Can wrongful discharge law enhance employment?

Economic Journal

Volumn 117, Issue 521, 2007, Pages

  Macleod, W Bentley ^a,b   Nakavachara, Voraprapa ^a,b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT; INVESTMENT; LABOR POLICY; SKILLED LABOR;

EID: 34347401422     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02056.x     Document Type: Article

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