Hidden-action in network routing

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Volumn 25, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1161-1172

  Feldman, Michal ^a   Chuang, John ^b   Stoica, Ion ^c   Shenker, Scott ^c  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Contract; Economics; Game theory; Hidden action; Mechanism design; Moral hazard; Principal agent; Routing

Indexed keywords

HIDDEN ACTION; MECHANISM DESIGN; MORAL HAZARDS; PRINCIPAL AGENTS;

AD HOC NETWORKS; GAME THEORY; INTERNET; MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS; TELECOMMUNICATION LINKS;

NETWORK ROUTING;

EID: 34547475442     PISSN: 07338716     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2007.070810     Document Type: Article

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