Executive compensation and non-financial risk: An empirical examination

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 436-462

  Campbell, Katherine ^a   Johnston, Derek ^b   Sefcik, Stephan E ^c   Soderstrom, Naomi S ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA   (United States)

^b Department of Environmental and Radiological Health Sciences   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

Environmental accounting; Executive compensation; Non financial risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250876416     PISSN: 02784254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2007.05.001     Document Type: Article

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