On the virtues of privatization when government is benevolent

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 17-34

  Lülfesmann, Christoph ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Incomplete contracts; Innovative technologies; Privatization

Indexed keywords

EID: 34447520628     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.016     Document Type: Article

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