Constitutionalism lite

International Organizations Law Review

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 31-58

  Klabbers, Jan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

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EID: 33645167179     PISSN: 15723739     EISSN: 15718069     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/1572374043242411     Document Type: Article

References (149)

1. See generally Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, "Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties", Leiden J. Int?l L. (2002), pp. 553-579.
2. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Cam bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1933).
3. An alternative strategy is to downplay the risks of fragmentation and underline its possible advantages. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, "The Danger of Fragmentation or Unifica tion of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice", NYU Jl. of International Law and Politics (1999), pp. 791-807.
4. This may be part of a broader trend, as suggested by Bruce Ackerman, "The Rise of World Constitutionalism", Virginia Law Review (1997), pp. 771-797.
5. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, "From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law", Recueil des Cours (1994/VI), pp. 221-384, 262
6. (" I have no problems at all with viewing the basic norms of the Charter as the constitutional law of the universal international community, and the Charter organs, at least in practical terms, as organs of the international community of States as a whole.").A1. A similar position was already endorsed in an early edition of Alfred Verdross & Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht: Theorie und Praxis (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2d ed., 1976), pp. 71-83.
7. See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community", Columbia Jl of Transnational Law (1998), pp. 529-619.
8. Conforti, however, is rather careful: "The constitutional aspect of the UN should not be exaggerated." See Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (The Hague, Kluwer, 1997), p. 10.
9. See case 294/83, Parti écologiste ?Les Verts? v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339.
10. See Tim Koopmans, Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative View (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 245.
11. This is loosely derived from T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 56-58. Allan himself draws inspiration from the works of Lon Fuller.
12. See Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 14-15.
13. see Kaarlo Tuori, "The Many Senses of European Citizenship", in: Kimmo Nuotio (ed.), Europe in Search of ?Meaning and Purpose? (Helsinki, Forum Iuris, 2004), pp. 51-87.
14. This is further explored in Jan Klabbers, "Straddling Law and Politics: Judicial Review in International Law", in: Ronald St.J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, forthcoming).
15. A warm plea for judicial review is Charles L. Black, The People and the Court: Judicial Review In a Democracy (New York, MacMillan, 1960).
16. A serious recent critique focusing on the politics behind establishing a system of judicial review is Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2004).
17. See Deborah Z. Cass, "The ?Constitutionalization? of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade", European Jl of International Law (2001), pp. 39-75.
18. On the modest ambitions of the WTO, see e.g. Rambod Behboodi, "Legal Reasoning and the Law of International Trade: The First Steps of the Appellate Body of the WTO", Jl of World Trade (1998/4), pp. 55-99;
19. Armin von Bogdandy, "Law and Politics in the WTO-Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship", Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2001), pp. 609-674.
20. See Richard H. Steinberg, "Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Consti tutional, and Political Constraints", AJIL (2004), pp. 247-275.
21. See, e.g., Sigrun Skogly, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (London, Cavendish, 2001);
22. Koen de Feyter, The International Financial Institutions and Human Rights-Law and Practice (discussion paper, Institute of Development and Policy Management, University of Antwerp, 2002);
23. Genoveva Hernández Uriz, "To Lend or Not To lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank?s Internal Contradic tions", Harvard Human Rights Jl (2001), 197-231
24. Dana L. Clark, "The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability", Harvard Human Rights Jl (2002), pp. 207-226.
25. See, e.g., Ellen Hey, "The World Bank Inspection Panel: Towards the Recognition of a New Legally Relevant Relationship to International Law", Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium (1997), pp. 61-74;
26. Daniel Bradlow & Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, "The World Bank?s New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the International Legal Order", Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1994), pp. 392-415.
27. While the Commission was, in 1988, not yet convinced that immunities raised an issue (see Spaans v. the Netherlands, 107 ILR 1)A1.For the Court, a material factor in determining whether granting immunities is possible under the Convention is whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention.
28. See Waite & Kennedy v. Germany [1999/I] Reports of Judgments and Decisions 393, paras. 67-68.
29. See Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No. 1, at 〈www.ombudsper-sonkosovo.org (visited 7 October 2004). I am indebted to Niels Blokker for bringing this report to my attention.
30. See Eric Stein, "Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution", AJIL (1981), pp. 1-27.
31. See Karel Wellens, Remedies Against International Organisations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
32. See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of Its Acts (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1994);
33. Erika de Wet, "Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the International Court of Justice", Netherlands International Law Review (2000), pp. 181-210
34. James Crawford, "Marbury v. Madison at the International Level", George Washington In ternational Law Review (2004), pp. 505-514.
35. See also Geoffrey Watson, "Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court", Harvard International Law Jl (1993), pp. 1-45.
36. Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja has, at the time of writing, delivered two reports. See Giorgio Gaja, "First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations", UN Doc. A/CN.4/532, 26 March 2003;
37. Giorgio Gaja, "Second Report on Responsibility of International Organizations", UN Doc. A/CN.4/541, 2 April 2004.
38. See the reports by rapporteur Rosalyn Higgins in 66 Annuaire de L?Institut de Droit International (1995/I) and (1996/II).
39. Its third report comes with a set of recommended rules and practices and is included in International Law Association, Report of the Seventieth Conference: New Delhi (London, 2002), pp. 772-815.
40. See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, So, Why does Europe Need a Constitution? (undated paper, European University Institute, on file with the author); Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London, Penguin, 2000).
41. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999).
42. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (London, Penguin, 2002).
43. See Naomi Klein, Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization Debate (London, Flamingo, 2002).
44. See Anthony Giddens & Will Hutton, "Fighting Back", in: Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens (eds.), On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism (London, Vintage, 2001), pp. 213-223, esp. at 217-218.
45. See generally Ige F. Dekker & Ramses A. Wessel, "De constitutionalisering van internationale organisaties: Over bevoegdheden en democratische legitimiteit", Vrede en Veiligheid (2004), pp. 61-81.
46. For the identification and analysis of different paradoxes (more at micro-level, one is tempted to say), see Miguel Poiares Maduro, "Europe and the Constitution: What if This is as Good as it Gets?", in: J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 74-102.
47. Most clearly spelled out in article 5 TEC: "The Community shall act within the limits of powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein." For a brief discussion, see Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
48. Notably, the draft constitution (dated July 2003) of the EU would even strengthen this idea by conceptualizing the EU as an agency which merely coordinates member state activities (article 1). See EU Doc. CONV 850/03.
49. See Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of December 1st, 1926, advisory opinion, [1928] Publ. PCIJ, Series B, no. 16.
50. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, advisory opinion, [1949] ICJ Reports 174.
51. On the doctrine generally, see Christine Denys, Impliciete bevoegdheden in de Euro-pese Economische Gemeenschap: Een onderzoek naar de betekenis van ?implied powers? (Antwerp, MAKLU, 1990).
52. A useful contribution to the debate is Viljam Engström, "Implied Powers of International Organizations: On the Character of a Legal Doctrine", Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2003, forthcoming).
53. The leading formulation is probably Judge Hackworth?s opinion in Reparation for Injuries, supra, fn. 39.
54. Others have held that the implied powers doctrine has two elements, one which connects it to express powers, the other relating it to the purposes of the organization. Over time, the emphasis would have shifted from the first to the second element. For this argumentA1. see Michael M. Pachinger, Die Völkerrechtspersönlichkeit der Europäischen Union (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2002), pp. 23-24.A1. Elsewhere, though, he refers to the standard concep tualization of there being two forms (or versions) of the doctrine. See, e.g., ibid., at 76.
55. See Opinion 1/94 (WTO) [1994] ECR I-5267.
56. See Klabbers, supra, fn. 36, pp. 73-74.
57. See Michel Virally, "La notion de fonction dans la théorie de l?organisation internatio nale", in: Suzanne Bastid et al. (eds.), Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau: La communauté internationale (Paris, Pédone, 1974), pp. 277-300.
58. See Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 4th ed., 2003), pp. 10-15.
59. See Peter H.F. Bekker, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organizations: A Functional Necessity Analysis of Their Legal Status and Immunities (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994);
60. A.S. Muller, International Organizations and their Host States (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995)
61. Moshe Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organizations Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995)
62. Hirsch?s work, while carried out at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, was co-supervised by Schermers.
63. See Bekker, supra, fn. 47, p. 5 (emphasis omitted).
64. The seminal critique is Michael Singer, "Jurisdictional Immunity of International Or ganizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns", Virginia Jl of International Law (1995), pp. 53-165.
65. As is also recognized in public law theory generally. See, e.g., Allan, supra, fn. 11, pp. 207-209.
66. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), advisory opinion, [1962] ICJ Reports 151.
67. In the wonderfully pithy formulation of historian Gary Wills: "unconstitutional things become constitutional if they are accepted as such". See Gary Wills, James Madison (New York, Times, 2002), p. 76 (question-mark omitted).
68. A rare example from the ECJ?s practice, brought by an outvoted member state, is Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament and Council (Tobacco directive), Decision of 5 October 2000.
69. See in particular the opinion of Judge Morelli in Certain Expenses, supra, fn. 52.
70. For a fine general discussion, see José Alvarez, "Legal Remedies and the United Nations à la Carte Problem", Michigan Jl of International Law (1991), pp. 229-311.
71. See J.H.H. Weiler, "Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization: The Case of the European Economic Community", Israel Law Review (1985), pp. 282-298.
72. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 4.
73. See Martti Koskenniemi, "The Police in the Temple. Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View", EJIL (1995), pp. 325-348.
74. See Matthias J. Herdegen, "The ?Constitutionalization? of the UN Security System", Vanderbilt Jl of Transnational Law (1994), pp. 135, 154.
75. See W. Michael Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations", AJIL (1993), pp. 83-100.
76. See Case No. 9/56, Meroni and others v. High Authority [1957/58] ECR 133.
77. See generally Klabbers, supra, fn. 36. As Blokker points out, control may also have to be exercised by the Security Council over UN members.
78. See Niels M. Blokker, "Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by ?Coalitions of the Able and Willing?", EJIL (2000), pp. 541-568.
79. Pachinger usefully discuss much of the discussion on the international legal personality of the EU in these terms: would the EU be acting in its own right, or rather as a collectivity of member states? See Pachinger, supra, fn. 42, p. 93.
80. And tellingly, the whole affair fizzled out, with the Council (Economics and Finance Ministers, meeting on 25 November 2003) adopting a few mild-mannered conclusions after sterner recommendations had proved unattainable, and the Commission expressing deep regrets at the way France and Germany had acted.
81. See Doc. 14492/1/03 REV 1 (en) Presse 320 15.
82. Various examples can be found in Fatoumata Jawara & Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade Negotiations (London, Zed, updated ed., 2004).
83. Thus, for example, the calls for an entity controlling international capital markets in Hutton and Giddens, supra, fn. 33.
84. An excellent analysis of the genesis of TRIPs is Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003).
85. Some of the remaining options for developing nations are sketched in Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options (London, Zed Books, 2000).
86. See generally Jan Klabbers, "The Changing Image of International Organizations", in: Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Organizations (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2001), pp. 221-255.
87. see Jan Klabbers, "International Law in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect", Yearbook of European Law (2002), pp. 263-298.
88. See Jan Klabbers & Päivi Leino, "Death by Constitution? The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe", German Law Jl (2003), pp. 1293-1305.
89. By cosmopolitanism I simply mean a sentiment that the international is generally prefer able over the local. For a far more sophisticated conceptualization, see David Kennedy, "The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy", Utah Law Review (1994), pp. 7, 13-14.
90. See Günter Frankenberg, "The Return of the Contract: Problems and Pitfalls of European Constitutionalism", European Law Jl (2000), pp. 257, 258.
91. This is not, of course, something uniquely to be associated with constitutionalism. See generally David Kennedy, "The Forgotten Politics of International Governance", European Human Rights Law Review (2001/2), pp. 117-125.
92. See Bart Tromp, Het einde van de politiek? (Schoonhoven, Dubio?Boeken, 1990).
93. See Elizabeth M. Meade, "The Commodification of Values", in: Larry May & Jerome Kohn (eds.), Hannah Arendt Twenty Years Later (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1996), pp. 107-126.
94. See Neil Walker, "Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union", in: Zenon Bankowski & Andrew Scott (eds.), The European Union and Its Order: The Legal Theory of European Integration (Oxford, Blackwell, 2000), pp. 31, 61.
95. For an incisive critique, see Martti Koskenniemi, "Legitimacy, Rights, and Ideology: Notes Towards a Critique of the New Moral Internationalism", Associations (2003), pp. 349-373.
96. See, e.g., Philip Allott, "Epilogue: Europe and the Dream of Reason", in: Weiler & Wind (eds.), supra, fn. 35, p. 217.
97. See J.H.H. Weiler & Joel Trachtman, "European Constitutionalism and its Discontents", Northwestern Jl of International Law and Business (1996-97), pp. 354, 356.
98. See generally Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1964).
99. For a brief overview, see Eleanor D. Kinney, "The Emerging Field of International Administrative Law: Its Content and Potential", 54 Administrative Law Review (2002), pp. 415-433.
100. See Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 142-164.
101. See Art. 2, TRIPS.
102. The example is derived from Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen: Kompatibilität durch Vernetzung statt Rechtseinheit (unpublished paper, 2004, on file with the author).
103. See generally also Gunther Teubner, "?Global Bukowina?: Legal Pluralism in the World Society", in: Gunther Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 3-28.
104. See Case No. C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and others [1996] ECR I-3953.
105. At the time of writing (August 2004), Bosphorous v. Ireland (application 45036/98) is pending before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights.
106. See also Koskenniemi & Leino, supra, fn. 1.
107. By way of example: it has been pointed out that all the wonderful talk, in the UK, about devolution and "bringing rights home" in the form of a Human Rights Act has done nothing to displace the Thatcherite economy.A1. See Alan Norrie, "Criminal Justice, Judicial Interpretation, Legal Right: On Being Sceptical about the Human Rights Act 1998", in: Tom Campbell, K.D. Ewing, and Adam Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 261-276.
108. In the same vein, Veitch advocates that alertness to "the ability of constitutionalism to lend legitimacy to the fixing of social and material relations in a specific manner". See Scott Veitch, "Legal Right and Political Amnesia", in: Nuotio (ed.), supra, fn. 13, p. 96.
109. See Neil Walker, "Flexibility Within a Metaconstitutional Frame: Reflections on the Future of Legal Authority in Europe", in: Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott (eds.), Consti tutional Change in the EU: Between Uniformity and Flexibility? (Oxford, Hart, 2000).
110. A brief argument along these lines is developed by Pavlos Eleftheriadis, "Aspects of European Constitutionalism", European Law Review (1996), pp. 32-42.
111. See also Pavlos Eleftheriadis, "Begging the Constitutional Question", Jl of Common Market Studies (1998), pp. 255-272.
112. See Brunner case, 33 ILM (1994), p. 388.
113. The most sophisticated answer to these sorts of questions is offered by Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Practical Reason (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).
114. Verzijl put it thus in 1945: the Big Five have appropriated for themselves a privilege that "does not feel pleasantly", but which was "probably inevitable".A1. See J.H.W. Verzijl, De nieuwe bond der Vereenigde Naties (Amsterdam, 1945), p. 126.
115. See Reisman, supra, fn. 62, p. 84.
116. The way Russia?s position as succeeding the USSR as a permanent member of the Security Council was sealed at a high-level meeting of the Security Council and in a document of ambiguous legal status may serve as a useful reminder.A1. The episode is help fully discussed in Nigel D. White, The Law of International Organisations (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 68.
117. Wheare captures the tension quite nicely when discussing the role of courts: "They may choose to treat a constitution as a living instrument, but they must treat it first of all as a constitution." See K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 237.
118. For an (explicitly de lege ferenda) argument to this effect, see Tetsuo Sato, Evolving Constitutions of International Organizations (The Hague, Kluwer, 1996).
119. This also informs Weiler?s fears with respect to a European constitution: a formal constitution may end up undoing the constitutional framework created predominantly by the Court of Justice.A1. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, "A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices", Jl of Common Market Studies (2002), pp. 563-580;
120. J.H.H. Weiler, "In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe?s Constitutional Sonderweg", in: Weiler & Wind (eds.), supra, fn. 35, pp. 7-23.
121. Less overtly political are the concerns voiced by Paul P. Craig, "Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union", European Law Jl (2001), pp. 125-150.
122. As a seasoned observer put it: "There is no doubt that most international organs take short cuts through their rules for purposes of convenience by general agreement." See Felice Morgenstern, "Legality in International Organizations", British Yearbook of International Law (1976-77), p. 252.
123. This is the gist of Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, "Human Rights, Development and International Financial Institutions", American University Jl of International Law and Policy (1992), p. 27-37. Shihata was the General Counsel of the World Bank for a long time.
124. Alternatively, it can circumvent or reinterpret its mandate, but both these methods also involve a loss of control.
125. Most outspokenly so, Jason Coppell & Aidan O?Neill, "The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?", Common Market Law Review (1992), pp. 669-692.
126. More subtly, De Búrca suggests that the proper exercise of EC powers may collide with the equally proper exercise of member state powers. See Gráinne de Búrca, "Fundamental Human Rights and the Reach of EC Law", Oxford Jl of Legal Studies (1993), pp. 283-319.
127. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art. 51.
128. See John O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, "The World Trade Constitution", Harvard Law Review (2000), pp. 511, 518, 566.
129. See Mark Tushnet, "Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory", 89 Yale Law Jl (1980) 1037-1062.
130. Think only about the criticism provoked by John Hart Ely?s Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980)
131. Some of the more vigorous commentaries include Paul Brest, "The Substance of Process", Ohio State Law Jl (1981), pp. 131-142
132. Laurence H. Tribe, "The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories", Yale Law Jl (1980), pp. 1063-1080.
133. The distinction between the two is one of degree rather than kind (or one of spirit, perhaps more accurately), and was not yet fully developed in Jan Klabbers, "The Bustani Case before the ILOAT: Constitutionalism in Disguise?", ICLQ (2004), pp. 455-464.
134. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958).
135. My reading of Arendt owes a lot to Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996).
136. Useful is also Philip Hansen, Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship (Cambridge, Polity, 1993).
137. See, e.g., Anthony d?Amato, "On Consensus", Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1970), pp. 104-122.
138. See Ulf Lindell, Modern Multilateral Negotiation: The Consensus Rule and its Implica tions in International Conferences (diss., University of Lund, 1988)
139. It is this latter version which seems to be gaining in popularity, embodied as it is in, for instance, the Agreement establishing the WTO: if consensus proves out of reach, the fallback position is not to resort to unanimity, but to resort to a form of qualified majority voting.
140. Diplomats such as Harold Nicolson have tended to be critical of Woodrow Wilson?s proposition that "open covenants" (itself to be welcomed) also be "openly arrived at", precisely because this openness of the negotiating process might inhibit the negotiators.A1. See Harold Nicolson The Evolution of Diplomacy (New York, Collier Books, 1962 (1954)), pp. 115-116
141. For a vigorous critique, see Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication {Fin de Siècle} (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1997).
142. Elsewhere, I have attempted to sketch some basic considerations relating to judicial review in international law. See Klabbers, supra, fn. 14.
143. In a similar vein, Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 270.
144. See also Rorden Wilkinson, "The Contours of Courtship: The WTO and Civil Society", in: Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes (eds.), Global Governance: Critical Perspectives (London, Routledge, 2002), pp. 193-211.
145. See Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York, Norton, 2003), p. 246.
146. See generally Martin Loughlin, Swords and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and Politics (Oxford, Hart, 2000).
147. This has been argued to even hold true of liberalism. See Michael Halberstam, Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999).
148. And note that, as Jennings put it, "the psychology of government is more important than the form of government". That too was a plea for adopting a certain "style" or "spirit" rather than carving anything into stone. See W. Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London, University of London Press, 3d ed., 1943), p. xxxi.
149. This is one of the standard critiques of neo-republican political thought. For a critical but sympathetic rendition in Dutch, see Ido de Haan, Zelfbestuur en staatsbeheer: Het politieke debat over burgerschap en rechtsstaat in de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1993).