Approximation of criminal laws, the constitutional treaty and the hague programme

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 42, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 1567-1597

  Weyembergh, Anne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547349146     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (138)

1. For more details about the definition of the notion, and its relation to the notion of harmonization, see Weyembergh, L'harmonisation des législations pénales: condition de l'espace pénal européen et révélateur de ses tensions (éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2004), pp. 31-36.
2. The Hague Programme, adopted by the Brussels European Council of 4/5 Nov. 2004, Presidency Conclusions, doc. 14292/1/04, 8 Dec. 2004.
3. Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, adopted by the JHA Council of 2 and 3 June 2005, doc. 9778/2/05 REV 2, 10 June 2005.
4. See the Framework Decisions adopted e.g. in in Labayle and Weyembergh, Code of Criminal Law of the European Union (Bruylant, 2005).
5. See especially the Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the Standing of victims in criminal proceedings, O.J. 2001, L 82/1; Framework Decision of 24 Feb. 2005 on confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property, O.J. 2005, L 68/49. See also the Commission's initiative on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union, which is still under negotiations (COM(2004)328 final, 28 April 2004).
6. For criticism regarding the legal basis of some of the framework decisions adopted, see Vermeulen, "Where do we currently stand with Harmonisation in Europe" in Klip and Vander Wilt, (Eds.), Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law (Royal Netherlands Academy of Science, 2002), p. 65.
7. See the legal basis of the three texts approximating criminal procedures (see supra note 5).
8. See Art. III-270 and 271 of the Constitutional Treaty. On the extensions and the limits, see de Kerchove and Weyembergh, "Quelle Europe pénale dans le traité constitutionnel?", in Dony and Bribosia (Eds.), Commentaire de la Constitution de l'Union européenne (éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2005), pp. 350-352.
9. See also de Biolley, "Panorama des mesures accompagnatrices de la confiance mutuelle dans l'espace européen de justice pénale" in de Kerchove and Weyembergh (Eds.), La confiance mutuelle au sein de l'espace pénal européen. Mutual Trust in the European Criminal Area (éd. de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2005), pp. 181 and 187.
10. Approximation governing admissibility of evidence has not yet been launched, but initiatives in this field are announced.
11. See supra note 5.
12. See section 3.3. therein about prevention and fight against organized crime, especially the para about "Improve legislation and review existing legal instruments where needed".
13. See 4.2. about Judicial cooperation in criminal matters, especially the para on approximation, (j).
14. See 4.2. about Judicial cooperation in criminal matters, especially the initiatives listed in the Action plan, under the para related to "approximation".
15. Concerning these conflicts, see especially Jacqué, "La question de la base juridique dans le cadre de la justice et des affaires intérieures", in de Kerchove and Weyembergh, (Eds.), L'espace pénal européen: enjeux et perspectives (éd. de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2002), pp. 249-256.
16. If most authors tend to consider that the EC does not have competences in the area of criminal law, others pronounce themselves in favour of such competences at least within certain limits: see France, "The influence of European Community law on the criminal law of the Member States", (1994) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 354 et seq.;
17. Tiedemann, "Pour un espace juridique commun après Amsterdam", (1997, No. 17) Agon, 12 et seq.;
18. Labayle, "Entre désir et réalité: quelle voie pour une répression pénale des violations du droit communautaire?", (2003) RMC, 293 et seq.
19. In this regard, the EC institutions have defended various opinions; see Salazar, "La Communauté européenne et le droit pénal, un parcours d'obstacles", in Delmas-Marty (Ed.), Quelle politique pénale pour l'Europe? (Economica, 1993), p. 23 et seq.
20. Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 Nov. 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, O.J. 1989, L 334/30.
21. Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, O.J. 1991, L 166/77.
22. But, of course, this is not to say that they did not have any impact on the Member States' criminal laws: both texts have had an indirect approximating effect.
23. In the field of the environment, see COM(2001)139 final, 13 March 2001 (O.J. 2001, C 180 E/238); in the field of EC financial interests, see O.J. 2001, C 240 E/125; COM(2003)52 final, 5 Feb. 2003, especially Art. 55 and Annex VI; Doc. 6777/03, Art. 20; COM(2003)92 final, 5 March 2003.
24. See in particular para 7 of the Preamble of the Framework Decision on the protection of the environment through criminal law, O.J. 2003, L 29/55.
25. Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, judgment of 13 Sept. 2005, nyr.
26. See de Kerchove and Weyembergh, "Quelle Europe . . .", op. cit. supra note 8, pp. 321-322.
27. The reasoning here is a summary of that given in the author's article "The functions of approximation of penal legislation within the European Union", 12 MJ (2005), 149-172.
28. On the subject of confidence, see especially the Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters, O.J. 2001, C 12/10. See also de Groot, "Mutual trust in (European) extradition law", in Blekxtoon and van Ballegooij (Eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, (TMC Asser Press, 2005), pp. 83-97;
29. de Kerchove and Weyembergh, La confiance mutuelle . . . op. cit. supra note 8.
30. See, e.g. the Rachid Ramda case (on this, see especially Alegre and Leaf, "Mutual recognition in European jusdicial cooperation: a step too far too soon? Case study - the European arrest warrant", (2004) European Law Journal, p. 210)
31. or the Sid Ahmed Rezala case (on this, see Weyembergh, "L'avenir des mécanismes de coopération" in de Kerchove and Weyembergh (Eds), Vers un espace judiciaire pénal européen (éd. l'Université de Bruxelles, 2000), p. 141.
32. See Jegouzo, "La création d'un mécanisme d'évaluation mutuelle de la justice, corollaire de la reconnaissance mutuelle", in de Kerchove and Weyembergh (Eds.), Sécurité et justice: enjeu de la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne (éd. de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2003), p. 147.
33. Compare Art. 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (OJ 2002, L 190/1) and Art. 1 of the Framework Decision on the execution of orders freezing property (O.J. 2003, L 196/45) with Art. 1(2) of the Framework Decision on the execution in the European Union of confiscation orders (this text was politically approved by the JHA Council on 8 June 2004: see doc. 10027/04 of 3 June 2004) and Arts. 1c and 16, para 1c of the Framework Decision on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties (O.J. 2005, L 76/16).
34. This Framework Decision is still under negotiation (for the initial proposal, see COM(2003)688 final).
35. On the different tools to achieve mutual confidence (e.g. judicial controls, mutual evaluation of the criminal justice systems, the development of contacts between practitioners, etc.) and on the importance of approximation in relation to this, see de Kerchove and Weyembergh (Eds.), La confiance .. op. cit. supra note 8.
36. See Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 1.
37. For a criticism of this blindness, see especially Vermeulen, "Van Tampere tot Laeken Meer veiligheid ten koste van vrijheid en rechtvaardigheid", (2002) Panopticon, 1;
38. and Peers, "Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: Has the Council got it wrong?", 41 CML Rev., 5-36.
39. See e.g. Arts. 4(7) and 5(1) and (2) of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant.
40. Action plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice (adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 3 Dec. 1998), O.J. 1999, C 19/1.
41. See para 5 of the introduction of the Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters (O.J. 2001, C 12/10).
42. Convention of 26 July 1995 on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), O.J. 1995, C 316/ 2.
43. Council Decision of 28 Feb. 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, O.J. 2002, L 63/1.
44. Joint Action of 29 June 1998 on the creation of a European Judicial Network, O.J. 1998, L 191/4.
45. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams, O.J. 2002, L 162/1.
46. See Flore, "D'un réseau judiciaire européen à une juridiction pénale européenne: Eurojust et l'émergence d'un système de justice pénale", in de Kerchove and Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 14, p. 16.
47. On the difficulties created by the current procedural differences, see Schalken and Pronk, "On joint investigation teams, Europol and supervision of their joint actions", (2002) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 70.
48. Art. III-274 CT.
49. See Communication from the Commission , The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for European Renewal in the field of freedom, security and justice, COM(2005)184 final 10 May, 2005, para 2.3, (9), in fine and the initiatives listed in the second part of the Communication concerning Eurojust.
50. See especially Art. 29a TEU.
51. See especially the Vienna Plan.
52. Bernardi, "Opportunité de l'harmonisation", in Delmas-Marty, Giudicelli-Delage and Lambert-Abdelgawad (Eds.), L'harmonisation des sanctions pénales en Europe (Société de législation comparée, 2003), p. 461.
53. On these States' difficulties, see Habermas, Après l'Etat-nation. Une nouvelle constellation politique (Fayard, 2000), p. 47.
54. On this notion of "ruse de la souveraineté" in general, see Magnette, "Questions sur la constitution européenne", in Magnette (Ed.), La Constitution de l'Europe (éd. de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2000), p. 12.
55. On the delay of legal globalization in general, see especially Salah, Les contradictions du droit mondialisé (PUF, 2002).
56. See para 11 of the Vienna Plan.
57. On the shocking nature of such differences in this field, see especially Knudsen, "La fraude au détriment du budget de la Communauté", (1995) Revue de Science criminelle, 73.
58. On the distinction between the sword and the shield functions of criminal law, see Vervaele, "Régulation et répression au sein de l'Etat providence: la fonction 'bouclier' et la fonction 'épée' du droit pénal en déséquilibre", (1997) Déviance et Société, 123.
59. Para 6 of the Vienna Plan.
60. Ibid., para 15.
61. Ibid., para 19.
62. Ibid., para 20.
63. The importance as well as the improvement of the access to justice and the legal certainty are among the objectives of the area of freedom, security and justice that are mentioned by the Tampere conclusions: see in particular its paras. 5 and 28.
64. Consultation Paper "Procedural safeguards for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings", para 1.
65. See the intervention of Kriegk, in L'espace judiciaire européen, Actes du colloque organisé en Avignon le 16 octobre 1998 (la Documentation française, 1999), p. 114;
66. contra: the intervention of Varaut, in ibid., p. 115.
67. On the criminal field and this sense of belonging, see Verdussen, Contours et enjeux du droit constitutionnel pénal (Bruylant, 1995), p. 695. In the field of criminal sanctions see Bernardi, "Opportunité de l'harmonisation", p. 460.
68. The symbolic motives behind approximation have been underlined by Bernardi during his intervention at the conference organized in Paris on 11 Oct. 2002 by the association de recherches pénales européennes (ARPE), "Du procureur européen à l'harmonisation des sanctions pénales en Europe".
69. "L'effet constitutif d'identité" is the expression used by Sieber, "Union européenne et droit pénal européen. Proposition pour l'avenir du droit pénal européen", (1993) Revue de science criminelle, 262.
70. See COM(2003)75 final, pp. 5 and 10; COM(2004)328 final, para 26.
71. On the link with the other framework decision concerned, see para 8 of the Preamble of Council Framework Decision on the execution in the European Union of confiscation orders.
72. Council Framework Decision of 24 Feb. 2005 on confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property, O.J. 2005, L 68/ 49. On the link with the other Framework Decision concerned, see para 10 of the Preamble.
73. See the introduction of the Programme of measures.
74. "In those circumstances, whether the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 54 of the CISA is applied to procedures whereby further prosecution is barred (regardless of whether a court is involved) or to judicial decisions, there is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were applied" (Joined Cases C-187 & 385/01, Criminal proceedings against Hüseyin Gözütok and Klaus Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345, para 33).
75. See Art. 1-42 (b))
76. See Art. III-270(2): "To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension...."
77. See 4.2. therein about Judicial cooperation in criminal matters, especially the initiatives listed in the Action plan, under the para related to "approximation".
78. See paras. 19, 28 and 29.
79. In the Commission's Green paper of February 2003 on Procedural safeguards for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union, it argues that "European citizens and residents can reasonably expect to encounter equivalent standards in respect of safeguards in criminal proceedings" (COM(2003)75 final, 19 Feb. 2003, p. 10, para 1.8. in fine). And in its former consultation document, it was even more explicit: "... in order to achieve the mutual trust and respect required for a true 'area of freedom, security and justice', standards of protection conferred on suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings must be adequate throughout the European Union. People travelling abroad should be confident that the existing standards offer equivalent protection whatever the Member State so as not to impede their free movement for fear of encountering a system operating lower standards".
80. Art. III-270(2) CT.
81. Para 3.3.2 of the Hague Programme.
82. These differences in the areas covered have their explanations. One of them is to be found in the more or less serious difficulties approximation has to face according to the different areas: penal law in general is very sensitive in terms of national sovereignty but, in this regard, two aspects are even more sensitive than the definition of offences: penalties (see Roth, "Vers un Tribunal pénal européen - Pour quelles sanctions - Brèves réflexions comparatistes" in de Kerchove and Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 14, pp. 285-286) and criminal procedure
83. (see Jung, '"L'Etat et moi': Some reflections on the relationship between criminal law and the State", (1998) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 210); these two areas are really at the core of national sovereignty.
84. O.J. 1997, L 63/2.
85. O.J. 2002, L 328/1 and L 328/17.
86. O.J. 2002, L 164/3.
87. ème pilier du traité sur l'Union européenne", (2000) CDE, 215-251).
88. See infra.
89. O.J. 2000, L 140/1.
90. O.J. 2002, L 203/1.
91. See Art. 49(3) of the Charter.
92. The Commission's initiative on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union covers the right to legal advice, the right to free interpretation and translations, the rights of suspects who are in a weaker position, the right to communication, and the written notification of rights (COM(2004)328 final, 28 April 2004). According to the Commission's proposal, these guarantees are only preliminary fields; other guarantees will be tackled in future initiatives.
93. All corresponding to one of the good governance axes (see the European Commission's White Paper: European Governance, COM(2001)428, 25 July 2001, p. 12 and seq).
94. See Art. 34(2) TEU.
95. See Art. III-264 of the Constitutional Treaty.
96. See Art. 1(2) of the Directive.
97. See the definition of the notion of "illegal immigrant smuggling" in the Annex to the Europol Convention; see also the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (Art. 27(1)).
98. See Art. 3 of the Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
99. Theses difficulties are all the more important since, fearing reprisals, the victims most of the time refuse to collaborate in the establishment of the evidence of the financial gain.
100. See Weyembergh, "De certaines propositions visant à renforcer la lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière au sein de l'Union européenne", (2001), Revue de droit des étrangers, 704-707.
101. O.J. 1998, L 351/1.
102. O.J. 2002, L 164/3.
103. On the difficulties in relation to defining organized crime and criminal organization, see Cesoni, (Ed.), Criminalité organisée: vers une définition opérationnelle, rapport scientifique de recherche pour le Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique réalisé en 2001. On the difficulties indefining terrorism,
104. see Laqueur, Terrorisme (PUF, 1979), p. 89;
105. Bourgues Habif, "Le terrorisme international" in Ascensio, Decaux, Pellet (Eds.), Droit international pénal (Pedone, 2000), p. 457 et seq.
106. Weyembergh, "L'impact du 11 septembre sur l'équilibre sécurité/liberté dans l'espace pénal européen", in Bribosia and Weyembergh (Eds.), Lutte contre le terrorisme et droits fondamentaux (Bruylant, collection Droit et Justice, 2002), pp. 153-195.
107. See Network of fundamental rights experts, Annual reports on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU in 2002, Thematic Comment, pp. 11 et seq.
108. Art. 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of human rights, Art. 15 of the International Covenant on civil and political rights, Art. 7 of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights, Art. 49 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union.
109. In this respect, see Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 280 et seq.
110. Twelve Member States did not recognize the ECJ's competence as regards preliminary ruling: Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom and nine of the 10 new Member States (all of them except the Czech Republic).
111. For an overview of the different national solutions, see De Schutter, "La contribution du contrôle juridictionnel à la confiance mutuelle", in de Kerchove and Weyembergh, La confiance mutuelle..., op. cit. supra note 8, p. 82 et seq.
112. According to Art. 35(3), even the national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may request the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling but are not under a duty to do it.
113. See Art. II-109 of the Constitutional Treaty.
114. However, there is one exception to this identical treatment, which is embedded in Art. III-377.
115. See the wording of Art. III-365(4).
116. Cases cited supra note 67.
117. See Weyembergh, "L'harmonisation des legislations", op. cit. supra note 1, p. 312.
118. See annotation of these cases by Vervaele in 41 CML Rev., 795-812.
119. See Tulkens and Callewaert, "La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme et la protection des droits fondamentaux" and Jacqué, "La Cour de justice, la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme et la protection des droits fondamentaux. Quelques observations" in Dony and Bribosia (Eds), L'avenir du système juridictionnel de l'Union européenne (éd. de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2002), pp. 191-192 and p. 259 et seq.
120. Approximation of criminal procedure can focus on the shield function (see the Commission's initiative related to procedural guarantees), but it can also focus on the sword function of penal law: see e.g. the Framework Decision of 24 Feb. 2005 on confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property (O.J. 2005, L 68/49).
121. This prevalence is logically obvious within the title "strengthening security" of the Programme: some of the new orientations developed, such as the improvement of the exchange of information and the principle of availability raise questions as regards the balance to keep between both functions of penal law. Paradoxically this prevalence is also clearly shown by the contents of the specific orientations developed under the title "strengthening freedom" of the Programme, which is very much marked by security concerns.
122. See e.g. Watson, "Le point de vue d'un homme politique", in de Kerchove and Weyembergh (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 26, p. 329 et seq.
123. Common positions, programmes or plans of action are for example not covered by this obligation. The same goes for the negotiations of agreements concluded with third States or third organizations on the basis of Art. 24 TEU.
124. See especially the Preamble of the Treaty as well as Art. 6 TEU.
125. See especially the Preamble of the Treaty as well as Art. 1 TEU
126. See Verdussen, Contours et enjeux du droit constitutionnel pénal (Bruylant, 1995), p. 98 et seq.
127. The framework decisions, which are the specific tool for approximating criminal laws are much more effective than the existing instruments under Maastricht (on this evolution, see Vermeulen and Dhont, "Harmonisatie van strafrecht en wederzijdse erkenning van gerechtelijke beslissingen in strafzaken", in Vermeulen (Ed.), Aspecten van Europees materieel strafrecht (Maklu, 2002), p. 17.
128. Case C-105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, judgment of 16 June 2005, nyr.
129. See particularly the observations of the Italian, Swedish and UK Governments.
130. "33. It should be noted ... that the wording of Article 34(2)(b) EU is very closely inspired by that of the third paragraph of Article 249 EC. Article 34(2)(b) EU confers a binding character on framework decisions in the sense that they 'bind' the Member States 'as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods'. 34. The binding character of framework decisions, formulated in terms identical to those of the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, places on national authorities, and particularly national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law.... 42. It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its task effectively if the principle of loyal cooperation .. .were not also binding in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which is moreover entirely based on cooperation between the Member States and the institutions, as the Advocate General has rightly pointed out in paragraph 26 of her Opinion. 43. ... the Court concludes that the principle of interpretation in conformity with Community law is binding in relation to framework decisions adopted in the context of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. When applying national law, the national court that is called upon to interpret it must do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework decision in order to attain the result which it pursues and thus comply with Article 34(2)(b) EU ...."
131. See de Kerchove, and Weyembergh, "Quelle Europe ...", op. cit. supra note 8, pp. 330-331.
132. Art. III-396 CT.
133. See Art. III-270(2((d) and Art. III-271(1) CT.
134. In this respect, see especially Art. I-46(2), Arts. I-11 and III-259 CT and the Protocol on the role of the national Parliaments in the EU.
135. See Magnette, Le régime politique de l'Union européenne (Presses de Sciences Po, 2003), p. 242.
136. Generally speaking, European penal questions are not debated much within the national Parliaments. The contents and method of the control exercised by th national parliaments vary from one Member State to another: some national parliaments exercise a fairly strict scrutiny of their governments' activities in the field (as e.g. the Dutch, the UK, Swedish or Danish Parliaments), while others (such as the Belgian one) are much more passive; see Kerse, "Democratic Control of the Third Pillar - Parliamentary Scrutiny", in Cullen and Jund (Eds.), Criminal Justice Co-operation in the European Union after Tampere (Era, 2002) p. 93 et seq.
137. See Art. I-47 CT.
138. In this respect, see Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 323 et seq.