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Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 443-466

Underpricing in discriminatory and uniform-price treasury auctions

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EID: 34250855746     PISSN: 00221090     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109000003343     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (52)

References (40)
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