Covenants and reputations

Synthese

Volumn 157, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 167-195

  Vanderschraaf, Peter ^a  

^a USA   (United States)

Author keywords

Covenant game; Folk theorem; Hobbes; Hume; Offensive violation; Simulation; Trigger strategy

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547313744     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9147-4     Document Type: Article

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