzhi yu xuanju (Hong Kong politics and elections), ed. Joseph Cheng Yu-shek and Louie Kin-shuen (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), 92. For example, the Xinhua supported campaigns for the Liberal Democratic Federation in the 1991 Legco election and for the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong in the 1995 Legco election.
36. It is reported that the Xinhua and some pro-Chinese enterprises (i.e., the China Bank) financially supported the establishment of the Hong Kong Youth and Tertiary Students Association in order to exert influence in the field of university students. In addition, the Xinhua planned to resume the Youth Branch to strengthen united front work toward university students because it thought that it had emphasized "united front from above" too heavily in Xu Jiatun's era. See Kuai bao (Express News), January 6, 1995, A3.
37. Norman Miners observes that there was active involvement (i.e., campaigns) of villagers in the election of a countryside head in the New Territories from the 1950s to the 1970s and points out that using "political apathy" to label the Hong Kong people is problematic. His discussion at a meeting of "Countdown to 1997: Hong Kong in Transition," November 1995.
38. Political slang like "newly recharged batteries" and "old batteries" has been used recently to negatively label former colonial appointees who were first put in important positions by the British government, and then given up by Chris Patten (Patten reorganized the Exco in 1992 and many officials, such as Sir Sze-yuan Chung, Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai and Nellie Fong Wong Kut-man, were dismissed or resigned). Subsequently, they have now been "recharged" by the Chinese government, and play a crucial role in the PRC-dominated consultative mechanisms.
39. Luk Tak-chuen [tcluk@ctsc.hkts.hk], "Hong Kong Gets on the China Express or Regresses?" (Private e-mail message to Postnet [rhizome@eden.rutgers.edu]), December 12, 1995.
40. Originally, Anthony Cheung Bing-leung, the chairman of the Meeting Point, a local liberal political organization, was invited to be a Hong Kong affairs advisor. However, he decided to combine the Meeting Point with the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) to form the Democratic Party in 1994. As a consequence, the Chinese government was angered and canceled the invitation.
41. Pingguo ribao (Apple Daily), November 13, 1995, A1.
42. Xu, Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu 1:123-24.
43. Quoted from Hung Ho-fung, "The [19]67 Trauma and the Making of 'Hong Kong People': A Tentative Search for the Repressed," Xianggang wenhua yanjiu qikan (Hong Kong Cultural Studies Bulletin) 4 (Winter 1995): 28.
44. South China Morning Post, April 11, 1995, 19.
45. Jingbao (The Mirror) 21, no. 4 (1994): 19.
46. Ibid.
47. Pingguo ribao, November 5, 1995, A1.
48. Sonny Lo Shiu Hing and Donald Hugh McMillen, "A Profile of the 'Pro-China Hong Kong Elite': Images and Perceptions," Issues & Studies 31, no. 6 (June 1995): 124.
49. South China Morning Post, July 17, 1993, 4.
50. Dangdai shishi zhoukan, March 15, 1994, 20.
51. South China Morning Post, July 20, 1993, 19.
52. Personal interview with Shiu Sin-por, July 24, 1995. Shiu was a PWC member and now is a Hong Kong affairs advisor and a member of the Preparatory Committee.
53. Telephone interviews with Chao Shing-kie, July 24, 1995, and Henry Tang Ying-yen, October 11, 1995. Chao is a district affairs advisor. Tang is a Hong Kong affairs advisor, a delegate of the CPPCC in Shanghai, and has been appointed as a chancellor in the SAR Executive Council.
54. Personal interview with Shiu Sin-por, July 24, 1995.
55. South China Morning Post, July 20, 1993, 19.
56. Ibid., July 17, 1993, 4.
57. Xin bao (Hong Kong Economic Journal), December 4, 1995, 3.
58. Ibid.
59. During interviews with Shiu, Chao, and Tang, all interviewees declined to discuss the details of meetings due to the confidentiality, only mentioning the variety of opinions during the meetings, with final decisions made by the State Council's HKMAO.
60. Fengshenbang: 97 guoduban (The announcement on offering the posts of god: Transitional version for 1997) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1994), 2.
61. Telephone interview with Chao Shing-kie, July 24, 1995.
62. Interview with Shiu Sin-por, July 24, 1995.
63. Ming Pao, January 16, 1995, C5. It should be noted that Chan Choi-hei and Hung Wing-tat, members of the Democratic Party, have been appointed as district affairs advisors. They were invited to participate in the meeting regarding setting up the Selection Committee and Preparatory Committee in April 1996. Therefore, it can be argued that united front work has not been completely exclusionary toward opposition forces. See News at 6:30, Jade Channel, Television Broadcast Limited (hereinafter TVB Jade), April 12, 1996; South China Morning Post, April 15, 1996, 1. At the time this article was being written, Chan Choi-hei even won in the Provisional Legislature's election in December 1996, with the support of some pro-China elite. It is suspected that the Chinese government wanted to embarrass the Democratic Party by absorbing him as a Provisional Legislature member, despite the fact that he was expelled before the start of the election. Ironically, Chan still retains his post as a committee member in the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China, a "subversive" organization in the PRC's eyes.
64. The legislation includes the Societies Bill of 1992, the Television Bill of 1993, the Telecommunications Bill of 1993, the Broadcasting Authority Bill of 1993, the Public Order Bill of 1995, and the Emergence Regulations Ordinance of 1995.
65. Eastern Express, October 18, 1995, 2. However, it is naive to say that human rights in Hong Kong have obviously improved after the abolition of such amendments. For example although the Public Order Bill of 1995 has been canceled, the police still has the absolute right to restrict the scale, number of participants, and form of demonstrations For example, there is evidence that the police has restricted any protests held near the Xinhua. All protests are video-taped by the police. However, the police has never announced what it will do with such videos after the end of each protest. See "Common Sense" (Keng Qiang Ji), TVB Jade, January 7, 1996. It is a popular TV program produced by RTHK which examines current issues. At the end of this program the narrator said: "The practice of the Bill of Rights Ordinance does not mean that the violation of human rights in Hong Kong has lessened. It is clear that the PWC is eager to restore the six controversial pieces of 'repressive' legislation."
66. Pingguo ribao, December 20, 1995, A8.
67. It is noted that the PWC's legal subgroup has been dominated by pro-China barristers, such as Lo Tak-shing, Simon Lee Fok-sean, Maria Tam Wai-chu, Chow Yiu-kei (who is also a CPPCC member), and Lau Han-chuen (who is also a Hong Kong affairs advisor). See Ming Pao, December 28, 1995, A6.
68. Pingguo ribao, December 20, 1995, A8.
69. Ming Pao, October 18, 1995, A6.
70. It was also reported that some interviewees did not participate in protests against the Chinese decision because they felt powerless to change the present situation. See Pingguo ribao, January 13, 1996, A9.
71. Ming Pao, October 28, 1995, A2, A4.
72. South China Morning Post, January 25, 1997, 1.
73. Ming Pao, January 31, 1997, B14.
74. Pingguo ribao, January 31, 1997, A2.
75. Jiushi niandai (The Nineties), February 1997, 42.
76. The Preparatory Committee planned to establish a provisional legislature because the PRC claims that the administrative changes made by Governor Chris Patten ruined the Basic Law. Hence, the Legco must be dissolved after July 1, 1997 and will be replaced by the Provisional Legislature. However, this has led to a public outcry because the Basic Law does not mention the establishment of such an organ. The absence of legal status thus presents a handicap for the existence of the Provisional Legislature after 1997.
77. South China Morning Post, March 25, 1996, 1.
78. Hong Kong Standard, April 8, 1996, 1.
79. Lo and McMillen, "A Profile of the 'Pro-China Hong Kong Elite'," 103.
80. See note 66 above.