Democracy as an equilibrium

Public Choice

Volumn 123, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 253-273

  Przeworski, Adam ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23044502877     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-7163-4     Document Type: Review

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