The impact of uncertainty on banking behavior: Evidence from the US sulfur dioxide emissions allowance trading program

Water, Air, and Soil Pollution: Focus

Volumn 7, Issue 4-5, 2007, Pages 559-571

  Rousse, Olivier ^a   Sévi, Benoît ^a  

^a UNIV MONTPELLIER   (France)

Author keywords

Acid rain program; Emissions trading; Permits banking; Prudence; Risk aversion; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

ACID RAIN; BANKING; BEHAVIOR; EMISSIONS TRADING; MODELING; SULFUR DIOXIDE;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 34547368951     PISSN: 15677230     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11267-006-9109-3     Document Type: Article

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