Codes of conduct and biological weapons: An in-process assessment

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 145-154

  Rappert, Brian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; BIOMEDICINE; ETHICS; HUMAN; MEDICAL ETHICS; RESEARCH;

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES; BIOTERRORISM; CODES OF ETHICS; HUMANS; RESEARCH;

EID: 34547440963     PISSN: 15387135     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1089/bsp.2007.0003     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. As opposed to dual-use facilities or agents. For a discussion of the multiple meanings of dual-use, see Atlas R, Dando M. The dual-use dilemma for the life sciences. Biosecur Bioterror 2006;4(3):276-286.
2. Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Geneva: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; 2006. Available at: http://www.opbw.org/. Accessed April 24, 2007.
3. Rappert B. Responsibility in the life sciences. Biosecur Bioterr 2004;2(3):164-175.
4. As elaborated by Mathews B, Webb J. Codes of conduct for scientists, and the CWC. Paper presented at: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry workshop, The Chemical Weapons Convention, Chemistry Education and the Professional Conduct of Chemists; July 10, 2005; St Anne's College, Oxford.
5. This means excluding policies such as that outlined in: Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, Medical Research Council and Wellcome Trust. Managing Risks of Misuse Associated with Grant Funding Activities. London: BBSRC, MRC, and Wellcome Trust; September 2005.
6. See, as well, Lentzos F. Considering codes of conduct. Nonproliferation Review 2006;13(2).
7. Rappert B. Towards a Life Sciences Code: Countering the Threats from Biological Weapons. Bradford Briefing Papers (2nd series), No. 13. Bradford, UK: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford; 2004. Available at: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/bw-briefing.htm. Accessed April 24, 2007.
8. See, as well, Atlas R, Somerville M. Life sciences or death sciences. In: Rappert B, McLeish C, eds. Web of Prevention. London: Earthscan; 2007.
9. Somerville M, Atlas R. Ethics: a weapon to counter bioterrorism. Science 2005;307:1881-1882.
10. Somerville M. The Ethical Canary: Science, Society and the Human Spirit. Toronto: Viking; 2000.
11. In November 2002, the Federation of American Scientists; the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; the Verification Research, Training and Information Center; the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility; the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy; the Sunshine Project; Pax Christi International; Physicians for Social Responsibility; and 20/20 Vision agreed draft recommendations for a code of conduct for biodefence programs. These were published as an Annex to: Rosenberg BH. Defending against biodefence: the need for limit. Disarmament Diplomacy 2003;69(Feb-March). Available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/ dd/dd69/69op03.htm.
12. Wright S, ed. Preventing a Biological Arms Race. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press; 1990:412.
13. See, as well, INES. Appeal to Engineers and Scientists. Dortmund: International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility; 1995. Available at: http://www.mindspring.com/%7Eines/ines3.htm. Accessed April 24, 2007.
14. Pax Christi International. Pax Christi International Calls for Ethical Approach to Biological Weapons [Ref.: SD.08.E.04]. Brussels: Pax Christi International; June 2004.
15. International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology. Code of Ethics of the International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology. Bern: IUBMB; December 2005. Available at: http://www.iubmb.unibe.ch/index.php? id=155&0=. Accessed April 24, 2007.
16. The IUMS Code of Ethics for the Prevention of the Misuse of Scientific Knowledge, Research and Resources reads as follows: "There has always been the potential for dual application of scientific knowledge for beneficial or malicious purpose. However, current societal and geopolitical changes have increased the risk of the misuse of this knowledge. The IUMS reaffirms its major goal is to promote research and the open exchange of scientific information for advancement of the health and welfare of humankind and the environment and strongly discourages any uses of knowledge and resources to the contrary. In particular, the IUMS strives to promote ethical conduct of research and training in the areas of biosecurity and biosafety so as to prevent use of microorganisms as biological weapons and therefore to protect the public's health and to promote world peace." International Union of Microbiological Societies. IUMS Code of Ethics for the Prevention of the Misuse of Scientific Knowledge, Research and Resources. Utrecht: IUMS; 2005. Available at: http://www.iums.org/reports/Genassembly2005.htm. Accessed April 24, 2007.
17. American Society for Microbiology. Conducting Research during the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security. Washington, DC: ASM: October 10, 2002. Available at: http://www.asm.org/Policy/index.asp?bid=5703. Accessed April 24, 2007.
18. American Society for Microbiology. Code of Ethics. Washington, DC: ASM; 2005. Available at: http://www.asm.org/ASM/files/ccLibraryFiles/FILENAME/ 000000001596/ASM CodeofEthics05.pdf. Accessed April 24, 2007.
19. Green S, Taub S, Morin K, Higginson D. Guidelines to prevent malevolent use of biomedical research. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2006;15:432-439.
20. InterAcademy Panel on International Issues. IAP Statement on Biosecurity. Trieste: IAP; November 7, 2005. Available at: http://www.nationalacademies.org/morenews/includes/IAP_Biosecurity.pdf. Accessed April 24, 2007.
21. That stemmed from the report: United Nations. Annex Refort of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism. A/57/273-S/2002/875. New York: United Nations; August 6, 2002. Available at: http://www.un.dk/doc/A.57.0273_S.2002.875.pdf. Accessed April 24, 2007.
22. International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. Building Blocks for a Code of Conduct for Scientists, in Relation to the Safe and Ethical Use of Biological Science. Trieste: ICGEB; 2005.
23. International Committee of the Red Cross. Principles of Practice. Geneva: ICRC; 2004. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/bwh? Open Document. And see: http://www.projects.ex.ac.uk/codesofconduct/Chronology/ Principles_Actionpoints_11Nov04.pdf.
24. Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. 2005. Report of the Meeting of States Parties. BWC/MSP/2005/3. December 14, 2005:3-4.
25. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. NSABB Draft Guidance Documents. Bethesda, Md: NSABB; 2006. Available at: http://www. biosecurityboard.gov/pdf/NSABB%20Draft%20Guidance%20Documents.pdf. Accessed April 24, 2007.
26. Such as the BTWC Regional Workshop in Melbourne, February 21-25, 2005.
27. To elaborate, at the BTWC Meeting of Experts in 2005, certain organizations nominated by states were designated as "friends of the Chairman" and allowed to make presentations in a manner not previously open to nongovernmental organizations. For further information, see Lennane R. Blood, toil, tears and sweat. Disarmament Forum 2006:3:5-15.
28. For a background discussion, see Grönvall GK. A new role for scientists in the Biological Weapons Convention. Nature Biotech 2005;23:1213-1216.
29. See The Royal Society. Report of the RS-IAP-ICSU international workshop on science and technology developments relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. London: The Royal Society; 2006. Available at: http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=22789. Accessed April 24, 2007.
30. World Medical Association. The WMA Declaration of Washington on Biological Weapons. Ferney-Voltaire, France: WMA; 2002. Available at: http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b1.htm. Accessed April 24, 2007.
31. International Committee of the Red Cross. Principles of Practice. Annex I of the Final Report. Geneva: ICRC; 2004.
32. Comments by M. Nance, NSABB Meeting; Bethesda, Md; July 13, 2006.
33. United Kingdom. Codes of Conduct for Scientists. Submitted to the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. BWC/CONF.VI/WP.23 22; November 2006.
34. Rappert B. Education for the life sciences. In: Rappert B, McLeish C, eds. A Web of Prevention. London: Earthscan; 2007.
35. For an overview, see Iverson M, Frankel M, Siage S. Scientific societies and research integrity. Sci Eng Ethics 2003:9:141-158.
36. Evers K. Standards for Ethics and Responsibility in Science-An Empirical Study. Paris: International Council for Science [ICSU]; September 2002. Available at: http://www.icsu.org/Gestion/img/ICSU_DOC_DOWNLOAD/ 217_DD_FILE_SCRES-Standards_Report%20.pdf. Accessed April 25, 2007.
37. Wanted - a code of conduct. New Scientist 29 February 1968:453.
38. Pigman W, Carmichael E. An ethical code for scientists. Science 1950;111:643-647.
39. InterAcademy Panel on International Issues. Summary of Replies to the Biosecurity Questionnaire. Trieste: IAP; February 15, 2007.
40. See Biological Weapons & Codes of Conduct. Chronology. Exeter, UK: University of Exeter. Available at: http://www.projects.ex.ac.uk/ codesofconduct/Chronology/index.htm. Accessed April 25, 2007.
41. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Codes, Charters, Oaths, Declarations . . . and Some Examples. Available at: http://www.biosecuritycodes.org/codes.htm. Accessed April 25, 2007.
42. Canada was one country that produced a number of thoughtful analyses. See, for instance: Canada. Thoughts on the Functions of Codes of Conduct: Potential Weaknesses and Solutions. Prepared for the Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. BWC/MSP/2005/MX/ WP.6; June 9, 2005.
43. Along these lines, it can be noted that in early 2007, IAP agreed to continue its mandate for work on biosecurity issues, including furthering the communication and embedding of its Biosecurity Statement.
44. The creation of new forums may contribute to facilitating this leadership. The fruition of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's call for a global forum on biological terrorism could provide one such medium. While the OECD has given attention to matters of biosecurity and has produced a website about codes, so far the topic of biosecurity has not received sufficient prioritization from Member States for the OECD to undertake a more substantial coordinating role. This situation could change.