Active control, agent-causation and free action

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 131-148

  Haji, Ishtiyaque ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34347288493     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869790410001694480     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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4. CLARKE, RANDOLPH. 2003. Libertarian accounts of free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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13. HUNT, DAVID. 2003. Freedom, foreknowledge, and Frankfurt. In Freedom, responsibility, and agency: Essays on the importance of alternate possibilities, edited by Michael McKenna and David Widerker. London: Ashgate Press.
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