Managing biorisks: Considering codes of conduct

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 211-226

  Lentzos, Filippa ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Biological Weapons Convention; Biotech industry; Codes of conduct; Institutional Biosafety Committees; Self governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349191314     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736700601012045     Document Type: Article

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