Charity auctions

International Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 953-994

  Engers, Maxim ^a   McManus, Brian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547205514     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00451.x     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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