Responding to systemic crisis: The case of agroterrorism

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 30, Issue 8, 2007, Pages 691-721

  Seebeck, Lesley ^a  

^a QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Australia)

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EID: 34447577846     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100701200165     Document Type: Article

References (168)

1. That is not to say that the prospect of BW-armed terrorist attacks had not occurred to pre-11 September Western governments. The Clinton administration was convinced of the prospect of a large-scale chemical or biological weapons attack by a terrorist group (see, for example, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report [U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004], 102, 116, 174).
2. Planning, however, continued to presume a nation-state adversary armed with WMD, in part because the threat remained undefined (Institute for Defense Analysis, Asymmetric Conflict 2010, Brad Roberts, D-2538, Alexandria, VA, November 2000). 11 September, however, alerted governments to the ease with which terrorist groups could operate withinWestern society, and that rather than simply a matter of speculation, terrorist activities had resulted in massive damage to the United States.
3. This article is based on a presentation given at a CSIRO-sponsored workshop on Managing Bio-terrorist Induced Disease Outbreaks, 22-23 February 2006, Geelong, Australia. The Workshop had a focus on Australian conditions and policy, and on foot-and-mouth disease.
4. Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where The Risk?," in Max Taylor and John Horgan (eds.), The Future of Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 106-132.
5. The Soviet program is alleged to have used recombinant DNA in an effort to combine smallpox and ebola viruses. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Assessing the Threat of Bioterrorism, Raymond A Zilinskas, Testimony, 20 October 1999, available at (http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/991020-test3.htm).
6. Achieving aerosolization is a particular challenge (ibid.).
7. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 60-65. Aum Shinrikyo had earlier unsuccessfully sought to use botulinum toxin and anthrax, but proved more successful in developing chemical weapons. In 1994, Aum used sarin gas to try to kill three judges north of Tokyo; they escaped, but seven others died.
8. David Claridge, "Exploding theMyths of Superterrorism," in Max Taylor and John Horgan (eds.), The Future of Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 133-148.
9. Developing BW is a costly and risky business. Given the resources available to terrorist groups and their intent, other means of sourcing BW, should those groups aspire toBWattacks, would be preferable. Those other sources may include collection and transmission of naturally occurring disease. (Assessing the Threat of Bioterrorism, Zilinskas.)
10. As Stern illustrates, even where regulatory and export controls are comparatively strong, cultures and pathogens can and have been obtained by legal means (Jessica Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," International Security 27(3) (2003), 89-123.
11. Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, "Proliferation Rings," International Security 29(2) (2004), 5-49. The best known such network is the AQ Khan network. Khan, credited with development of the Pakistani nuclear capability, offered nuclear weapons development assistance to Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Egypt, sourcing equipment fabricated in workshops across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East as well as expertise from Europe.
12. There are suspicions the network also had contacts with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and through the Taliban to Al Qaeda (David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," The Washington Quarterly 28(2) (2005), 111-128.
13. Ball and Gelber also report that 20 percent of Russian scientists engaged in WMD research indicated a willingness to work in "rogue" states (Deborah Yarsike Ball and Thomas P. Gerber, "Russian Scientists and Rogue States," International Security 29(4) (2005), 50-77.
14. Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," 96.
15. RAND, Hitting America's Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks Against the US Agricultural and Food Industry, Peter Chalk, MG-135-OSD, 2004.
16. Ibid. Chalk offers a good discussion of such inherent vulnerabilities; he identifies food packaging and processing plants as being of particular concern. By way of illustration of the effect of industrialized production, Wien and Liu simulate the effect even the release of botulism in the milk supply - a tanker truck, a vat in a processing facility and on the farm itself, in easily accessible points in the supply chain. Process effects, such as achieving economies of scale through frequent, bulk cleansing of vats, can have nonlinear effects on the dispersal and impact of the toxin, mitigating small releases but exacerbating large releases.
17. (Lawrence M. Wein and Yifan Liu, "Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk," PNAS 102(28) (2005), 9984-9989.
18. See also Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat, Henry S. Parker, McNair Paper No. 65, Washington DC.
19. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the United States Department of Agriculture, Anne Kohnen, Discussion Paper, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-29, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2000-04, Boston, October 2000, 8. Kohnen also records two attempts to use biological weapons against agriculture by non-state groups: The poisoning of a small group of steers by the Mau Mau in Kenya; and Tamil militants threatening Sri Lankan rubber plantations with disease.
20. FMD has formed part of a number of BW programs (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Agricultural Biowarfare: State Programs to Develop Offensive Capabilities, 2006), available at (http://cns.miis.edu/ research/cbw/agprogs.htm) (accessed 5March 2006). AFM Dvaccine development facility formed a front for Saddam Hussein's BW activities; BW-related equipment at the Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant was later destroyed by UNSCOM.
21. (Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD: Volume 3: Biological Warfare, Central Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, available at (http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/ iraq_wmd_2004/chap6.html).
22. Chalk, Hitting America's Soft Underbelly.
23. Ibid., 19-20.
24. AusInfo, Impact of a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak on Australia, Productivity Commission, Research Report, Canberra. Australia, free from FMD for over 130 years, is also a net exporter of beef and sheep products, with 85 percent of beef and 40 percent of sheep sent to FMD-free markets. In Australia's case, multiplier effects are closely entwined with international restrictions.
25. Past experience suggests such estimates are conservative. Kohnen, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism
26. Roger Breeze, "Agroterrorism: Betting Far More than the Farm," Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 2(4) (2004), 251-264.
27. Breeze, "Agroterrorism: Betting Far More than the Farm."
28. Stern, "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons," 98.
29. The focus here onFMDas a potential agent reflects its contagiousness, resilience, and ready availability, and the economic importance of FMD-free status for particularly Australia. However, as will be seen, many of the implications for system design may be applied more widely to other plant, animal, and human pathogens and bioterror attacks.
30. Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Weber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," Policy Sciences 4 (1973), 155-169.
31. Russell L. Ackoff and John Pourdehnad, "On Misdirected Systems," Systems Research and Behavioral Science 18(3) (2001), 199-205.
32. The Stationary Office, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," Iain Anderson, London.
33. Ibid., 23.
34. Herbert A Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996).
35. Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
36. Rittel and Weber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning."
37. "Satisficing" was coined by Herbert Simon as meaning satisfying need to a "good enough" level, not the maximum possible level (Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 36-37).
38. Thomas Homer-Dixon, "The Rise of Complex Terrorism," Foreign Policy (January - February 2002), available at (www.foreignpolicy.com/ issue_janfeb_2002/homer-dixon.html).
39. For an overview of complex adaptive systems, see, among others,Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar (London: Abacus, 1994)
40. Sunny Y. Auyang, Foundations of Complex Systems Theories in Economics, Evolutionary Biology, and Statistical Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
41. Yaneer Bar-Yam, Dynamics of Complex Systems, Studies in Non-linearity (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997).
42. Other specific areas of CAS work include the notion of "criticality" (Per Bak, How Nature Works [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997])
43. and complex network theories (D. J. Watts, Six Degrees [New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003]).
44. Homer-Dixon offers a readable overview of the implications of CAS for international and environmental security (Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap [Vintage Books, 2000]
45. Homer-Dixon, "The Rise of Complex Terrorism").
46. The 2005-2006 outbreaks of avian influenza notwithstanding.
47. Louise K. Comfort, "Rethinking Security: Organizational Fragility in Extreme Events," Public Administration Review 62(Supplement 1) (2002), 98-107.
48. Ibid.
49. The Royal Society, Infectious Diseases in Livestock: Scientific Questions Relating to the Transmission, Prevention and Control of Epidemic Outbreaks of Infectious Disease in Livestock in Great Britain, The Royal Society, London.
50. Animal Health Australia, Disease Strategy: Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Version 3.0) Australian Ventinary Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, Animal Health Australia, Canberra.
51. Ibid.
52. In 1967, animal-to-animal and virus plumes among cattle and sheep had comprised the main transmission routes.
53. Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," 30-31.
54. Ibid.
55. Market pressures, fewer local auctions and slaughterhouses, smaller abattoirs, and decreasing transport costs have led to stock being sent further afield in search of profit (FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: John Thorley, National Sheep Association, 9 April 2002," 2002, Foot and Mouth Disease Lessons Learned Inquiry: Meeting Notes, available at (http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/fmd/ fmd_report/documents/B-MeetingNotes/National Sheep Association.pdf)
56. House of Commons Library, Foot and Mouth Disease,ChristopherBarclay,Research Paper, 01/35, London, 27 March 2001). Although livestock populations fluctuate over time, since 1967 there had been a relative increase in sheep numbers compared to those of cattle and pigs, both of which have declined markedly since 1967.
57. The U.K. sheep herd is now the largest in the European Union (FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: John Thorley, National Sheep Association, 9 April 2002"
58. Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," 175).
59. Many farmers had more than one property - Cumbria in particularwas "patchworked" with interlinked properties - and moved animals between them, including on a seasonal basis. In hilled areas, lowlands had become stocked more intensively (FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: John Thorley, National Sheep Association, 9 April 2002"
60. FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: Jim Scudamore, Chief Veterinary Officer, 19 April 2002," 2002, Foot and Mouth Disease Lessons Learned Inquiry: Meeting Notes, available at [http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/fmd/fmd_report/documents/ B-MeetingNotes/JimScudamoreSecondMeeting.pdf], paragraph 65
61. FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: North West Pre-Meeting 11 March 2002," 2002, Foot and Mouth Disease Lessons Learned Inquiry: Regional Visits, available at [http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/fmd/fmd_report/documents/ C-RegionalVisits/North West Pre Meeting.pdf]).
62. IP1 stands for Infected Premises 1, the index case.
63. The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," Anderson. The sows carried to Cheale had been infected perhaps 12 days earlier, on 7 February 2001; the initial outbreak was later estimated as between 26 and 28 January 2001. The outbreak resulted from pigs feeding on swill infected with FMD likely sourced from a local Chinese restaurant, which may have imported meat illegally from Asia.
64. Ibid.
65. The Royal Society Infectious Diseases in Livestock, 76.
66. Ibid., 44-45. As in the later 2001 U.K. outbreak, the spread of the virus was hastened by transit along the main road network.
67. Many of those involved in both outbreaks argued that the local experiences of and lessons from the 1967 outbreak, such as on-farm burial, were in fact ignored (see, for example, K. M. Tyrrell, "Submission to the Royal Society Inquiry," 14 October 2001, available at [http://www.royalsoc. ac.uk/inquiry/index/237.pdf
68. FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Transcript of Meeting held in Carlisle, 12 March 2002," 2002, Foot and Mouth Disease Lessons Learned Inquiry: Regional Visits, available at [http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/fmd/fmd_report/documents/ C-RegionalVisits/north_west_transcript.pdf], 17, 20, 25).
69. In contrast, the Dutch imposed a transport ban on 21 February, the day after the confirmation of the first case on 20 February (Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry").
70. The Royal Society, Infectious Diseases in Livestock, 44.
71. Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry."
72. The Royal Society, Infectious Diseases in Livestock.
73. A contributing factor is the reduction of State Veterinary Service (SVS) vets: Vets in private practice had not the same access to material on or experience with exotic diseases (FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: British Veterinary Association, 9 May 2002," 2002, Foot and Mouth Disease Lessons Learned Inquiry: Meeting Notes, available at [http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/fmd/fmd_report/documents/ B-MeetingNotes/British Veterinary Association.pdf]). Other factors, such as the decline in numbers of large animal vets, are discussed later.
74. See, for example, Rod Welford, "Submission to the Royal Society Inquiry into FMD," 20 April 2001, available at (http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/inquiry/index/128.pdf).
75. Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," 92-93.
76. Infected animals were to be slaughtered within 24 hours, whereas contiguous animals within a 1.5 km radius of the infected premises were deemed likely to be infected, and were to be culled within 48 hours (ibid., 93).
77. Ibid., 90.
78. Ibid., 91.
79. See also contributions by local veterinarians to the various inquiries such as that by Tyrrell, "Submission to the Royal Society Inquiry"
80. and Welford, "Submission to the Royal Society Inquiry into FMD."
81. The ESRC Centre for Business Relationships Accountability, Sustainability & Society, Cardiff University, "Carnage by Computer": The Blackboard Economics of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Epidemic, David Campbell and Robert Lee, Cardiff, available at http://www.fmd.brass.cf.ac.uk/carnagebycomputerDCBL.pdf.
82. See, for example, John Vidal, "Never Say Die," The Guardian (London), 25 April 2002, available at (http://www.guardian.co.uk/ footandmouth/story/0,,690078,00.html)
83. Sarah Hall, "Slaughterman fired on sheep 'willy-nilly'", The Guardian, 2 October 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ footandmouth/story/0,,802724,00.html; Campbell and Lee, "Carnage by Computer"
84. Devon County Council, Crisis and Opportunity: Devon Foot and Mouth Inquiry 2001, Ian Mercer.
85. Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," 133-135.
86. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat.
87. Ibid.
88. G. F.Webb, "ASilent Bomb: The Risk of Anthrax as aWeapon of Mass Destruction," PNAS 100(8) (2003), 4355-4356.
89. The chronology given here is sourced from Eric Lipton and Kirk Johnson, "A Nation Challenged: The Anthrax Trail," The New York Times (New York), A, 26 December 2001, Late.
90. One, in Connecticut, may have contracted it from the trace found on a letter delivered to a neighbor's one mile away (Kevin S. Griffith and others, "Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax in an Elderly Woman, Connecticut, 2001," Emerging Infectious Diseases 9(6) (2003), 681-688).
91. The route of infection of the other case, an employee of Manhattan's Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital, remains unknown (Timothy H. Holtz et al. "Isolated Case of Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax, New York City, 2001," Emerging Infectious Diseases 9(6) (2003), 689-692).
92. Only much later was the index case confirmed - on 21 September, Johanna Huden of the New York Post contracted cutaneous anthrax (Lipton and Johnson, "A Nation Challenged: The Anthrax Trail").
93. Debora MacKenzie, "Anthrax Attack Bug "Identical" to Army Strain," NewScientist. com, 9 May 2002, available at (http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn2265).
94. Ibid.
95. Dany Shoham, "The Anthrax Evidence Points to Iraq," International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 16(1) (2003), 53.
96. This is the supposition behind FBI investigations and scrutiny of Dr. Steven Hatfill (Scott Shane, "Closing of Lab Marks Renewed Intensity in Anthrax Probe," Baltimore Sun, 21 July 2004, available at [http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/health/ bal-te.anthrax21jul21,0,3002134.story?coll=bal-health-utility]).
97. Although initially labeled a "person of interest," as of the time of writing, Hatfill has not been charged with an offense, but has pursued defamation proceedings against government and media organizations (Associated Press, "Hatfill Suit Against N. Y. Times To Proceed," The Washington Post [Washington], 28 March 2006).
98. See, for example, Shoham, "The Anthrax Evidence Points to Iraq."
99. Stephen P. Freccero, "Anthrax Whodunnit: Is it a Cold Case File?," Christian Science Monitor, 10 November 2005, available at (http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1110/p09s02-coop.html).
100. Jay C. Butler et al., "Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response," Emerging Infectious Diseases 8(10) (2002), 1152-1156.
101. Ibid., 1155.
102. Ibid., 1153.
103. Ibid.
104. Laura Rozen, "The EnemyWithin?," The American Prospect, 20 May 2002 2002, available at (http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/9/ rozen-l.html)
105. Butler and others, "Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response," 1155.
106. A valuable point raised by an anonymous referee.
107. Plant Health Australia, National Citrus Industry Biosecurity Plan, Plant Health Australia, Canberra, 7.
108. In a Senate committee hearing in 2005, the former citrus manager and other employees of Evergreen described "special" budwood packed in tea and stored separately from other plantmaterials on the farm (Hansard, Reference: Citrus Canker Outbreak, Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, Canberra, 15 June 2006).
109. National Citrus Industry Biosecurity Plan, Plant Health Australia, 6.
110. Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries, Submission to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee Inquiry into the Citrus Canker Outbreak, Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries, July 2005.
111. As set out in Plant Health Australia, PLANTPLAN: Australian Emergency Plant Pest Response Plan, Plant Health Australia, Canberra.
112. The Gunnedah-Mudgerabah citrus district south of Emerald was initially assumed to be infected as well, but later cleared.
113. Submission to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee Inquiry into the Citrus Canker Outbreak, Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries.
114. Ibid., 31.
115. An assistance package was made available to citrus growers and nurseries in February 2005 (Ibid., 31-32). However, at least one grower whose farm had not been identified as harboring canker had made further investments in plants and infrastructure following Queensland government reassurances regarding the control of the outbreak (Joanne Shoebridge, "Citrus Canker Costs Growers Millions," 5 June 2005, Lateline, ABC, available at [http://www.abc.net.au/landline/content/2005/ s1382164.htm]).
116. Comfort, "Rethinking Security: Organizational Fragility in Extreme Events," 100.
117. An outcome of information theory (C. E. Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory of Communication," The Bell System Technical Journal 27(July, October 1948), 379-423, 623-656.
118. European Parliament: Temporary Committee on Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Questions to Representatives and Former Representatives of the UK Government for the Meeting of the Temporary Committee on Foot-and-Mouth Disease on 26 March and 8 April 2002, DEFRA, available at (http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/inquiries/eptc.pdf).
119. It is also possible that the anthrax attack may well have been limited by the amount of material available to the protagonist, for example, either as material smuggled from a U.S. weapons lab or made available by a sponsor nation.
120. Whether the cull was an over-reaction is debatable - many of the criticisms of the cull have been made in hindsight, and without the urgency and confusion facing decision makers at the time. "Stamping out" and "fire-breaker operations" are established practices, accepted by many if not the majority of the farming and scientific community as justifiable, and continue to be the containment policy inmany FMD-free nations (Breeze, "Agroterrorism: Betting Far More than the Farm"
121. Disease Strategy: Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Version 3.0) Australian Veterinary Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, AnimalHealth Australia). However, the financial and even political costs associated with contiguous culling - and even enforcement of FMD-free status - are likely to rise, not least because certainty over the reach of any outbreak is likely to diminish with the increasing complexity, speed, and interconnectedness of the modern farming environment.
122. Lipton and Johnson, "A Nation Challenged: The Anthrax Trail."
123. Dietrich Dörner, The Logic of Failure (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 30.
124. Ibid.
125. In the U.K. FMD outbreak, farmers (and associated tradesmen such as stockmen and milkers) were often seen as not paying sufficient attention to biosecurity or in some cases inflating losses for the purpose of increased welfare claims, whereas others refused to allow officials on to their farms. The slowness in diagnosis and disposal of slaughtered stock, inconsistent policies on compensation, contiguous culling and the closure of footpaths, and confusion between agencies fuelled farmer and community frustration. From the evidence presented to both inquiries preparation, good communications, the immediate and close involvement of local farmers, and competent local management of the disease mitigated farmer-related issues. See FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: Jim Scudamore, Chief Veterinary Officer, 10 April 2002", 2002, Foot and Mouth Disease Lessons Learned Inquiry: Meeting Notes, available at (http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/fmd/fmd_report/ documents/B-MeetingNotes/Jim Scudamore First Meeting.pdf)
126. FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: National Farmers Union, 20 March 2002," 2002, Foot and Mouth Disease Lessons Learned Inquiry: Meeting Notes, available at (http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/fmd/fmd_report/documents/ B-MeetingNotes/NFUSecondMeeting.pdf)
127. FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: Staffordshire Animal Health Officials, 15 May 2002," 2002, Foot and Mouth Disease Lessons Learned Inquiry: Meeting Notes, available at (http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/fmd/fmd_report/documents/ B-MeetingNotes/StaffordshireAnimalHealthOfficeOfficials.pdf)
128. and FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Transcript of Meeting held in Carlisle, 12 March 2002." In the citrus canker case, suspicions that Evergreen had been responsible for the initial outbreak colored government attitudes toward compensation, including for growers uncontaminated but affected by the outbreak. Growers were suspicious of government intention given first the confidential arrangement between AQIS and Evergreen, and later constrained communication with growers (Shoebridge, "Citrus canker costs growers millions"; Reference: Citrus Canker Outbreak; Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee).
129. Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," 134-136.
130. Australia's PLANTPLAN and AUSVETPLAN are not atypical in this regard. On the other hand, the Australian National Counter-Terrorist Plan does address recovery, initially in the context of aftermath (p. 3.8), but for the longer term recovery (chapter 5) mainly contents itself with flagging areas of concern (community; psycho-social and health; infrastructure; economic; and environmental recovery) and broad federal-state responsibilities (Commonwealth of Australia, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, Attorney-General's Department, Canberra, September 2005).
131. Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," 108.
132. Stafford Beer, Designing Freedom (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1974).
133. Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," 56
134. The Royal Society, Infectious Diseases in Livestock, chapter 7.
135. The use of the term "peace-time" in this context refers to a stable, known, and low-threat environment - the same terminology was used on occasion in the hearings of the various inquiries (see, for example, FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note of Meeting: National Farmers Union, 20 March 2002").
136. Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," 27.
137. Ibid., 36.
138. Welford, "Submission to the Royal Society Inquiry into FMD."
139. Andrew Geering, "Emerging Diseases - Ready and Waiting?" (paper presented at the High Flyers Think Tank, The Shine Dome, Canberra, 19 October 2004, available at [http://www.science.org.au/ events/emergingdiseases/geering.htm]).
140. Rozen, "The Enemy Within?"; Butler and others, "Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response."
141. Lipton and Johnson, "A Nation Challenged: The Anthrax Trail."
142. The Royal Society, Infectious Diseases in Livestock, chapter 5.
143. See, for example, British Veterinary Association, "Response to the Royal Society's Inquiry into Infectious Diseases in Livestock," 3 December 2001, Evidence Presented to the Royal Society's Inquiry, London, available at (http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/inquiry/index/227.pdf).
144. One estimate during hearings was that only 10-15 percent of sheep were seen regularly, and some farms visited only once or twice a year (The Royal Society, "Record of Meetings: Visits to Cumbria and Dumfries and Galloway 1-2 November 2001," 2 November 2001, Oral evidence to the Royal Society Inquiry into Infectious Diseases in Livestock,available at [http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/inquiry/index/ 508.pdf]).
145. The Royal Society, Infectious Diseases in Livestock, 44.
146. George J. Armalagos, "The Viral Superhighway," The Sciences 38(1) (1998), 24-29.
147. The Productivity Commission estimated its 12 month outbreak scenario would decrease GNP by 1-2 percent. The affects on individual states vary, with Queensland most likely suffering close to a 4 percent reduction in Gross State Product (Impact of a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak on Australia, Productivity Commission).
148. ShaulMishal and Maoz Rosenthal, "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28(4) (2005), 275-293
149. Bruce Hoffman, "What Can We Learn from Al Qaeda," Global Agenda (2004), 32-34.
150. As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the same analysis applies to the use of other animal, plant, and human pathogens.
151. Mass carcass disposal remains a challenge. Vaccination may be used to control spread while allowing for the staged disposal of animals, as undertaken by the Dutch in 2001 (Anderson, The "Lessons Learned Inquiry," 109-110). Australian policy dictates burial of carcasses over burning; rendering may be considered in certain circumstances (Disease Strategy: Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Version 3.0) Australian Veterinary Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, Animal Health Australia, 26). However, preparation of policies and facilities before the event is crucial. In the 2001 FMD outbreak, the speed and scale of pre-emptive slaughter overwhelmed existing facilities - some six weeks into the crisis, 1.2 million animals had been identified for slaughter, of which some 700,000 had been killed - and vaccination was not considered an option (British Veterinary Association, "BVA FMD Update," 9 April 2001, Members Briefing, available at [http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/ inquiry/index/227a 5.pdf]).
152. This is not to say QPI&F did not trace the disease. The department traced viable pathways forward and back from each infestation (Submission to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee Inquiry into the Citrus Canker Outbreak, Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries). That the trace-back did not address causation, that is, determining from where the infestation originated, may be due to a lack of legislative powers (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Submission to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee's Citrus Canker Inquiry, Forestry and Fisheries Department of Agriculture, Canberra, September 2005, 24).
153. The Australian National Counter-Terrorism Plan (National Counter-Terrorism Plan, Attorney-General's Department) also identifies three phases: Prevention and preparedness, response, and recovery.
154. A term borrowed from Daniel Beunza and David Stark, "Tools of the Trade: The Socio-Technology of Arbitrage in a Wall Street Trading Room," Industrial and Corporate Change 13(2) (2004), 369-400.
155. Unlike transmission by migrating wild birds, for example, as is the change with bird flu.
156. Under Ashby's "Law of Requisite Variety," to handle the diversity inherent to sociotechnical problems, any solution must itself contain diversity sufficient to enact control but without overwhelming cost (W. Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics [London: Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1957]).
157. A challenge difficult to meet. Traditionally,Western governments have drawn a distinction between intelligence and policy within and external to states - hence the split between the FBI and the CIA, the U.K.'s MI5 and MI6, and Australia's ASIO and ASIS, and methods used to collect information external to the state is highly constrained when applied to the nation's own citizens and institutions. Within government, even where there is an agreed need, attaining coordination and sharing of data between agencies is fraught with bureaucratic infighting, inter-operational difficulties and cultural and habitual differences.
158. Williams offers an insightful account of the brittleness and inflexibility of student administration systems at MIT (Rosalind Williams, Retooling: A Historian Confronts Technological Change [Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002]).
159. Keen also notes the role of social inertia in information system failure - often for good and honest reasons, including poor design, poor implementation, threats to autonomy and added workloads, and the fact than "[m]any innovations are dumb ideas" (PeterG.W. Keen, "Information Systems and Organizational Change," Communications of the ACM 24(1) (1981), 27).
160. Eric Bonabeau and Guy Theraulaz, "Swarm Smarts," Scientific American 2000(3) (2000), 72-79
161. Sean J. A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present and Future (RAND, 2000). 123.
162. See, for example, Lesley Seebeck and Simon Kaplan, "Understanding Time in System Design" (paper presented at the 8th World Conference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, Orlando, FL, 18-21 July 2004).
163. Lesley Seebeck, "Cadence,War and Security," Australian Journal of International Affairs 58(4) (2004)
164. Lesley Seebeck, Richard M. Kim, and Simon Kaplan, "Emergent Temporal Behaviour and Collaborative Work," in Hans Gellerson and others (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth European Conference on Computer Support Collaborative Work, 18-22 September 2005, Paris, France, (Springer, 2005).
165. Department of Education, Science and Training, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Review of Rural Veterinary Services, Peter Frawley, Canberra. See also FMD Inquiry Secretariat, "Note ofMeeting: Jim Scudamore, Chief Veterinary Officer, 10 April 2002," paragraph 38.
166. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations (London: Atlantic Books, 2004).
167. Information technology can generate more information, but in doing so, through Shannon's Law, generates greater uncertainty (Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory of Communication").
168. Niklas Luhmann, "The Control of Intransparency," System Research and Behavioural Science 14 (1997), 359-371.